

# RUSSIAN ARMY OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR (I)



ANGUS KONSTAM BILL YOUNGHUSBAND

EDITOR: LEE JOHNSON

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# RUSSIAN ARMY OF THE SYW(I)

## INTRODUCTION

In 1741, at the accession of the Empress Elizabeth Petrovna, Russia was fully integrated into contemporary western European politics, commerce and its power balance. The country was the newest addition to the ranks of mid-18th century European superpowers, and to western eyes possessed seemingly limitless natural resources, reserves of manpower and revenue. Russia's sphere of political and military influence within Europe extended over most of eastern and central Europe and the Baltic basin. Together with what was essentially her satellite state, the Kingdom of Poland, she bordered both the Austrian Empire and the increasingly powerful Kingdom of Brandenburg-Prussia. In diplomatic terms, an alliance between the Russian Empire and either of her two large neighbours would significantly alter the balance of power in central Europe. If this was combined with a further alliance with either France or Hanover (and therefore Britain) on Austria's and Prussia's western borders, then her participation in any future European war of alliance could have decisive results.

This position as a major European power was achieved through the reforms of Tsar Peter I 'the Great' (1682-1725), a despotic genius who dragged Russia kicking and screaming from her semi-feudal and introverted state into the 18th century. He pursued an aggressive, expansionist foreign policy which brought him into conflict with Sweden, the pre-eminent northern European power of the period. During the long and costly conflict known as the Great Northern War (1700-1721), Peter the Great and his newly formed Russian army, which was modelled on western European lines, defeated their Swedish counterparts, who were generally regarded as being the finest troops in Europe (See MAA 260 *Peter the*



*Tsar Peter I, the Great, (1682-1725), founder of the modern Russian army. At his death the Russian state was regarded as a major European military power, and took a lively interest in the political and military affairs throughout Central Europe and Asia. (Author's collection)*

*Great's Army (1)*, MAA 264 *Peter the Great's Army (2)* and Campaign 34 *Poltava 1709* for further information). The aim of this book is to examine the development, equipment and organisation of the Russian army following the death of Peter the Great, and to describe how it emerged from three decades of experimentation and political involvement as a major military power during the Seven Years War.

The Treaty of Nystadt (1721) between Russia and Sweden ended the war, and incorporated the Baltic states (Livonia, Estonia and Latvia), Eastern Finland and Ingria into the Russian Empire. While Peter's campaigns in the southern Ukraine against the Turkish Empire were largely unsuccessful, he managed to extend Russia's southern borders by



*Russian guard infantryman during the reign of Peter the Great. These uniforms would remain relatively unchanged throughout the 1730s, and this figure would have been representative of the Russian infantryman during Munnich's Turkish campaigns. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

incorporating Georgia, Daghestan and Azerbaijan at the expense of the Persian Empire. When Peter the Great died in 1725, the Russian state possessed a powerful military machine, including for the first time a large navy, which ensured her strategic control of the Baltic Sea.

This was not achieved without great cost, manifested in an oppressive poll tax and widespread conscription for life, both of which drained Russia's rural peasant economy. While the period from the death of Peter the Great until the accession of the Empress Elizabeth was one of significant internal political turmoil, most of Peter's

military achievements were retained, and even improved upon, largely through the consolidating work of the German-born military reformer, Marshal Munnich (1683-1764). The experimentation and 'Germanification' of the Russian army during this period were resented in court circles, and a backlash against them led to Munnich's fall from power. The subsequent policy adopted during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth included a 'Russification' of the army, together with major reforms to the artillery arm. Between 1725 and 1757 the army was tested in battle through campaigns in Finland and Germany, so that it embarked upon the war with Frederick the Great of Prussia as a professional modern army with plenty of combat experience.

During the Seven Years War (1757-63), the Russian Empire was allied with Austria, a coalition which also included (at various times) France, Sweden and numerous minor German states of the Holy Roman Empire. Initial and rather lethargic campaigns in East Prussia (a Prussian province separated from the rest of Frederick's kingdom by Poland) in 1757 and 1758



*Marshal Christoph Munnich, the German who oversaw the development of the Russian army from the death of Peter the Great until his fall from grace in 1741-42. Although many of his innovations were beneficial, they were seen by many as representative of an unwanted Germanification of the army and state. (Author's collection)*

consolidated Russian power east of the River Vistula. This cleared the way for operations in direct support of her Austrian ally. The campaign of late 1758 brought the Russian army to the banks of the River Oder, within the borders of Prussia. Extensive supply lines limited Russian involvement in the theatre, and also influenced subsequent Oder campaigns in 1759, 1760 and 1761. Despite these limitations, the Russian army proved a match for the Prussians and was a major contributing factor in forcing Frederick to sue for peace. The ability of the Russian army to defeat the troops of Frederick the Great made it a force worthy of its founder, Tsar Peter I.

## CHRONOLOGY

From the death of Peter the Great to the start of the Seven Years War.

(Note: A chronology covering the Seven Years War and its immediate aftermath will be published in Volume 2, which will detail the cavalry and artillery)

- 1725 Death of Peter the Great and accession of his wife the Empress Catherine
- 1726 Russia signs treaty of alliance with Austrian Empire
- 1727 Death of the Empress Catherine and accession of Tsar Peter II.  
Exile of Prince Menshikov (Peter the Great's favourite)
- 1728 Formation of Corps of Engineers
- 1729 Munnich becomes Master General of the Ordnance
- 1730 Death of Tsar Peter II and accession of the Empress Anna. Establishment of Ismailovski Guard Regiment and of the Military Commission
- 1731 Munnich becomes President of the Military Commission. Foundation of the Military Academy. Introduction of cuirassier regiments into the Russian army
- 1732 Munnich becomes President of the War College
- 1734 Caspian provinces returned to Persia
- 1735 Outbreak of war with Turkey (Russia allied with Austria)
- 1736 Military administration centralised under the War College. Limitation of military service decreed. Capture of Turkish fortresses of Perekop (Crimea) and Azov (River Don estuary)
- 1737 Successful defence of Azov. Lacy's Crimean campaign. Capture of Turkish city of Ochakov (River Bug estuary)
- 1738 Munnich's Ukrainian campaign; Ochakov razed and abandoned
- 1739 Munnich's Polish and Moldavian campaigns  
Austria makes peace with Turkey (Treaty of Belgrade)
- 1740 Russia makes peace with Turkey. Crimea abandoned. Frederick II ('the Great') succeeds to Prussian throne. Death of the Empress Anna. Outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748: France, Prussia and Spain *v* Austria, England and Holland). Maria Theresa becomes Empress of Austria
- 1741 Power struggle at court influenced by Guard Regiments. Frederick II defeats Austrians at battle of Mollwitz. Seizure of power by the Empress Elizabeth (25 November). Fall from power of Munnich and 'German' military faction. Outbreak of war between Russia and Sweden (1 December). Anna announces wish to make Finland an independent state
- 1742 Execution of Munnich and Ostermann halted by Imperial decree; Munnich exiled. Prussians defeat Austrians at battle of Chotusitz. Field Marshal Lacy invades Swedish-held Finland (24 June). Main Swedish field army surrenders at Helsingfors (Helsinki). Austria sues for peace with Prussia (July)
- 1743 Major Russian campaign clears Finland of Swedes. Swedes sue for peace at Treaty of Abo (6 August). Russian border advanced 60 miles into Finland
- 1744 Count Bestuzhev-Ryumin becomes chancellor and foreign minister. War declared between Prussia and Austria (2nd Silesian War). Prussians capture Prague (September) but forced to withdraw
- 1745 Austrians invade Prussian-held Silesia. Frederick defeats Austrians at battle of

# THE RUSSIAN ARMY 1725-1740

- Hohenfriedberg. Prussians invade Bohemia, defeating Austrians at Sohr. Austrian invasion of Silesia halted at battle of Hennersdorf. Frederick invades Saxony, beating Saxons at Kesseldorf. Bestuzhev makes Empress aware of growing Prussian threat. Austria sues for peace, with Prussia retaining Silesia
- 1746 Russia signs defensive alliance with Austrian Empire
- 1747 Russia allies with Austria, Holland and Britain against France. Prince Repnin leads 37,000 Russians into Central Europe
- 1748 Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ends War of Austrian Succession. Russian expeditionary corps returns home
- 1753 Empress Elizabeth resolves to reduce Prussian military power. Austrian alliance extended to include mutual military support
- 1755 Military Commission reorganises and expands Russian army. New army establishment, organisation and tactics approved. 120,000 strong Russian army stationed in Livonia and Ingria. Cavalry Reorganisation Committee formed
- 1756 Shuvalov becomes Master General of Ordnance. 'Artillery Bank' founded to ensure funding for military. Four combined Grenadier Regiments formed. Corps of Observation formed by Shuvalov. Reforms made to army administration, logistical train and cavalry
- Alliance formed between Prussia, Hanover and Britain. Russian army mobilised for impending war with Prussia. Alliance formed between Austria and France. Frederick the Great marches into Saxony (August). War declared between Prussia and Austria (allies of Saxony). Saxon army abandons Dresden, Austrian army invades Silesia. Prussians defeat Austrians at battle of Lobositz (October). Austrian army retreats from Prussian-held Silesia. Frederick consolidates his hold on Saxony, Saxons surrender. Sweden joins the anti-Prussian coalition
- 1757 Russia joined Franco-Austrian alliance (11 January). Russia and Austria agree on joint military plans (2 February). Russian army in Livonia prepares for spring offensive and Russia enters the Seven Years War.

On the death of Peter the Great in 1725, the Russian army consisted of two guard regiments, five grenadier regiments, 49 regiments of line infantry, 49 regiments of garrison infantry, 30 dragoon regiments, four garrison dragoon regiments and an extensive engineering and artillery train. With over 240,000 men in uniform, a number increased (at least in theory) in time of war by up to 100,000 Cossacks, Kalmucks and other irregular horsemen, the Russian army was by far the largest military force in Europe.

After the Great Northern War with Sweden in 1721, Peter sought to expand his southern borders by invading the region between the Caspian and Black seas. The Caspian Sea forces consisted of nine regiments, drawn by drafts from 18 line and two grenadier regiments of the main army. Fresh drafts of troops had to be dispatched at frequent intervals, and until the provinces were returned to Russia in 1734, this proved to be the single largest drain of military manpower of the 18th century. The British ambassador to the court of the Empress Anna reported: 'One can scarcely imagine the number of officers and soldiers that die in that hot country. A major in this service assured me that he and 26 other officers were sent there three years ago, and in two years they all died except himself' (Rondeau, 1730).

It has been estimated that between 1722 and 1734, over 130,000 Russian soldiers died of disease in these provinces, and the army recruiting system set up by Tsar Peter failed to keep up with the attrition. It was only after the 1734 withdrawal that the army was able to build up its numbers to those it attained on Peter's death. In some respects the Caspian provinces represented a similar drain on manpower and resources to those caused by the Russian invasion of Afghanistan 150 years later.

## The Guard regiments

This was the situation and the army inherited both by the Empress Catherine and, in 1727, by



*Musketeer and sergeant, line infantry regiment, c.1759. The sergeant carries a company pennon in place of a halberd (not in picture), while the musketeer is holding the standard Russian musket of the Seven Years War period, the copy of the Austrian model. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

Peter the Great's grandson, Peter II. One other military factor had a major influence on Peter the Great's successors. The guard regiments, Preobrazhenski and Semenovski, had been created by Tsar Peter I as the nucleus of his modernised army, and during the Great Northern War were used as a military fire brigade, being sent where their extensive combat experience was needed the most. During the latter years of Peter's reign they spent more time in the capital, St Petersburg, than on the battlefield, and their officers played a not inconsiderable part in court politics and intrigue. Even the ranks themselves participated in court life, as the majority of ordinary soldiers were young noblemen, rather than the usual peasants of the line regiments. When combined with the line infantry regiments St Peterbourgski, Narvski,

Ingermanlandski and First Moskovski, plus the dragoon regiments of Belozerski and Narvski, the Life Regiment of Cavalry, a mounted Drabant company and four militia regiments, there was a body of 30,000 troops in and around the capital; a force capable and frequently willing to intervene if they considered their interests were not represented in court. They fell under the command of Prince Menshikov, Peter I's favourite and commander of the army. Supported by the Empress Catherine, his almost supreme military and political power was of concern to Peter II and his close advisers within a few months of the young tsar's accession. In September 1727, Prince Menshikov was arrested on one of numerous charges that could have been laid against him, and



*Senior and junior regimental officers, c.1759. The junior (under) officer carries a shortened musket, an affectation introduced into the army following its campaigns against the Turks in the 1730s. The senior officer, whose uniform was not laid down in any regulations, is depicted wearing a plain tricorne and a uniform with the minimum of embellishment. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*





*Operations around Kutztrin, on the Oder River, 1758, showing the deployment of the Russian army into a fortified position. Note that it is still adopting the huge moving column formation which was perfected during the 1730s in the war against the Turks. The army baggage train is fortified in a separate hilltop position at some distance from the main army. (Collection of Dave Ryan, Partizan Press)*

stripped of power and exiled. As further insurance against a possible military coup, Peter II moved his court to Moscow shortly before he died in 1730.

Following a period of wrangling within the court, Peter the Great's niece Anna, Duchess of Courland, was named as the new Empress, but with significant limitations to her power. By winning the support of the Preobrazhenski guard regiment she staged a court coup against the nobles who tried to control her, and regained the traditional imperial powers. As a reward to the guardsmen she conferred hereditary nobility on all soldiers of the Preobrazhenski grenadier company, thereby ensuring the continued support of the army. To further safeguard her position she raised a third guard regiment, Ismailovski, which was officered largely by Germans she could trust.

### 'Germanification'

This was the start of a 'Germanification' of the army which would continue until Anna's death in 1741. St Petersburg was reinstated as the capital and the new Empress surrounded herself with German advisers, principally Count Ostermann, a Westphalian who was in charge of foreign affairs.

Foreigners dominated the senior positions in the Russian army. A Scotsman, Lieutenant-General James Keith, commanded the principal field army, and Prince Ludwig of Hessen-Homburg became the Master General of the Ordnance.

The overall control of the army in the name of the sovereign lay with the War College, the president of which was virtually the commander of the armed forces. The Empress appointed another German to this post, Field Marshal Burchard Christoph von Munnich.

Born into a military family in Oldenberg, Munnich fought in the War of the Spanish Succession under Prince Eugene of Savoy before entering the service first of Augustus II of Poland, and then, in 1721, that of Peter the Great. Between 1725 and 1730 he held the posts of Director of Fortifications and Master General of the Ordnance before accepting the presidency of the War College. 'Robust and active by temperament, he seemed to be a born general', wrote one German historian.

During his decade in control of the army, he pursued a policy of military reform, the first since Peter the Great's death. Between 1735 and 1739 he

*As the Prussian army is shown approaching the Russian positions at Zorndorf, it is shown moving into a position between the two elements of the Russian army. Ignoring the well-positioned but vulnerable supply and siege train park, the Prussians advanced on the main Russian army, seen occupying low ground with its back to a marshy stream. (Collection of Dave Ryan, Partizan Press)*



led his newly-reorganised army on a series of campaigns against the Turks, thereby testing the mettle both of his troops and his reform programme.


In 1731 he took over the Presidency of the Military Commission, a body set up by the Empress to reform the army. From 1736 the Commission became responsible for military administration, operating according to Munnich's principles. His administrative and legislative reforms were widespread and had an influence far beyond pure military affairs. One of the legacies of the Petrine system was a two-tiered pay structure for officers, with a higher rate for foreign officers. While this served Peter's purpose to attract foreign military expertise to Russia, it now appeared divisive. Munnich instituted a new pay structure based on the average of the two rates, while effectively raising pay levels for the rank and file by removing deductions made for clothing and equipment. Entry into the Russian army by foreigners was henceforward to be strictly regulated.

When Munnich became president of the war college, army service was seen as a life sentence for the rank and file. He limited military service to a maximum of 25 years, while at the same time

improving pay and conditions. For officers, training for young officers was provided by the Noble Land Cadet Corps, and new regulations regarding service for noblemen moved away from the Petrine notion that social rank was strongly linked to serving the state (in most cases this meant obligatory military service).

Munnich's other reforms directly affected army equipment, uniforms, composition and doctrine. The baggy and comfortable uniforms worn by Peter the Great's army were replaced by those which reflected European fashion of the time, and Prussian fashion at that. The soldier's coat was cut more tightly, as were breeches. The long hair favoured in the Petrine army was replaced by an ordinance decreeing that hair would be plaited and powdered in 'the German style'. Tricornes, gaiters and grenadiers' mitres were also fashioned after the Prussian model. Attempts were made to standardise the firearms carried in the army, and a new musket pattern of 1734 was introduced, based on that carried by the Austrian army.

Peter the Great relied on two types of cavalry; dragoons and cossacks, a decision influenced by the particular requirements of service in the



The positions held during the Battle of Zorndorf, 25 August 1758. The inability of the Russian high command to position its army in an advantageous position prompted the Prussians to launch a frontal assault. Only the doggedness of the Russian infantrymen and gunners prevented the Prussians from destroying the army. The engagement ended in an inconclusive and costly draw. (Collection of Dave Ryan, Partizan Press)

wooded and broken terrain which predominated in the main theatre of operations of the Great Northern War. As these dragoon regiments were considered unable to stand up against the heavy cavalry of the Prussian army, Munnich converted four regiments of dragoons into cuirassiers, despite problems of finding suitably powerful horses to mount them. Similar alterations were made to Russia's light cavalry, with Hussar companies and trained bodies of Cossacks added to the army establishment.

### Campaigns against the Turks

Apart from a brief campaign in Poland which reconfirmed the satellite status of that country following French intervention, Munnich was given the opportunity to test the mettle of his army against the Turks. He saw the conflict as a chance to 'give the troops opportunity to exercise in arms' (Mediger, 1952), and produced a four-phased plan of operations on a grand scale, to be conducted over four years. An attack on the Crimean peninsula was to be supported by ancillary attacks on the flanking Turkish fortresses at Azov and Ochakov. When this was completed a war of liberation in Moldavia would free the Orthodox Christians in that region from Turkish oppression. Many aspects of this campaign are of interest for the influence they played on Russian operational and logistical thinking during the Seven Years War.

In 1736, on the eve of the campaign, General

Fermor published *Disposition for military arrangements and movements for a general battle against the Turks*, a manual that emphasised many of Munnich's doctrines; 'The attack imbues the soldier with courage, and establishes respect for the attacker in the minds of the enemy' (Baiov, 1906).

The campaigns bear many resemblances to those conducted by colonial armies against less well equipped native forces in the 19th century. The army frequently moved in a large square, with the baggage train and train of artillery protected in its centre. As insufficient numbers of cossacks joined Munnich to ensure adequate scouting and screening, the enemy superiority in light cavalry was partly nullified by resorting to the Petrine expedient of arming a portion of each battalion with pikes, which were carried in wagons accompanying the army. Further protection from cavalry was providing sharpened stakes to the troops which could be emplaced when they were threatened. Supply was of primary importance in the inhospitable landscape of the Ukrainian steppe, so where possible river lines were followed. A series of fortified depots were established at landing places on the Dniepr, Bug and Don rivers, but at some point the army had to be prepared for cross-country marches. Munnich provided a baggage train of over 30,000 wagons to accompany the army, which greatly slowed the pace of its advance, but ensured its logistical self-sufficiency from lines of supply and


communication. This logistical trend was repeated during Russian campaigns in the Seven Years War, and did much to provide the Russians with a reputation for ponderous movement.

The 1736 campaign saw the Russians capture Perekop, the fortress guarding the Crimean isthmus, and the fortress city of Azov at the effluence of the River Don. In 1737 the Crimea was subdued and Ochakov captured, Munnich's final primary objective. In the following year, disease and Turkish scorched earth tactics forced the abandonment of a drive on Moldavia, and forced the razing and abandonment of Ochakov. A more successful campaigning season in 1739 saw Munnich's army drive through northern Moldavia when a peace accord between Austria (who had been allied with Russia) and the Turks brought an end to operations. In a peace treaty signed in 1740, much of Munnich's gains were returned to Turkey, although the Russians retained Azov. A British observer reported on the campaign that, 'Though the Russians did not lose many men in battle, yet it cannot be denied, that they lost great numbers by fatigue, want of water, travelling through these scorched deserts, and by plague' (*Cook, 1770*).

The Empress Anna died in 1740, and with the assistance of the Preobrazhenski regiment Princess Elizabeth, the daughter of Peter the Great, seized power. Acting in support of a popular backlash against Anna's German advisers, the new Empress had Munnich and other leading courtiers arrested, tried and exiled. Despite this lack of appreciation, the Empress Elizabeth would find much to be grateful for in the reforms of Marshal Munnich as her country faced Prussia in the years ahead.

### The Empress Elizabeth's army

The army inherited by the new Empress was one which had undergone a distinctive 'Germanification', and although many of these changes had been beneficial, particularly the reforms undertaken by Munnich, this process was rapidly reversed. The Empress ordered that the army be organised 'in every respect according to the earlier code which was in force during the lifetime of His Imperial Highness, Peter the Great'. A backlash against foreigners in the army which began at this time was to continue until the middle



*Russian guard company on parade in St. Petersburg, c. 1750. Approximately 60 men are shown marching five abreast, with drums and colours stationed to the rear of the unit. From a contemporary engraving. (Author's collection)*

of the war with Prussia. Administrative changes included the devolvement of power from the war college to separate ministries controlled by the Russian Senate, and the administration of the army which had been modelled on extremely efficient Prussian lines began to suffer.

A brief campaign against Sweden in 1741-43 gave some scope for the new administration to test its effectiveness. In September 1741, the Irish Field Marshal Lacy invaded Swedish-held Finland and conducted a successful campaign of harassment. In the following year he led a joint military and naval force along the Finnish coast, captured the main Swedish army at Helsingfors (Helsinki) and forced Sweden to sue for peace. A second and more significant campaign in 1748 saw a 37,000 strong force enter Austria as the Russian contingent of a joint Russo-Austrian alliance, but peace was declared before they could engage the Prussians. This allowed Russian staff officers to examine both the Austrian army and their own shortcomings, and to remedy the situation before undertaking any further campaign against Prussia.

By the early 1750s it was clear that Prussia posed the most significant threat to Russian political interests in Europe, and would almost certainly be an adversary in a future war. While an alliance of mutual assistance was signed with



*Depiction of the cape, coat and vest worn by Russian guardsmen from 1712 until 1735. Also depicted are the guard grenadier mitre and guardsman's tricorne of the same period. (Drawing by S. Petyuna, Orel Magazine 1992)*

Austria, the War College commissioned a Military Commission to examine the establishment, organisation and tactical doctrines of the army. In 1756 this remit was extended to include an examination and reorganisation of the logistical tail of the Russian army. Significant organisational changes were undertaken in 1756, particularly to the cavalry arm, with the effect that Russia entered the Seven Years War with her army in a state of some flux.

## THE SEVEN YEARS WAR

On the eve of the Seven Years War the Russian army, at least in theory, comprised over 400,000

men. This was broken down as follows: 20,000 guardsmen, 15,000 grenadiers; 145,000 fusiliers; 43,000 cavalrymen (including hussars); 13,000 artillerymen and engineers; 75,000 garrison troops; 27,000 Ukrainian Land Militia; 110,000 Cossacks and Kalmuks.

With the guard, garrison troops, and militia stationed in Russia during any campaigning in central Europe, and only part of the 110,000 Cossacks and Kalmuks available for service at any one time, actual troop numbers were somewhat reduced. In addition, many of the fusiliers were unavailable for service in the main field army as a force was needed to safeguard the Swedish and Turkish borders.

Of the remaining available troops, the totals for cavalry and fusiliers included a force set up in Livonia and referred to as the 'Corps of Observation'. This was virtually an army within an army, answerable directly to Petr Shuvalov, the Master General of the Ordnance, rather than directly to the War College. Although it was designed to act in support of any main field army operating in central Europe, it functioned more as a strategic reserve, and was therefore only available to the Russian field commander if sanctioned by the Empress.

In May 1757, when Field Marshal Stephan Fedorovitch Apraxin (1702-58) led the field army into East Prussia from its garrisons in Livonia, he had 72,000 fusiliers and grenadiers, 7,000 cavalrymen, and 16,000 Cossacks under his command, supported by an artillery train. Despite being surprised and nearly defeated by a small Prussian army at Gross-Jagersdorf (30 August 1757), the army acquitted itself well during this, its first serious campaign since the Great Northern War. A Saxon officer attached to the Russian army remarked: 'In the battle of Gross-Jagersdorf the Russians had neither time nor opportunity to form a square, and yet they did extremely well. It is very certain, that if these people, who are brave in the extreme, had better regulations respecting their baggage, provisions, etcetera, and were equal to the Prussians in manoeuvring, which may possibly be the case some time or other, it would be very difficult for any army to withstand them.'

East Prussia was cleared of Prussian troops in 1758, and the army marched towards the River Oder, where it could directly influence the war. During this campaign, which led to the bloody but indecisive battle of Zorndorf (25 August 1758), one of the most serious flaws in the Russian army was exposed. Russian experience of warfare against the Turks led to the existence of a logistical tail, baggage wagons and supply depots that would all but paralyse movement of the army.

The Military Commission stated that logistics were the principal factor in the war with Prussia, and this insistence on matters of supply dominated the Russian war effort. Field Marshal Fermor found that the cumbersome system was only improved when he ordered that the army War Commissar move his department to the headquarters in the field rather than attempt to control logistics from St Petersburg. Despite this, problems continued. While many 18th-century armies harried the countryside through which they travelled, the Russians chose not to offend the Poles or the Germans in occupied East Prussia and paid for all their provisions, such as food for men and horses, in the field. Military supplies had to be shipped from Russia by sea, river and road. Military bureaucrats and extensive political, diplomatic and religious non-combatants further increased the size of the army's logistical tail. When on the march, the Turkish experience led to vast supply trains accompanying the army, requiring manpower to guard them, with over 300 wagons attached to each regiment, not counting those often extensive baggage trains which carried officers' belongings and supplies. Each *artel*, or section of around ten men, had their own wagon, and detailed off one man to look after it. The Russian army on the march through central Europe was very similar to the army which had campaigned in the southern Ukraine. The need to protect the supply wagons also influenced the army dispositions on the march; as a result of its occidental experience it moved in large columns, resembling the squares of Munnich's campaigns.

Experience gained in the first two years of the war helped to alter Russian military thinking, as commanders gained more experience of campaigning in Europe. Despite attempts by field

commanders to group individual regiments together into permanent brigades and divisions, this policy was rejected, mainly because in Peter the Great's reign this had only been done on an *ad hoc* basis, and the Empress wanted to emphasise a return to the military structures of her grandfather's day. Shuvalov's Observation Corps was seen as an anomaly, and integrated into the main field army, which reduced potential conflicts of command on the battlefield. The strict control of



*Grenadier, line grenadier regiment, c.1756-62. Although part of a combined grenadier regiment, his mitre bears the crest of his home regiment, in this case the Ingermanlandski Regiment. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*



*Captain, grenadier regiment, c.1756-63. As with the previous plate, his regimental crest indicates his parent formation, the Vladimirski Regiment. The officer sports the moustaches which were compulsory for all grenadiers in the Russian army.  
(Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

the field army by the Russian senate (and ostensibly the Empress) was also relaxed somewhat, allowing commanders greater operational latitude. In effect, St Petersburg still pointed the army in the direction it wanted it to go, but the army commanders chose how to get there.

### Army reforms

In 1759, a series of organisational changes were made, the principal alteration being the detachment of the third battalion of each regiment as a supply battalion, to co-ordinate the flow of replacements to its parent regiment. Strict edicts from the War College did much to reduce the size of the army's baggage train, thereby speeding up offensive operations, and greater co-operation with

the Poles and the Austrians; more efficient use of waterways further improved the supply of the army in the field. This was enhanced by a tougher policy towards occupied East Prussia, forcing the province to furnish the army with much of its needs, and therefore shortening the long supply lines stretching back to Russia.

Operational changes began to be felt after 1759. The army abandoned moving in a large mass, and was divided into smaller, faster-moving and more manageable columns on the march. While in its early campaigns there was a shortage of suitable artillery, greater numbers of guns reached the army in the field, and these were divided in support of the various *ad hoc* divisions. Much of the manpower for this improved artillery presence was supplied by the Corps of Observation, with 14,000 men being reassigned as gunners in 1759. The artillery itself was able to move faster once the ponderous trains of artillery were divided up among the various columns of the army, and its large reserves of ammunition were consigned to be moved well to the rear of the army itself.

One major criticism of the Russian army during at least the early years of the Seven Years War was in its use of Cossacks. While the Austrian army used its light cavalry as an effective screen, as well as for reconnaissance, the lack of discipline and control over the Cossacks and Kalmuks greatly reduced their efficiency. Prussian propaganda made much of their indiscipline, and their terrifying effect on the German and Polish populace only fuelled their reputation. Lack of understanding between Cossack commanders and regular army officers meant that their use as an effective military force was extremely limited. Indeed, their tendency to destroy German villages served mainly to increase the supply problems of their own army. During the campaigns of 1760 and 1761, the Russian command managed to organise the Cossacks into large divisional-sized formations capable of providing a cavalry screen through sheer weight of numbers.

In 1760, Field Marshal Saltykov succeeded in attaching light artillery units and regular cavalry officers to these large Cossack formations, significantly increasing their military usefulness; during the raid on Berlin in 1760 the army was able to

retain some degree of control over its irregular cavalry.

As experience within the army grew, so did its belief in its own abilities, a phenomenon also encountered in Peter the Great's reign. During the defensive battle of Paltzig (also known as Zulichau) in July 1759, the Russian army inflicted a clear-cut victory over the Prussians: 'Nowhere was there the slightest disorder on either side during the whole continuance of the combat, and so the victory may be attributed above all to the superiority of our force, to the advantage of a well-chosen position, and to the good effect of our unicorns and Shuvalov howitzers.'

This confidence stood the army in good stead when it met Frederick the Great at the battle of Kunersdorf (12 August 1759). In partnership with elements of the Austrian army in one of the true allied efforts of the war, the Russian army fought a gruelling and costly engagement which routed the Prussians from the field. The Empress Elizabeth had every reason to be proud of her troops, and in a letter to Frederick she boasted that he could not defeat the Russian army.

The ability to defeat the Prussians in battle was insufficient to force the Prussians to sue for peace, and as in every campaign of the war the Russians were forced to withdraw into winter quarters in East Prussia, thereby relieving the pressure on the Prussian homeland. The death of the Empress in December 1761 led to the end of Russia's direct involvement in the war, and the loss of any chance to exact any significant gains from the conflict.

Her successor to the throne, Peter III, was an ardent admirer of Frederick, but his attempts to switch sides were too much for the army to bear. The guards regiments stationed around St Petersburg supported Peter's wife in a coup, and in July 1762 he was swept from power. The new Empress, Catherine II ('the Great'), brought an end to the war with Prussia, and in February 1763 the Treaty of Hubertusburg was signed, and ended seven years of conflict throughout Europe.

During the period from 1757 to 1761 the power and skill of the Russian army was ably demonstrated and its reputation transformed. 'In this bloody war the Russian army won great glory, advancing considerably in the estimation of all



*The Empress Elizabeth Petrovna (1741-61), whose strong dislike of Frederick of Prussia and any attempt to Germanify the Russian army greatly influenced both Russian relations with Prussia and the nature of her army. The grand-daughter of Peter the Great, she chose to follow his example rather than that of any foreign adviser. (Author's collection)*

peoples,' wrote one Russian historian in 1818. By consistently defeating the greatest military power of its time it showed itself to be the main arbiter of any future conflict in Europe. That next conflict would be against the Emperor Napoleon.

## INFANTRY ORGANISATION

In 1725 the line infantry regiments of the army were divided into two (and in some cases three) battalions, each with four companies of 141 men each, including officers. In addition 54 *denchikii*, or batmen, accompanied each company as non-combatants. The exceptions to the two-battalion rule were the Moskovski, Kievski, Narvski and Ingermanlandski regiments, each of which had three battalions. Each regiment was accompanied by two 3-pdr. light guns. One of the first reforms of Marshal Munnich was to increase the regimental





*The Princess Catherine and the Grand Prince Peter, both resident in St Petersburg during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth and her successors following her death in 1762. Peter's attempts to introduce a 'model' regiment of German infantry into the regular Russian army is not covered in this work as they were never considered anything other than an amusement, serving no military purpose. (Author's collection)*

compliment of light artillery from two to four 3-pdr. pieces. In 1731, prior to the Turkish campaigns, the five grenadier regiments were disbanded, the more deserving soldiers of the line companies converted to grenadiers, and two grenadier companies attached to each of the line regiments. The complement of these companies remained at the Petrine level of 200 men per company.

Following the accession of the Empress Elizabeth and the fall from power of Munnich, the organisation of the infantry regiments were reviewed. Experience during the war with the Swedes led the War College to approve the estab-

lishment of a third battalion to be attached to each line regiment, thereby increasing the establishment of the regular army from 170,000 to over 270,000 men. This organisation remained in place until after the outbreak of the Seven Years War, giving a battalion strength of 1,728 musketeers organised into three battalions of four companies apiece. Each company was broken down into four platoons, each of two *artels*, or squads. The *artel* remained the basic messing unit of the Russian army. It must also be remembered that these numbers refer to 'paper strengths'; losses from desertion, foraging parties, and armed escorts, not to mention disease and action, meant that the true strengths were often lower. Companies in infantry regiments were numbered from one to 12, with the grenadier companies numbered one and two.



*Officer of the Leib Company, the élite section of the Russian Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment formed by the Empress Elizabeth. All officers and men swore allegiance to the Empress herself and acted more as an inner palace guard than as a military formation. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

When Apraxin launched his invasion of East Prussia in 1757, the shortage of combatant manpower in his army forced him to detach the third battalion of each regiment. From this point on throughout the war it would act as a supply battalion, organising replacements and sending batches of troops to the front to bolster the strength of its parent regiment. This temporary measure was ratified by decree of the War College in November 1757, and what was in effect a two-battalion organisation became a permanent organisational structure for the army.

While each regiment officially contained two grenadier companies, from 1731 one of these two companies was frequently detached to form *ad hoc* composite grenadier battalions. In 1756 these companies were grouped into permanent grenadier regiments, numbered 1st to 4th. Each regiment contained two battalions of five companies, although these were reduced to four companies each in 1757, the remaining two companies forming the depot or supply battalion for the regiment. Companies were numbered from one to ten.

The artillery complement of the infantry regiment remained at four 3-pdr. light guns from 1725 until after the adoption of the Artillery Establishment in January 1757, which introduced the Shuvalov secret howitzer to the army. It met a mixed reception after use in the field at Zorndorf (1758), but nevertheless, two howitzers replaced two of the 3-pdrs. attached to each regiment. In addition, eight small Coehorn mortars (6-pdrs.) were, at least in theory, attached to each regimental artillery battery. Although these were supposed to have been mounted in pairs on the carriages of regimental field pieces, there is no record of them being used in action after 1759, so it may be supposed that these were abandoned by the gunners. The artillery section attached to each regiment numbered one NCO and 30 gunners and *matrosses* (gunners' assistants), giving a crew of six to seven men per gun.

In the Corps of Observation stationed in Livonia, regiments were split into four battalions, each of three musketeer companies and a grenadier company. It is evident that one of these battalions remained in Livonia when the Corps of Observation was called to the front. When the



*Officer of the Cadet Corps c.1732-41. This body was formed to train the future officers of the Russian army, and was responsible for producing some of the country's finest commanders of the Seven Years War. Details of the Corps uniforms are unclear, but they appear to resemble those of the Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

Corps was amalgamated with the regular army in 1759, all but one of the grenadier companies were converted into musketeer companies, and one of the battalions in each regiment converted into gunners. They therefore adopted the same organisation as the standard line infantry regiments.

The three guard regiments introduced by Peter the Great were the exception to normal army organisation. The Preobrazhenski Regiment



*Senior infantry officer, 1756-68. His red-fronted army coat is unadorned, as appears common with a number of Russian senior officers on campaign. Note that he wears the Order of Alexander Nevsky, a military decoration introduced in the early 18th century. (Russian Historic Museum, Moscow)*

boasted four battalions each of four companies (210 men each), in addition to a bombardier company (107 men), and a grenadier company (200 men). The Semenovski and Ismailovski guard regiments retained a similar organisation, but contained only three battalions each. In both cases the bombardier company was replaced by an artillery company. The artillery complement of the guard regiments remained at eight 3-pdrs. (12 for the Preobrazhenski Regiment) throughout the war. In addition, a Lieb Company carried out ceremonial duties in St Petersburg as the escort of the Empress. The total guard strength around St

Petersburg therefore exceeded 7,000 men, a powerful force in the event of a struggle for power, such as that which resulted in the accession to the throne of the Empress Catherine II.

It has already been noted that no permanent organisation in the army existed above the regimental level. Regiments were grouped into brigades and divisions at the whim of the army commander. On occasion flying columns, *Korzolans*, were formed: combined armed forces which were designed to move quickly, a relative term in the Russian army of its day. The normal regimental baggage train of at least 160 two-horse wagons slowed movement down considerably in all regular formations.

### The officer corps

Two major influences shaped the character of the Russian officer corps from the death of Peter the Great until the accession of Catherine the Great. The first was the Petrine doctrine of service drawn up for the nobility, and the second was the influence of foreign officers serving in the army.

In 1722 Tsar Peter I drew up a Table of Ranks which equated military, naval and civilian ranks with a set level of pay and degree of noble status, regardless of background. This system continued until 1917 with only minor modifications. All noblemen (including army officers) were required to serve the state for 25 years. This system was designed to imbue professionalism and duty into the officer class, although this was not always successful. It also led to the appointment of inexperienced army officers, sometimes moved from a diplomatic career. After the war a Russian nobleman admitted to Frederick the Great that he was a civilian general. 'We don't have anybody like that here,' replied Frederick.

Foreign-born officers formed a substantial part of the officer corps of the Petrine army: over a third of the total number, most of whom were ranked as colonels or higher. Good foreign commanders such as Generals Lacy and Keith were a great boon to the mid-18th-century Russian army because, according to a contemporary, 'the soldiers repose more confidence in them than in the officers of their own nation'.

On the other hand, Russia under Tsar Peter I



*General Fieldmarshal, 1761-68. He carries a gold baton embossed with the Imperial eagle and a victory rostral. His heavily decorated uniform would have been worn only on ceremonial occasions, despite the portrayal of the figure on active duty. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

provided a haven for the military adventurer regardless of his experience, and to some extent this continued until the reign of Catherine the Great. A number of inadvisable appointments made during the 'Germanised' period under Munnich led to resentment within the service and prompted a backlash against foreign officers during the reign of the Empress Elizabeth. Despite this anti-foreign and particularly anti-Germanic feeling, one historian has pointed out that during the siege of Colberg in 1758, all of the senior officers present were foreigners, either Germans or from the Baltic states (Duffy, 1981). Although foreigners were considered suitable for

middle-level commands, command of the main field army during the war with Prussia was always given to a Russian commander.

Young officers often entered military service in their early teens, and a decree of 1736 ordered that these youths became 'supernumerary soldiers' in an army regiment, so they could learn their profession from the bottom up. In practice this cadetship was rarely practised, and young officers remained soldiers in name only until their late teens or early twenties. An exception was cadetship in the guard regiments, where youngsters' attendance was seen as a social benefit, and the young officers received formal training in the military arts. A number of military academies were established by Peter the Great for training young officers, most notably the artillery schools and engineering academies. Cadets from these establishments were sent to their respective army branches and provided in part for the professional reputation enjoyed by the artillery and engineer branches of the service. In 1732 the Noble Land Cadet Corps was formed. Based in St Petersburg, the Corps provided a training for young army officers based on Prussian lines, and by the outbreak of the Seven Years War was seen as a 'fast stream', its highly trained graduates being regarded as the elite of the young officers in the army.

While many of the young noblemen in the army were educated and well-versed in western ways, as many others were regarded as ill-educated by Europeans who encountered them. One contemporary noted: 'There can exist... striking differences between individual officers of the same regiment. While you may observe a considerable degree of education, elegance and polish among certain groups, you can be surprised by the total absence of these qualities among others.'

### Other ranks

The Russian army throughout the 18th century was a force built upon the use of conscripts. In theory all classes were required to perform military service, and as described above, service for the nobility was considered obligatory. A pool of potential recruits was named drawn from an eligible male population of over 7,300,000 in 1760. An annual levy was selected from the pool by

district authorities (*voevodas*), the quota approaching 40,000 men a year during the Seven Years War (thereby involving over three per cent of the available manpower during the course of the war). The initial pool excluded most merchants, clergymen, skilled artisans and students, so the majority of recruits were peasants, with a small proportion of unskilled townsmen.

Service was for 25 years, although conscripts from the Baltic provinces, the Ukraine and Byelorussia only had to serve for 15. Losses from disease, war or fatigue meant that most of the conscripts would never survive to return home. Those chosen by the district authorities tended to be those who would be missed least: 'If amongst his peasants there is an incorrigible thief, then he will send him. In the absence of a thief he will dispatch an idler or a drunkard.' Once conscripted, the unlucky individual was shaved, chained and led off to the military depot. Of those conscripted, many would be detached to guard supply lines, act as

police, tax-collectors, or servants, and many would be lost through disease and desertion, leaving barely enough to furnish the needs of the wartime army. The 'supply battalion' system introduced during the Seven Years War greatly assisted the equipping, feeding and flow of conscripts on their way to their front line regiments.


Normal rations consisted of flour and water, which was used to bake bread or biscuit (*sukhare*). On occasion this was augmented by cabbage (used to make soup) and weak beer produced from rye bread (*kvass*). Each *artel* was issued rations for the group, and the unit messed together. Meat or fish had to be bought or plundered, a common practice despite draconian punishments for looting. Any officer could order a soldier to be beaten, and regimental colonels literally held the power of life and death over their men. Soldiers were regarded as being the possessions of their officer, and were even known to have been sent to the officers' estates to act as serf labour. Executions and savage beatings were common in any mid-18th-century army, but Russian military discipline was noted as being particularly strict.

One factor which allowed these soldiers to endure the hardships inflicted upon them was the docile and stoic nature which personified the Russian serf. This allowed Russian regiments on the battlefield to endure substantial losses without any apparent wavering of morale. 'Taken as individuals the Russians are gentle, even timorous. Massed in battalions they manifest a herd-like cohesion which makes them redoubtable, and at times unbeatable.' A Prussian officer at the battle of Zorndorf (1758) said of his Russian opponents that 'Even a shot through the body was often not sufficient to bring them to the ground. The Prussians were therefore left with no alternative but to hack down anyone who refused to give way.' Frederick the Great is also reputed to have commented that it was insufficient to kill the Russians; you also had to knock them down.

The Russian state could not complain about the quality of its soldiers. Poorly-trained officers and a lack of suitably educated non-commissioned officers meant that this admirable raw military material was not used to its best effect, a problem that would also occur in later Russian armies.



*Russian battle against the Turks, mid-18th century. Leadership in battle during the Seven Years War period was a matter more of personal example and guesswork than the calm direction shown in this contemporary engraving. Note that the commander wears a plain and unadorned uniform, unlike his staff. (Collection of Alexei Petrov)*



## UNIFORMS

Most material for army uniforms came from Russian sources, although a significant amount was supplied by Austria and Holland. Apart from clothing worn by officers and guardsmen, the materials used were coarse, and quality was often poor. Until 1731 the cost of clothing was deducted from the soldiers' pay. Basic dress codes were imposed on officers, but these were often modified by senior officers. The uniform coat (*kaftan*) was knee-length, cut in a similar style to that of the Prussian infantry. It was of a uniform dark green, with both the wide collar and turnback cuffs exposing a red inner lining. The coats of officers and NCOs carried two pockets secured by three copper buttons. Nine buttons ran down the front of all coats, with a further three buttons securing each cuff turnback. Two decorative buttons were found on the back of the coat, with hidden buttons securing the red-lined turnbacks. The Leib Company had green turnbacks and facings, with gold wire epaulettes and gold lace on the collar,

*The Battle of Kunersdorf, 12 August 1759. The Russian army adopted a defensive formation on high ground, and was faced with repeated Prussian assaults, particularly on their left (the Muhlberg hill), where the defenders withstood attacks to front, flank and rear simultaneously. The charge of Russian cavalry in front of Kunersdorf village (centre of the map) finally drove off the Prussian army, resulting in a hard-won Russian victory. (Collection of Dave Ryan, Partizan Press)*

cuffs and front edging of the coat. All buttonholes were reinforced by red stitching.

The coats of regimental musicians (fifers, drummers and oboists) were identical save the addition of 'swallows' nests' on the shoulders and lace on the collar, front, shoulders, and cuffs of a pattern chosen by the regimental commander.

A sleeved waistcoat (*kamzol*) was worn beneath the *kaftan*. It was of a similar design, but shorter, with no cuffs and a closer cut. Made of red cloth, it was secured by nine copper buttons running down the front. Two side pockets were each secured by three copper buttons. Leib Company waistcoats had a gold-laced front, bottom and pocket edging. Those of officers and guardsmen



*Petr Ivanovich Shuvalov (1710-62), whose reorganisation of the administration of the Russian army and the train of artillery greatly helped the army during the Seven Years War. He was also responsible for the establishment of the Corps of Observation. (Collection of Alexei Petrov)*

were also edged with gold lace. Red knee-length trousers (*pantaloni*) were secured by a buttoned front flap and two knee buttons on each leg. Leib Company trousers had gold laced side seams. White woollen stockings (*chulkii*) were covered in summer by white full-length gaiters, with slightly shorter black gaiters worn in winter. Both types were secured by nine copper buttons, covered with white canvas when on summer campaign. In distinction of service at Kunersdorf (1759) the Apcheronski Regiment were awarded the right to wear red gaiters, 'having stood knee-deep in blood'. Shoes were black leather, square cut, with high backs and brass buckles, usually covered by the gaiters, secured over them by a leather strap.


Black linen neckerchiefs or stocks were worn around the neck, largely obscuring the white linen collared shirt, which was tied by a drawstring. The shirt cuff was supposed to extend two finger widths below the coat cuff. Guardsmen and the Leib Company wore white neckerchiefs, and officers' shirt cuffs were often edged with lace. Officers also wore buff leather gloves, and some illustrations show that these were lace-edged.

Further indications of officer rank included the wearing of a gold-plated gorget and a sash (*sharf*). Those of junior officers (below the rank of major) were of black and yellow horizontal stripes with yellow tassels. Gold silk replaced yellow for senior officers. Sashes of Leib Company officers were all gold. It is probable that sashes were not worn by regimental officers when on campaign.

Headgear for all infantry except grenadiers was a tricorne hat (*treugolka*) made of coarse black felt. A two-finger width white wool border surrounded its upper edge. A white linen bow cockade was pinned in line with the left eye by a copper button. Guardsmen wore an earlier (pre-1756 pattern) tricorne, with two white tassels which were stitched to the inner bowl of the hat so that they extended beyond the crease of each side. Officers' *treugolkas* were similar, but white edging was replaced by gold lace. For senior officers on parade white ostrich feathers which lay inside the turned-up brim could be added.

Grenadiers wore mitres (*grenaderskaya tshapka*) unlike those worn by any other European army. It was constructed from black leather with a leather extension acting as a neck-guard. The helmet had a copper lower rim and reinforcing bands running vertically from tip to base. A copper ferrule at the tip of the mitre held a short white 'shaving brush'-shaped plume. A copper front plate extending well above the front of the mitre was embellished with a raised stamped regimental crest surrounded by a trophy of arms flanked by flaming grenades; above it was a black painted Imperial Russian eagle. Grenadiers of grenadier regiments had the regimental crest replaced by a second, smaller, unpainted eagle. Officers wore the Imperial monogram in place of the regimental crest.

Guardsmen wore a mitre without reinforcing bands and were issued with a smaller front plate, embellished with an unpainted Imperial eagle. Their mitres were also fitted with a larger ferrule which was worn further back on the hat to accommodate a large red ostrich plume. Officers wore a white plume and NCOs a plume of red flanked by white feathers. Mitres worn by the Leib Company were similar, but lined with red cloth, and with white and red mixed plumes for the other ranks.



*General Fieldmarshal Stefan Fedorovich Apraxin (1702-1758) commanded the Russian army during the opening campaign of the Seven Years War. A political rather than a military appointment, his performance was lacklustre, and following the Battle of Gross-Jägersdorf he was recalled to Moscow.*

A 'cornflower blue' cape (*shinel*) completed the issued uniform; a woollen garment extending to just below the knee. It was sleeveless, with a wide collar. From 1761 a second collar was added, attached to the first by two buttons. A hidden button secured the cape around the soldier's neck. Guardsmen had dark green capes with a red lining.


On summer campaign in central Europe it appears that the coat and cape of each soldier was stored amongst the regimental baggage, and the army fought wearing their vests. Also, at least during the Kunersdorf campaign, grenadier mitres were covered with dark green cloth, and officers abandoned the wearing of distinctive sashes.

### Equipment

All musketeers, grenadiers and guardsmen carried a black leather cartridge box (*patrona sumka*). For the other ranks of line regiments this was dec-


orated with a copper plaque bearing the regimental coat of arms, and copper reinforcing edging plates. Inside the box was a wooden block drilled to hold 18 cartridges. From 1761 a practical modification was adopted whereby the block was replaced by a leather separating panel, allowing 40 cartridges to be carried. The cartridge box, which had two leather straps fitted to its sides, was secured to a 10cm-wide red leather shoulder belt. The shoulder belt itself was secured by a copper buckle, placed behind the left shoulder blade. An iron button on the belt secured it in place over the left shoulder by fitting through a loop in the tunic.

The cartridge box issued to guardsmen differed only in that the regimental plate was replaced by an Imperial eagle. Shoulder belt cartridge boxes were not issued to troops of the Corps of Observation or to grenadiers or the Leib



*Russian generals during the later years of the Seven Years War and the first decade of the reign of Catherine the Great. The figure on the left represents a field marshal, a lieutenant general is shown in the centre and the third figure wears the uniform of a major-general. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*





Although a later illustration depicting the Russian Imperial Guard parading inside Gatchina Palace, this painting gives a fair impression of the non-military duties required of the Leib Company and to some extent the other Guard units during the period from 1725 until the death of Catherine the Great. (Russian Museum, St Petersburg)

Company. Those worn by officers carried either an Imperial eagle or the Muscovite symbol of St George and the dragon. In addition, the officers' belt was only half the width of the version issued to other ranks, and it was edged in gold thread.

Waistbelt cartridge boxes carried by grenadiers were fitted to carry ten (later 20) cartridges. Made of black leather, those of line grenadier companies were decorated with a regimental crest flanked by flaming grenades, and those of grenadier regiments with the regimental crest replaced by the Imperial eagle. Guardsmen carried boxes decorated with the Imperial monogram (*EP*) flanked by grenades. Similar boxes were issued to troops of the Corps of Observation and decorated with an Imperial eagle amid a trophy of arms and the Imperial monogram. Those worn by the Leib Company were covered in red velvet, but otherwise were identical to other guard waistbelt boxes. Similarly, officers tended to wear boxes of red leather, but it appears no regulations described their issue.

Grenadiers also carried shoulder grenade pouches (*lyadunka*) of black leather bearing the regimental coat of arms with trophies and grenades in the corners. The 6cm-wide belt was secured in the same manner as the cartridge boxes of musketeers. Decoration for boxes worn by the regiment of grenadiers, guard grenadiers, the Leib Company and the Corps of Observation grenadiers adopted the same copper plaque designs as the waistbelt cartridge box. Similarly, the pouch was secured and the strap buckled in an identical manner to the musketeers' cartridge pouch. It appears from illustrations that the belt for all such

pouches was of buff leather. In the centre of the belt (over the left breast) was a copper lantern-shaped fuse holder. Slowmatch (*fitali*) is depicted as being worn looped around the waistbelt. The pouch could hold up to six grenades. The waistbelt (*portupeya*) issued to all other ranks was of leather, sewn at the top and bottom edges, and secured using a copper buckle. A leather sword hanger with two loops was suspended from the left-rear side of the belt. Bayonets were not worn from a belt frog, but rather fitted into loops on the shoulder cartridge box or grenade pouch.

### Infantry weapons

In 1725 there was no standard infantry musket in the Russian army. A variety of sizes, weights and calibres of longarms meant that even in the same regiment there was no guarantee that the weapons carried would be similar. This reflected the rather *ad hoc* manner in which the Petrine army was equipped during the Great Northern War, and although the situation improved during the next three decades, the problem remained when Russia entered the Seven Years War. Of the surviving examples of the flintlock fusils, the average longarm had a bore of around 16mm and an overall length of about 165cm. These fusils (*fusili*) fired an 8 *zlotnik* (34g) lead ball, with an effective range of 200 metres.

A new regulation pattern was set in 1756, modelled on the Austrian musket of 1754, but by the onset of the war this was far from being a standardised weapon. Indeed, lack of longarm standardisation would continue to plague the Russian

- 1: Musketeer, line infantry regiment
- 2: NCO, line infantry regiment
- 3: Junior officer, line infantry regiment



- 1: Musketeer, line infantry regiment
- 2: Drummer, line infantry regiment
- 3: Musketeer, Apcheronski Regiment



- 1: Guard musketeer, Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment  
2: Guard grenadier, Semenovski Regiment  
3: Junior guard officer, Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment



D Leib Company  
1: Grenadier  
2: Officer  
3: Senior officer



VR/96

1 & 2: Line grenadiers  
3: NCO, grenadier regiment




- 1: Musketeer, Corps of Observation
- 2: Musician, Corps of Observation
- 3: Musketeer, Ukranian land militia




- 1: Guard Colour,  
Preobrazhenski Regiment
- 2: Regiment of Grenadiers Colour  
1st Regiment of Grenadiers
- 3: Corps of Observation Colour,  
1st Corps of Observation



1




2



3



- 1: Colonel's Colour, 1st Moskovski  
Line Musketeer Regiment,  
pre 1745  
2: Second Colour, Apcheronski  
Line Musketeer Regiment  
3: Colonel's Colour, 1st Moscow  
Line Musketeer Regiment




army throughout the 18th century. The 1756 fusil was 163cm long, with a 18mm bore, firing a 9 *zolotnik* (38g) ball. All fittings were iron until 1758, when copper fittings replaced them, meaning that throughout the Seven Years War both types were in use. A 46cm-long iron bayonet of triangular section was fitted to the fusil, and Russian drill emphasised its use whenever the infantry were in action. Wooden ramrods were replaced with all-metal ones for all calibres and types of infantry longarm in 1756, greatly increasing the ease and speed with which the fusils were loaded. This change was also reflected in other European armies at around the same time.

Leib Company soldiers and officers carried shorter fusils (on average measuring 142cm overall), with copper fittings and a higher level of decoration; all bore a brass escutcheon plate carrying the Imperial cipher. Officers could supply their own weapons, and highly decorated sporting guns were often used in battle. The finely decorated firearms produced in the workshops in Tula were even used in the field according to contemporary Austrian observers.

As the firearm production centres of Tula, Olonetz, Moscow and St Petersburg were capable of producing over 35,000 *fusili* a year, almost all issued weapons were of Russian manufacture, although some 25,000 1754-pattern Austrian muskets were issued to the Russian army in 1760. Production levels were enough to supply the needs of the army in the latter part of the Seven Years War, but in 1757 it was noted that some regiments took the field with outdated, obsolete and unsuitable weapons. A report by Quartermaster-General Weymarn in 1759 reported that this problem had been resolved, and that the field army was equipped with firearms which had recently been produced in Russia.

Militia and garrison regiments were the last to benefit from any new patterns, and a number of older 'dog-lock' muskets were still in service with militia units in 1762. Garrison regiments had the largest variety of bore sizes, a problem which warranted a special report to the War College in the same year, highlighting the logistical problems this caused for the supply of ammunition to Russian garrisons and fortresses.



*This musket is a Russian copy of the Austrian infantry musket of 1754, a copy which improved on the original Austrian model by the addition of a stronger spring mechanism and iron ramrod. This example is in the collection of the Russian Historic Museum, Moscow. (Author's collection)*



*Russian partizan, c.1730-50. A number of different staff weapon heads were adopted and discarded during the period from the death of Peter the Great to the accession of Catherine the Great. This polished iron partizan was used by the Cadet Corps, and is in the collection of the Kremlin Armoury, Moscow. (Author's collection)*

Swords were issued to all ranks in all formations of the army. There is substantial evidence to suggest that many, if not all, other ranks left their swords in the regimental baggage wagons when on campaign, commanders preferring to rely on the bayonet for offensive action. Swords for line musketeers and grenadiers had a 76cm-long curved blade, surmounted by a gilt-bronze hilt with a plain brown leather grip. The ricasso carried the monogram of the Empress. Swords issued to the Corps of Observation were similar, but had a curved grip without a guard, and only a small crosspiece. Officers purchased their own swords, and there was a considerable variety. The standard type was a smallsword with a silver or brass guard and a wire-bound grip.

Halberds were carried by sergeants, and partizans by under-officers, at least on ceremonial occasions. A field order issued by Fermor in 1757 stated that under-officers were required to carry firearms when on active service. Therefore we may deduce that staff weapons were rarely carried into battle, at least by officers. Both the halberd and partizan were mounted on 190cm-long black-painted wooden hafts fitted with a brass shoe. Both blades were steel, the partizan being decorated with a brass inlaid crowned cipher. Those of under-officers of the guards bore a St Andrew's cross surmounted by a crown and ringed by a laurel wreath. A group of partizans held in the collection of the Russian Historical Museum bearing the monogram of the Empress Elizabeth have brass heads, and it has been suggested that these were issued to guard regiments and the Leib Company for ceremonial occasions in St Petersburg.

During Munnich's campaigns against the Turks, the old Petrine expedient of using pikemen was revived. Two hundred pikes (*pikas*) were issued to each regiment as extra protection against cavalry, and were carried in the regimental baggage. During the Turkish attempt to recapture the Russian-held fortress of Azov in 1737, pikes were used to repel attempts to storm the walls. It is reported that they were the only weapons which were of any avail against the Turkish sabres. There is no evidence to suggest that they were ever used against European opponents, although a list of stores held in the Russian arsenal in Riga in 1756 included 36 bundles of 25 pikes each. Perhaps experience gained from the Turkish assault on Azov resulted in the weapon being retained in service for fortress defence.

### Garrison regiments

On the death of Peter the Great in 1725 the army contained 58 regiments of garrison troops, four of them being cavalry units. Each province (or rather military district) in which they were stationed was responsible for the upkeep of their respective regiments, and in return the soldiers maintained order and acted as policemen within their province. Other tasks included the rounding up of deserters and overseeing the collection of fresh conscripts.



*Russian line grenadier, 1756-61. He is carrying his musket in the Prussian fashion, a drill movement introduced under the Empress Elizabeth and unlike most German innovations it was retained by the Empress Anna. From a 19th-century lithograph. (Collection of the Russian Museum, St Petersburg)*

By 1742 five garrison infantry regiments had been disbanded, and the remainder were distributed as follows:

St Petersburg:	four regiments
Kronstadt & Kronslot:	two regiments
Viborg:	four regiments
Schlussemburg & Kexholm:	one regiment
Reval:	three regiments
Riga:	three regiments
Pernau:	one regiment
Moscow District:	two regiments
Kazan district:	six regiments, one dragoon regiment

Azov district:	six regiments, one dragoon regiment
Kiev district:	six regiments
Siberia district:	four regiments, one dragoon regiment
Archangel district:	two regiments
Astrakhan province:	eight regiments, one dragoon regiment
Smolensk district:	two regiments

Following the Russian occupation of East Prussia, four new regiments were raised from an extra conscription of troops from St Petersburg, Moscow, Kiev and Riga. These troops were stationed in Königsberg, and paid directly from the Russian state. It was not considered diplomatic to make the newly-conquered province pay for its own occupying garrison, a decision based more on the need to counter Prussian propaganda than on benevolence.

Garrison regiments in the first seven locations were designated as 'Baltic' formations, and these troops received a higher level of pay than those in the remaining regiments, who were designated 'Internal' regiments. In 1756 the Baltic regiments were renamed 'Coastal' formations. The Königsberg garrison regiments were grouped in the Coastal regiment category. Individual regiments were named after towns or cities within their district, although often in supply accounts they were banded together as, for example, the garrison regiments of Riga.

Each infantry regiment was organised into two battalions, each of four companies. The total paper strength remained constant throughout the period at 1,319 men, with 1,309 men for 'internal' regiments. One of the companies in each Baltic battalion was designated an artillery company, although they remained unaffiliated to the artillery regiment organisation of the regular army. Dragoon regiments were organised into five squadrons, with a total paper strength of 1,077 men. In 1741 they were reorganised into a four-squadron regiment. The total strength of the garrison regiments combined with district military officials in 1756 amounted to 74,548 men.

Uniforms resembled those of the line regiments, but until 1734 garrison infantry regiments wore grey collarless working coats. After that date

they wore the same green coats with red facings as those issued to line formations. At the same date the dragoon regiments adopted blue coats. Neither infantry nor dragoons were issued with vests.

### Militia

During the reign of Tsar Peter I a number of militia units were raised in the Ukraine to help protect the region from Turkish or Tartar raiders, or to assist in subduing any Cossack revolt. These units, named the Ukrainian Land Militia Regiments, numbered just under 10,000 men in 1725. During Munnich's campaigns against the



*Line grenadier over-officer and private, both from Line Grenadier Regiment 1. The officer is carrying a short musket, a typical campaign feature of Russian officers, emphasising the Russian devotion to firepower as a battle-winning doctrine. Suvarov's bayonet doctrine replaced this firepower doctrine after the Seven Years War. From a 19th-century lithograph. (Collection of the Russian Museum, St Petersburg)*



*Russian independent Jaegers, c.1761-70. Formed as an experiment during the Seven Years War, Jaegers proved their worth during the Siege of Colberg. While their early uniform details are unknown, by 1765 an all green uniform was adopted. Also, at Colberg, Jaegers were noted as wearing tricornes. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

Turks during the early 1730s, the militia was expanded to 27,000 men, a manpower level that remained until the 1760s.

Each regiment consisted of eight companies, and although numbers varied from unit to unit, the average company strength was around 180 men. The 18 regiments were largely administrative formations, as companies were scattered throughout the Ukraine in defence of border posts, towns, villages and river crossings. It appears that there was no battalion organisation for the militia regiments, and individual companies would only combine into regimental units in the face of a large-scale Turkish or Tartar invasion. Complete regiments of Ukrainian Land Militia did accompany Munnich's expeditions in

1737 and 1738, and a number were used to supplement the garrison of Ochakov when the fortress was captured from the Turks in 1737.

The militiamen differed from the regular army in that they were all 'crown peasants', and therefore not treated as serfs. They were also spared much of the harsh discipline encountered in the regular army. Uniforms consisted of green coats, red breeches, and tricornes similar to those issued to the regular army, although it appears that civilian clothes were also worn when on duty.

## INFANTRY TACTICS

Russian military doctrine at the start of the Empress Anna's reign was based upon instructions contained in the *Military Codes*, a tactical manual produced by order of Peter the Great in 1716. This in turn was based upon the *Rules of Combat* of 1708, a tactical manual which drew on Russian experience gained during the early part of the Great Northern War.

Infantry battalions were drawn up in four ranks following the Anglo-Dutch example, and the soldiers were trained to fire both by ranks or by platoons, using the current Prussian system. In 1731 Prussian military advisers were employed to alter Russian infantry drill to conform to the latest method laid down in the Prussian infantry regulations of 1726. Battalions were split into four divisions, each sub-divided into platoons. Although still ranged in four ranks, the rear rank did not fire, but served to plug any gaps in the ranks. If grenadiers served with the battalion (rather than being used to form combined grenadier battalions), they took their place at the extreme right of the battalion line. The new Prussian development of 'cadenced' marching (marching in step) was not introduced into the Russian army until 1755.

During Munnich's campaign against the Turks, great emphasis was placed on the use of firepower, and Russian infantry were trained to fire while conducting a rolling advance. This development was

outlined in General Fermor's *Disposition for Military Arrangements and Movements for a General battle against the Turks*, published in 1736, where a combination of offensive and defensive tactics were espoused. He realised that firing by ranks broke down after only a short period because of the smoke created by black powder. He argued that platoon fire, with each platoon commanded by an able officer, was the only method that could be used for any length of time on the battlefield.

When the Empress Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1740, these Prussian tactics were largely abandoned and she ordered a return to the tactical doctrines evolved by Peter the Great. Part of a larger anti-German revolution within the army, this resulted in the circulation of a new drill book in 1746 written by General Lacy, *A Description of the Drill of an Infantry Regiment*. Although it retained many of the older Petrine ideas, the new emphasis on the reliance on firepower was retained, supplemented by the order that bayonets were to be fixed when in battle by all ranks of a formation. This was a direct result of Russian experiences fighting Turkish light cavalry, where the bayonet was seen as an adequate defence against cavalry.

The next and most significant alteration of Russian infantry drill came in 1755, during Petr Shuvalov's review of the army. The *Opisanie Pekhotogo Polkovogo Stroyu* (loose translation: 'Code of Regimental Drill') was the result of a growing concern in the Russian army at the new and innovative infantry drills introduced by the Prussian army. Shuvalov was advised by both Russian and Austrian tacticians, and the resulting code was one which greatly complicated infantry drill on the eve of Russia's entry into the Seven Years War. Consequently it was not until at least 1759 that infantry commanders were able to become skilled enough in tactics to be able to use their troops to best effect.


The battalion was deployed in four ranks as before, but to complicate matters a three-rank formation was suggested as an alternative when in close proximity to the enemy (i.e. within 70 paces). In the four-rank formation the first two ranks delivered their fire while kneeling, while only the front rank did so in the alternative formation. The Prussian division of the battalion into divisions of

four, under-divisions of eight, and 16 platoons was meant to increase control on the battlefield. Grenadiers attached to the battalion were split between the two flanks, and a three-platoon reserve was sited 50 yards behind the main firing line. The reserve performed the same function as the 1731 code's non-firing fourth rank, the provision of a reserve having been abandoned during the period 1740 to 1755.

When put into practice, the Shuvalov system of drill displayed a number of flaws, including the rapid breakdown of platoon firing, a problem shared by the Prussians, 'Our muskets and cannon replied, certainly not in salvos, in fact in great disorder, but shooting with considerably greater speed than the enemy,' wrote a contemporary. This rapidity of fire, reputedly at a ratio of three shots for every two of the Prussians, was a direct result



*General Petr Semenovich Saltykov, who commanded the main Russian field army at the battles of Paltzig and Kunersdorf. A popular and talented commander, he retired during the winter of 1759/60 due to ill health. (Collection of the Suvarov Museum, St Petersburg)*



*The Battle of Paltzig, 23 July 1759. The Russian army adopted a tight defensive formation in two lines and sited its artillery to cover the only direct path to its position, as shown on this plan. The Russian victory was largely due to its careful positioning and in the use of its reserves from the Corps of Observation. (Author's collection)*

of the old Petrine doctrine encouraged in turn by Munnich and Fermor. Firepower and solidity under fire were seen as the cornerstones of Russian military practice during the Seven Years War, not the offensive use of the bayonet, as suggested by later historians.

Experience gained during the first clashes of the war led to a second Fermor manual in 1758, *General Disposition for Battle with the Enemy*. In this he stated that, 'You must open fire by platoons at the command of the officers, aiming at the enemy soldiers' middles. When the Prussians come still nearer you employ division fire, and continue the fight with the bayonet until, through the help of God and the courage of the Russian army, the enemy are beaten and chased from the field.' While Prussian drill stated that the soldiers should fire at the centre of an enemy formation without aiming, Fermor's approach was a more practical one, inevitably resulting in a higher percentage of balls finding their mark. This greater rate of accuracy, combined with the high rapidity of fire, gave the Russian soldier a marked advantage in a sustained exchange of musketry, which was usually fought at a range of 50-70 paces.

However, the Russian army exhibited a weakness in a different area that countered this advantage. A British observer reported that: 'The Russian troops...can never act with expedition.' Ponderous drill movements and an almost lethargic attitude to manoeuvre hindered the Russian ability to move troops easily on the battlefield. At Gross-Jägersdorf a Russian observer noted that, 'Our army was ranged immobile for the whole duration of the combat, with the first rank kneeling and sitting.' A Prussian reported that '...although deployment into line has been introduced into their service, the infantry regiment is scarcely capable of arranging a line in less than an hour, and even then the process is always attended with disorder.' By 1759 the situation had improved somewhat, and manoeuvre in column of march into line was simplified following the adoption of Fermor's drill.

Movement in large divisional columns was adopted during Munnich's campaigns against the Turks, and this trend continued during the early years of the Seven Years War. Not usually intended as a formation with which to face the enemy, the cramped battlefield at Zorndorf (1758) necessitated deploying in column, so that Prussian

artillery were able to cut down scores of men at a time. Although Shuvalov's drill manual advocated the use of the battalion-sized column as an offensive unit, Russian commanders in the field continued to place their main emphasis on line formations which allowed the firepower of the whole battalion to be used. After advancing to point-blank range, a sustained barrage of musket fire was followed by an advance in line, intended to drive a shattered enemy from the field at bayonet point. In 1761, during the Colberg campaign, a field formation was adopted where a brigade of two battalions moved in a column formation that resembled a moving square, and troops were trained to deploy to face any threat, or to deploy into line when required. This indicates a greater degree of battlefield mobility than was demonstrated in the early years of the war.

The Russian army's manner of deploying on the battlefield also underwent change during the war. During the early part of the century the norm was to deploy the infantry in two lines, with a third line in the rear, acting as a reserve. The whole body of infantry was flanked by two equal wings of cavalry. If the deployment of huge columns during the Turkish war can be discounted, then the first development came during the war, when two main lines with a small intermediate line of regimental reserves was favoured. Cavalry remained on the flanks, the infantry relying on firepower and mobile field defences to thwart any cavalry charge to their front. At Paltzig (1759) the Russian army resorted to using field defences to disorder the enemy, and a second line of mixed reserves was available to bolster the troops lining the fortifications should the enemy threaten to breakthrough.

One further important tactical development was the experiment with light infantry in the Russian army during the war. During the siege of Colberg (1761) two battalions each of five companies were formed. They were ordered to use cover, to act in small groups independently, and an emphasis was placed on marksmanship. This nucleus was to be encouraged and expanded during the reign of Catherine the Great, but in 1761 they were initially intended purely as a counter to Prussian skirmishers around Colberg.



*Tsar Peter III, the husband of the Empress Catherine, shown here in this detail of an engraving wearing the uniform of a commander of the Leib Company of the Chevalier Guard. On the death of the Empress Elizabeth he decided to ally with Frederick the Great, a decision which contributed to his overthrow and death at the hands of his wife, the Empress Catherine. (Collection of Walter Yarbrough Jr)*

## INFANTRY COLOURS

Russian colours were standardised by Peter the Great, and the patterns continued in service until 1730, when they were modified by the Empress Anna. These patterns continued throughout her reign, and that of the Empress Elizabeth.

Each regiment was issued with a white (colonel's) colour and one coloured (lieutenant-colonel's) colour. Company ensigns also carried a green pennon bearing the company and regimental numbers. There is no evidence that this pennon was carried into battle. Attached grenadier companies never carried colours, although for ceremonial purposes they frequently comprised a colour honour guard. While the basic pattern of the standards remained the same throughout the army, differences in base colour, the colour of dec-



## Russian Infantry Colours of the Seven Years War

<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Colour</i>	<i>Flame Colour</i>	<i>Crown<sup>1</sup></i>	<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Colour</i>	<i>Flame Colour</i>	<i>Crown</i>
<b>Arkhanguelogorodski</b> <i>Yellow background. Archangel in blue dress with white wings, carrying a silver helmet and sword and red shield. Black prostrate devil or minion at feet.</i>	Green	Red	2	<b>Rostovski</b> <i>Red background. White stag with yellow hooves and antlers on a green grass base.</i>	Yellow	Red	4
<b>Astrakhanski</b> <i>Sky blue background. Silver scimitar with gold hilt. Gold crown with red lining.</i>	Red	Yellow	3	<b>St Petersburgski</b> <i>Red background. Gold sceptre or rostral bearing the Imperial eagle with crossed black anchors behind.</i>	Green	Red	5
<b>Azovski</b> <i>Sky blue background. Silver fish, crescent, and cross.</i>	Red	Yellow	1	<b>Schlüsselburgski</b> <i>Royal blue background. Off-white fortress on a green grass base. Fortress is surmounted by a golden key (shlüssel) and crown (type 5).</i>	Red	Yellow	5
<b>Belozerski</b> <i>Sky blue background. Yellow cross and white crescent. Yellow fish.</i>	Orange	Green	4	<b>Sibirski</b> <i>White background. Two black sabres bearing crossed black arrows with red flights. Behind them is a golden crown and gold scrollwork.</i>	Green	Red	3
<b>Boutyrski</b> <i>Red background. Flesh-coloured centaur. Golden bow and arrow.</i>	Green	Red	2	<b>Smolenski</b> <i>White background. White eagle astride a black cannon on an ochre carriage which stands on a green grass base.</i>	Blue	Yellow	4
<b>Iaroslavski</b> <i>Yellow background. Black bear carrying a silver halberd with red haft.</i>	Light Blue	Red	4	<b>Sousdalski</b> <i>Red background. White falcon wearing a gold crown perched upon a red base.</i>	Green	Red	4
<b>Ingermanlandski</b> <i>Sky blue background. Off-white stone crenellations.</i>	Green	Red	4	<b>Tchernigovski</b> <i>White background. Black eagle with golden crown and yellow claws and beak carrying a golden sceptre bearing a cross.</i>	Yellow	Red	4
<b>Kazanski</b> <i>White background. Black dragon with red wings, gold crown with red lining and gold feet and tongue.</i>	Green	Red	3	<b>Tobolski</b> <i>Red background. A golden pyramidal obelisk flanked by red, white and blue flags. Green and gold drums lie at its base.</i>	Green	Red	3
<b>Kexholmski</b> <i>Royal blue background. Off-white fortress gate with black portcullis on a green grass base.</i>	Yellow	Red	1	<b>Troitzki</b> <i>Red background. Gold crown and cross.</i>	Green	Red	1
<b>Kievski</b> <i>White background. White angel with white wings, silver sword and red shield.</i>	Red	Yellow	5	<b>Velikoloutzki</b> <i>Red background. A silver sword held by a flesh-coloured hand and arm emerges from a light grey cloud. Green severed serpent lies on a green grass base.</i>	Light Blue	Red	1
<b>Koporski</b> <i>Sky blue background. White mountain and light grey cloud.</i>	Green	Red	2	<b>Viatski</b> <i>Yellow background. Black bow with a white arrow and black flights held by a flesh-coloured arm emerging from a light grey cloud. Red cross above the hand.</i>	Blue	Yellow	4
<b>Ladojski</b> <i>Light blue background. Red walls with golden gates.</i>	Green	Red	1	<b>Vladmirski</b> <i>Red background. Golden lion rampant wearing a golden crown carries a silver sceptre bearing a cross.</i>	Green	Red	5
<b>Moskovski (1st and 2nd)</b> <i>Red background. Flesh-coloured St George with a light blue cape astride a white horse. Gold horse furniture and lance. Green dragon.</i>	Blue	Yellow	5	<b>Volgodski</b> <i>Red background. Flesh-coloured arms extend from a light grey cloud bearing a golden orb and silver sword.</i>	Blue	Yellow	2
<b>Mourumski</b> <i>Sky blue background Off-white crenellations above a green grass base. Light grey cloud with a flesh-coloured arm protruding bearing a golden crown suspended by a gold chain.</i>	Green	Red	4	<b>Voronejski</b> <i>Red background. White eagle astride a bronze cannon on an ochre carriage. Carriage sits on a green grass base.</i>	Light Blue	Red	2
<b>Narvski</b> <i>White background. Silver cross and laurel wreath</i>	Light Blue	Red	1	<b>Vyborgski</b> <i>White background. Blue shield with gold border bears three crowns and a 'W', all in gold. Shield is surmounted by two flesh-coloured angels (upper torsos only) wearing red tunics. The left hand angel has blue wings, while his companion has yellow ones.</i>	Green	Red	1
<b>Nevski</b> <i>Red background. Dark blue column standing on a green grass base. Gold crossed key and small sword.</i>	Green	Red	3				
<b>Nijegorodski</b> <i>White background. Red-brown stag with black antlers and feet.</i>	Light Blue	Red	4				
<b>Novgorodski</b> <i>White background. Black bears. Gold throne bearing golden crossed cross and Imperial eagle sceptre. Golden throne-stool with red cushion below a golden candelabra with square golden base.</i>	Orange	Green	5				
<b>Ouglitzki</b> <i>Red background. Golden figure of Tsarevitch Dmitri dressed in gold, holding a silver knife and a white sacrificial lamb. Figure stands on a green grass base.</i>	Light Blue	Red	3				
<b>Permski</b> <i>Red background. White bear with a silver bible on his back. Silver cross above animal.</i>	Green	Red	4				
<b>Pskovski</b> <i>Sky blue background. A brown animal resembling a panther walks upon a green grass base. A flesh-coloured hand of God reaches down from a grey-green cloud.</i>	Orange	Green	4				
<b>Riazanski</b> <i>Yellow background. Flesh-coloured warrior dressed in a red cloak and kilt. Grey fur boots, cap and cloak trim. The figure carries a silver sword and scabbard and stands on a green grass base.</i>	Blue	Yellow	4				

### Regiments without an individual coat of arms, 1756

<i>Regiment</i>	<i>Colour</i>	<i>Flame Colour</i>	<i>Crown</i>
Apcheronski	Blue	Yellow	4
Daghestanski	Green	Red	4
Kabardinski	Lt. Blue	Red	3
Kourinski	Red	Yellow	5
Navaguinski	Orange	Green	5
Nacheburgski	Blue	Yellow	1
Nizovski	Green	Red	2
Tenguinski	Yellow	Red	4
Chirvanski	Red	Yellow	3

(1 Individual crown detail is discussed in Volume 2)



*Musketeer, line infantry regiment, c.1763. The modification of the standard tricorne during the reign of Catherine the Great was the main difference between this soldier and his Seven Years War contemporaries. (Viskovatov, 1844-56)*

orative features and in the design of the central regimental crest ensured that individual units could be identified by their standard.

The colonel's colour measured 266cm by 182cm and bore a brown Imperial eagle with the arms of Moscow in its centre (or the regimental crest,

whichever was appropriate). This was surrounded by a gold chain bearing a blue St Andrew's cross. The staff was white with either gold or silver tassels and a gold-plated finial. The coloured flag bore the regimental crest within a gold (or occasionally silver) shield. The entire design was surmounted by a crown. Both colours were decorated with flames in the four corners.

Guard regiments carried one white and five orange-coloured flags (seven in the Preobrazhenski Regiment). All colours were of a similar design, as illustrated in *G1*. All guard colours were surrounded by a gold tasselled fringe. Guard flags measured 362cm by 142cm.

The four grenadier regiments were each issued with four colours, one white and the rest red. These all bore a peculiar Imperial eagle design sitting astride a trophy of arms amid a white cloud. The arms of Moscow sat around the neck of the eagle. The colonel's colour had red flames at the corners, the remainder having white flames.

Regiments of the Corps of Observation carried eight colours, one being white, the rest coloured according to the wishes of the regimental commander. Two examples in the Hermitage are light blue with yellow flames, and white with yellow flames. All carried an Imperial eagle astride a trophy of arms, which in turn sat within a cloud. The centre of the eagle bore the arms of Moscow and the eagle was surmounted by the Imperial cipher amid a fan of gold rays. These standards measured 213cm by 142cm.

The colours of the line regiments all bore a regimental crest, and a distinctive combination of background and flame colours and crowns. The table on page 40 shows the details of the decoration and colours of the infantry flags of the Russian army during the Seven Years War. 'Colour' refers to the colour of the non-white standards of the regiment. The same colours of flames were found on both white and coloured flags within the same regiment. 'Crown' lists a number referring to one of the five patterns used on regimental standards above the coat of arms and surrounding cartouche. (See plates *G* and *H* for details of flags.) The description in italics outlines the design of the regimental shield, which was the central feature of the standard. In all cases



*The Empress Catherine II, 'the Great', (1762-96). Following the overthrow of her husband Peter, Catherine ruled as absolute monarch, and encouraged the continued development of the army. Almost immediately after the close of the Seven Years War her troops were involved in a protracted war against the Turks (1768-74). (Collection of Walter Yarbrough Jr)*

where no description is listed, the arms of the Moskovski Regiment were substituted. These regiments carried their regimental name in black Cyrillic script in a gold scroll below the cartouche. In most cases the regimental coat of arms was set in a golden cartouche, the exceptions being the Arkhangelogorodski, Viatski, and Iaroslavski regiments, where the cartouche was silver. The regiments are listed in alphabetic order using the Latin rather than Cyrillic alphabet.

## THE PLATES

*A1: Musketeer, Line Infantry Regiment, winter or ceremonial dress*

This figure represents the standard infantryman of the period, wearing the issued coat, breeches and

winter (i.e. black) gaiters. His cape was double-collared, the inner of the two collars being removable. The whole garment was double-lined, and the larger collar could be turned up like a cowl as extra protection in bad weather. His musket is the model issued to the army shortly before the Seven Years War, a Russian weapon based on an earlier Austrian pattern. Although Russian infantry commanders placed a great emphasis on firepower, the bayonet was always attached to the musket in battle.

*A2: NCO, Line Infantry Regiment*

The uniform of NCOs in the army differed from those of the private soldier by the addition of rank bands on the cuff turnbacks and a gold lace border on the tricorne rim. All NCOs wore one gold lace band above the cuff buttons. Corporals carried one stripe below them, and sergeants two extra stripes. This man clearly displays the cartridge pouch as issued to Russian line infantry, each decorated with the appropriate regimental crest. It was filled with a wooden former which held 20 cartridges, and later in the war the capacity was increased to 40 rounds.

*A3: Junior Officer, Line Infantry Regiment*

Although no set regulations were officially laid down concerning the dress of officers, it was expected that they would conform to the uniforms worn by the officers' parent regiments. The coat is of a fine-quality wool with side pockets which were omitted on the coats of enlisted men. Marks of rank, such as sashes, were rarely worn in battle, nor were partizans carried; they were reserved by junior officers principally for use on ceremonial occasions. Although firearms were the recommended weapon for junior officers in action, cartridge pouches were worn on almost all occasions; whether used to carry ammunition, French brandy or handkerchiefs has not been recorded!

*B1: Musketeer, Line Infantry Regiment, summer dress*

As the majority of battles fought by the Russian army during the Seven Years War took place in mid- to late summer, this figure represents the typical Russian soldier during the campaigning

season. His heavy woollen coat would have been left with the regimental baggage wagons when on the march, while he fought wearing his red long-sleeved vest. Although the garment resembled the coat, it was fitted with side pockets and it lacked cuffs. The unusual appearance of lines of red-coated infantrymen was noted by contemporary observers.

*B2: Drummer, Line Infantry Regiment, summer dress*

The regulations which allowed the abandonment of coats when permitted by regimental commanders dated from the campaigns against the Turks during the 1730s. The same rules also stated that this concession did not apply to regimental drummers, who were forced to wear their distinctive coats at all times. This was because the drummers served both as a rallying point for the regiment and as the transmitters of orders. Their dress, therefore, had to be distinguishable from that of the other soldiers in the regiment. His drum bears the Imperial eagle with the badge of the city of Moscow superimposed upon it.

*B3: Musketeer, Apcheronski Regiment, summer dress*

This figure shows the vest uniform from behind to demonstrate the method of attaching both sword and cartridge pouch. When the bayonet was not fitted to the musket it was carried in leather slings which held it in place behind the cartridge pouch. Hair was worn in three plaited strands; and length was carefully regulated, as it was in other European armies. Although white gaiters were worn in summer, the Apcheronski Regiment was allowed to wear red gaiters in honour of its performance during the battle of Kunersdorf (1759), when it held its position against all Prussian attacks despite fearful losses, and while standing 'knee deep in blood'.

*C1: Guard Musketeer, Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment*

The premier regiment in the Russian army, the unit remained in St Petersburg throughout the war, defending both the capital from attack, and the Empress from assassination or intrigue. Unlike the




*General Fieldmarshal P. A. Rumantsev (1725-96), one of the new breed of Russian commanders who emerged during the war and who co-ordinated the central European campaigns during the war's closing stages. Portrait by an unknown artist, late 18th century. (Collection of the Suvarov Museum, St Petersburg)*

musketeers of line infantry regiments, guardsmen wore the earlier (pre-1742) pattern of tricorne, which was further distinguished by white tassels which protruded from its outer corners. It appears that button linings varied by regiment; those of the Preobrazhenski being red, those of the Semenovski Regiment light blue, and the Ismailovski Regiment light green.

*C2: Guard Grenadier, Semenovski Guard Regiment*

These soldiers considered themselves the finest in the Russian army, even superior to the Leib Company, whom they regarded as a mere non-combatant palace guard. Their most distinctive piece of dress was the guard mitre, smaller and more decorative than those issued to line grenadiers. When not on active duty (i.e. throughout the war) the mitre was decorated with an ostrich plume. The cartridge box of these troops, unlike those of the guard musketeers, was designed to carry grenades, and the smaller waist pouch held cartridges. Both



*Russian regimental crests 1*

*First row, left to right: Archangelogorodski, Astrakhanski*

*Second row: Boutyrski, Belozerski*

*Third row: Velikoloutski, Vladmirski*

*Fourth row: Volgodski, Voronejski*

were heavily decorated and carried the grenadier's symbol of flaming grenades.


*C3: Junior Guard Officer, Preobrazhenski Guard Regiment*

Although the majority of guardsmen were recruited from the nobility, all guard officers were of noble birth, and many held political or diplomatic posts in addition to military ones. Guard officers were also employed as imperial emissaries or observers, and could be detached from their regiments for extended periods for service in these areas. Junior guard officers carried partizans for ceremonial duties, and the example shown here is based on one held in the collection of the State Historic

Museum, Moscow. It carries the cipher of the Empress Elizabeth.

*D1: Grenadier, Leib Company*

These grenadiers were essentially the palace guards of the Empress, and all were recruited from the ranks of the nobility. They were issued with shorter muskets than those of the rest of the army, and the weapons resembled the fusils carried by line officers. Indeed, the ranks of the Leib Company were all regarded as being of officer status in their own right. Their uniforms had extra embellishments including epaulettes and scalloped gold edging to their coats, vest and breeches. As grenadiers they were issued with grenade pouches, cartridge boxes and match holders.



*Russian regimental crests 2*

*First row, left to right: Vyborgski, Viatski*


*Second row: Ingermanlandski, Kazanski*

*Third row: Kexholmski, Kievski*

*Fourth row: Koporski, Ladojski*

## D2: Officer, Leib Company

This group of a dozen officers constituted the social élite of the army. Appointed directly by the Empress, it was even asserted that they were chosen more for their looks than their military abilities! Their uniform was an elaborate version of that issued to the grenadiers, with green turnbacks and facings, gold wire epaulettes, gold lace on the collar, and additional gold lace on cuffs, buttonholes and gauntlets. All buttonholes were reinforced with red stitching. This officer wears two badges of rank; a gold gorget bearing the cipher of the Empress and the inscription *1741 Ho 2s* (which represented the date of her accession through armed intervention), and a gold officer's sash.




*Russian regimental crests 3*

*First row, left to right: Moskovski, Mouromski*

*Second row: Narvski, Nevski*

*Third row: Novgorodski, Nijegorodski*

*Fourth row: Permski, Pskovski*



*Russian regimental crests 4*

*First row, left to right: Rostovski, Ryazanski*

*Second row: St Peterbourgski, Sibirski*

*Third row: Smolenski, Souzdalski*

*Fourth row: Tobolski, Troitski*

## D3: Senior Officer, Russian army

No dress regulations covered the attire of senior officers, but the style of the Preobrazhenski Guard uniforms appears to have been widely copied. This figure resembles Field Marshal Stefan Fedorovich Apraxin, commander of the Russian field army during the invasion of east Prussia (1757). He was a general of limited military ability, having achieved his rank through the grace of the Empress. His sword is based on a French example held in the collection of the Kremlin Armoury, Moscow.

## E1: Line Grenadier, winter dress

This grenadier illustrates the method of securing the waistbelt pouch to the belt. The pouch was slung slightly below the belt using leather loops or

tabs sewn into the rear of the pouch itself. Regulations required grenadiers to sport moustaches, which were worn waxed and curled upwards in the German manner, one of the few remaining German influences in the army to survive the accession of the Empress Elizabeth. His musket is of Austrian manufacture, and represents one of those issued during the war, many of which were sent to grenadier regiments. Musket slings of leather were piped with white clay, an essential part of equipment if the grenadier's hands were to be left free to throw grenades.

### *E2: Line Grenadier, summer dress*

This coatless figure represents the Russian line grenadier as he would have appeared during the summer battles of the Seven Years War. Grenadiers' accounts from the siege of Colberg mention that they were unable to light the fuses of their grenades and this suggests that match holders were not always carried on cartridge belts. This may reflect the abandonment of cumbersome match holders when in the field. Also mentioned during the siege was the practice of covering the front of the grenadier's mitre, to avoid drawing the fire of enemy sharpshooters, although no details are given concerning the material used. Note that the pattern of sword issued to line grenadiers is different from that issued to line musketeers.

### *E3: NCO, Grenadier Regiment*

This grenadier sergeant carries a non-commissioned officer's halberd, which is based on an example in the State Historic Museum, Moscow. It appears to have been replaced by a musket when on campaign. The rear of the grenadier mitre is shown, with its extensive leather neck protector and reinforcing bands clearly depicted. Also visible is the cartridge pouch, showing the decorative differences of grenadier pouches when compared with that of the line musketeer figure (see *B3*).

### *F1: Musketeer, Corps of Observation*

Like his comrades on summer campaign, this figure has abandoned his coat to the regimental baggage wagons. Instead of the shoes issued to other line infantry regiments, soldiers of the Corps of Observation wore dragoon boots of black leather,

a practice that was abandoned when the Corps was amalgamated with the artillery. He wears no large cartridge pouch, having only a small waistbelt pouch issued to him. The musket is based on a Russian example in the collection of the Kremlin Armoury, Moscow.

### *F2: Musician, Corps of Observation*

This figure wears a more elaborate version of the uniform issued to the Corps of Observation musketeers, with the addition of chevrons, 'swallow's nest' shoulderboards, and gold lace on the tricorne. All are designed to make drummers and musicians more distinguishable on the battlefield. The figure shows the type of sword issued to the Corps of Observation, a 77cm-long sabre with no protection guard and a simple leather grip.

### *F3: Musketeer, Ukrainian Land Militia*


These troops were raised to defend the extensive Russian borders and fortifications in the Ukraine from attack by the Turks or by cavalry raiding parties. Uniforms centred on the basic grey coat, and it appears that soldiers would, on occasion, report for service wearing their civilian clothes. Following the Turkish wars of the 1730s, the Militia became better equipped and organised, and were seen to provide the first line of defence against Turkish attack. Weapons were frequently obsolete by the standards of the regular army.

### *G1: Guard Colour, Guard Infantry Regiment Preobrazhenski*

The Preobrazhenski regiment carried one white ('Colonel's' or 'First') colour and seven orange ('Company') colours. The remaining two Guard infantry regiments had one white and five orange colours each. The same pattern was used for both types of colours. Individual Guard infantry regiments were identified by colour coding on the border of the flag and the sleeve staff; red for the Preobrazhenski Regiment, sky-blue for the Semenovski and mid-green for the Izmailovski regiments.

### *G2: Regiment of Grenadiers Colour, 1st Regiment of Grenadiers*

Each grenadier regiment had one white colour with



*Russian regimental crests 5*

*First row, left to right: Ouglitski, Tchernigovski*

*Second row: Schlüsselburgski, Yaroslavski*

red flames in each corner and three red colours with white flames. While the 1st Regiment colour carried the intertwined cipher PR (for Premier Regiment) in its centre, the remaining regiments carried their regimental number in golden Latin numerals in the same location (e.g. II, II and IV). Both white and red colours were of the same design.

***G3: Corps of Observation Colour, 1st Regiment, Corps of Observation***

The Corps of Observation issued one white and seven coloured flags to each regiment. All colours in the Corps of Observation carried the same design. The 1st Regiment carried no additional regimental identifying number, but all other regiments carried the appropriate regimental number in gold Latin numerals set in the centre of the cloud below the imperial eagle (e.g. the 2nd Regiment colours bore the numeral III etc.). This numeral was only carried on the Colonel's colour in each regiment. Although each regiment had a set field colour for their coloured flags and a set flame colour for all

regimental colours, these have not been ascribed to particular regiments.

***H1: Colonel's Colour, 1st Moskovski Line Musketeer Regiment, pre-1745***

Each line musketeer battalion carried two colours, one white, the other coloured. The white (Colonel's) colour carried the regimental coat of arms in a plaque set in the centre of the Imperial eagle. Regiments with no coat of arms used the colour shown in *H3*. The majority of regiments could therefore be identified by a combination of the coat of arms and the flame colours of their Colonel's colours. The colour depicted is that of the two Moskovski regiments as used before 1745. It was subsequently changed to that shown in *H3*.

***H2: Second Colour, Apcheronski Line Musketeer Regiment***

The second colour of each line musketeer battalion also varied depending on whether the regiment had its own coat of arms or not. If not then it bore the Imperial cipher as shown here. All others carried the regimental coat of arms in the central oval plaque in place of the cipher. Field colour, flame colour and the shape of the crown above the cartouche all varied, individual regiments having their own unique combination.

***H3: Colonel's Colour, 1st Moscow Line Musketeer Regiment***

White (Colonel's) colours for regiments without a coat of arms bore this design, as did the two Moscow regiments after 1745. All the 12 'no-arms' regiments (9 after 1745) and the Moscow regiments carried their regimental name in a scroll below the Imperial eagle, as shown here for the 1st Moskovski Regiment. Although all colours carried the badge of the city of Moscow in the central plaque, flame colours varied between regiments, as described above.