PREY · MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

The Russian Army of the Crimea

Text by ALBERT SEATON

Colour plates by MICHAEL ROFFE



MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

EDITOR: PHILIP WARNER

The Russian Army of the Crimea

Text by ALBERT SEATON

Colour plates by MICHAEL ROFFE

OSPREY PUBLISHING LIMITED

Published in 1973 by
Osprey Publishing Ltd, P.O. Box 25,
707 Oxford Road, Reading, Berkshire

In the preparation of this text acknowledgement is made to *Opisanie Odezhdui Vooruzheniya Rossiiskikh Voisk* edited by Viskovatov (St Petersburg 1899–1902), *Vostochnaya Voina* by Bogdanovich (St Petersburg 1876) and *The Russian Army Under Nicholas I 1825–55* by Curtiss (Duke University Press, Durham N.C. 1965). The photographs are reproduced by courtesy of the Keeper, the Library of the Victoria and Albert Museum (Photographer: Berkhamsted Photographic, Berkhamsted, Hertfordshire), the National Army Museum, Chelsea, and Radio Times Hulton Picture Library.

ISBN 0 85045 121 3

Printed in Great Britain by
Jarrold & Sons Ltd, Norwich

Introduction

When Genghis Khan's Mongol-Tartar hordes invaded Europe in the middle of the thirteenth century, all the principalities in eastern and central Russia were brought under the Tartar yoke. They remained as part of the Mongol-Tartar Empire for nearly two centuries. The Russian states in the far west, however, soon passed from the subjugation of the Tartars to that of the new and rapidly growing military power of Lithuania-Poland. From this period of partition and foreign rule, which lasted about 300 years, were born three separate and distinct Slav groups, Great Russia in the east forming part of the Tartar Empire, White Russia in the west closely allied to Lithuania, and Little Russia or the Ukraine in the south-west forming part of the Polish Kingdom. In due course the Great Russian became known simply as the Russian.

The Principality of Moscow, one of the Russian princedoms in the east, had not come into being until 1147, and even 100 years later was so small that it measured hardly 100 miles across. The Princes of Moscow sought and eventually obtained the office of agent and tax collector for the Tartar Golden Horde, and from this position of privilege began rapidly to extend their domain at the expense of their Russian neighbours, so that by 1462 only the great Principality of Novgorod remained independent of Moscow in eastern Russia. In 1480 Moscow successfully challenged the overlordship of the Tartars, and the Princes of Muscovy took upon themselves the title, not of king (*korol*), but that of Caesarean emperor (*tsar*). By 1487 Novgorod had been overcome by Ivan III and this took Muscovy's borders to the Arctic Ocean and to the Urals.

The Tartar Golden Horde, with its capital at Sarai, near Astrakhan on the lower Volga, steadily declined in importance, eventually breaking up into three separate khanates of the Crimea, Astrakhan and Kazan. Of these, the Crimean Tartars were the most powerful and their horsemen continued to raid as far north as the city of Moscow even as late as the end of the sixteenth century. Ivan IV (the Terrible) overran and absorbed both the Astrakhan and Kazan khanates, but neither he nor his successors could overcome



Privates of a grenadier regiment, *c.* 1843, showing the grenade crest on the ammunition case, carried rather like a sabretache, the half-sabre, bayonet scabbard, and (right) entrenching tool



A company officer and private soldier of marines, *c.* 1843

the Crimean Tartars who, as Moslems, had placed themselves under the protection of the Ottoman Empire.

On the death of Ivan IV in 1584 there followed the anarchy of the 'Time of the Troubles', when Muscovy was threatened and, at one time, occupied by Polish troops. Stability returned with the election as Tsar of the first of the Romanov dynasty in 1613. Seventy years later, when Peter the Great came to the throne, Russia had already annexed Ukrainian territory from Poland (known as 'left-bank Ukraine') as far west as the Dnieper. Under Peter's brutal and energetic leadership Muscovy rapidly expanded eastwards over the whole of Siberia as far as the Pacific Ocean, and wrested from Sweden the Baltic states of Ingria, Estonia and Livonia, founding in Ingria the new capital of St Petersburg. In 1709 Peter defeated Charles XII at Poltava and broke the power of the Zaporozhian Cossacks. In his early battles against the Swedes, however, his troops, many of them mercenaries, had been routed. Nor was Peter more successful against the Turks; and so the monarch was forced to raise a modern Russian force of both volunteers and conscripts, officered by the Russian nobility. Two of his boyhood 'play regiments', the Preobrazhensky and the Semenovsky were incorporated into the new armed forces as regiments of the guard. Peter the Great is generally acknowledged to be the founder of both the Imperial Russian Army and the Russian Navy.

Russia in Europe

In the eighteenth century the Poles and the Lithuanians still ruled the White Russian territories between Brest-Litovsk and Vitebsk, together with the old Kievan, Ruthenian and Ukrainian principalities of Podlesia, Volhynia, Podolia and Galicia. The Kingdom of Poland had been so severely weakened by its system of elective monarchy that it could exist as an independent state only if allied to one or more of its powerful neighbours. By the latter half of the century such a situation no longer existed and the Polish Kingdom was annexed by the three partitions of 1772–95 between Russia, Prussia and Austria, the White Russian and Ukrainian areas (except for Galicia which went to Austria) being transferred to Catherine the Great's Empire. And so the eastern frontier of Russia reached the Polish Bug.

In South-west Europe the powerful Ottoman Sultanate stretched across the whole of the Balkans south of Hungary, taking in Moldavia and the northern littoral of the Black Sea, that is to say, Jedisan, what is now the South Ukraine, the Crimea and the estuary of the Don, together with the Caucasus from the Kuban to the Caspian. Between 1783 and 1792, in a series of engagements against the Turks, Catherine the Great's troops occupied the predominantly Ukrainian area of Jedisan, the Nogai-Kalmyk territories of the northern Kuban and the historic Tartar stronghold of the Crimea. This gave Russian vessels access into the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

Catherine the Great, not unnaturally, was hostile to the new Revolutionary French Republic and joined the First Allied Coalition against it; Russia, however, was distrusted and feared by Austria and Prussia. One by one, the Allies were defeated and made peace. Once again Russia

joined the Second Coalition and by 1799 a Russian army under Suvorov crossed the Alps into French North Italy and, taking Milan and Turin, won victories at Trebbia and Novi. Suvorov then moved north into Switzerland to join a second Russian army under Korsakov, which, in the event, was defeated by Masséna before it could make a junction. With the accession of the mad Tsar Paul I, an ardent admirer of Napoleon, Russia dropped out of what remained of the Second Coalition and put an embargo on British goods, entering into the Baltic League of Armed Neutrality directed against the United Kingdom.

After the short eighteen months' peace which was really a respite between the Revolutionary and the Napoleonic Wars, Russia, now under the Tsar Alexander I, entered into secret negotiations with Britain, Prussia, Austria and Sweden. In 1806 an Austrian and a Russian army under Kutuzov was defeated at Austerlitz. In February of the following year the Russians inflicted a repulse on the French at Preuss-Eylau, only to be decisively defeated at Friedland. By the Treaty of Tilsit in July Alexander passed over to the side of the French, and, urged by Napoleon, attacked Britain's ally Sweden and annexed Finland, at that time a Swedish dependency. Between 1809 and 1812 there was no fighting on the continent of Europe except in the Iberian Peninsula. For Napoleon was believed to be invincible by his own troops, by his allies and by his continental enemies. The whole of Europe was cowed.

Meanwhile Alexander continued the Russian forays against the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasus, occupying Georgia in 1801, Megrelia in 1803 and part of Erivan and Daghestan in 1805. This desultory fighting against Turkey ended only in 1812.

Moscow 1812

By 1812 Alexander was already in disagreement with Napoleon and was no longer a faithful adherent to Napoleon's Continental System which had as its aim the blockading of all the mainland ports to British shipping. In the summer of 1812 Napoleon crossed the Niemen at the head of the

Officer of an infantry company, *c.* 1843



A private soldier of an infantry regiment using the musket ramrod, *c.* 1843

Grand Army, drawn from the dependent nations of Europe and nearly half a million strong. The Russian forces under Barclay de Tolly, a Livonian, probably of Scottish origin, fell back without giving battle. The Tsar Alexander was compelled by his officers and advisers to desist from carrying out any functions of Commander-in-Chief and to leave the theatre of operations for his capital. Barclay de Tolly was on bad terms with his fellow army commander and nominal subordinate Bagration, and his reluctance to stand and fight so aroused popular feeling against him that the Tsar was forced to replace him as the field Commander-in-Chief by Kutuzov, a disciple of Suvorov, but by then a prematurely old and sick man.

Kutuzov fought only one main battle, that of Borodino (23 August 1812) about 100 miles due west of Moscow. Casualties on both sides were severe, Napoleon being left in possession of the battlefield from which he occupied Moscow. Kutuzov's forces remained to the south and east of the city, much of which had been destroyed by Russian incendiaries. Meanwhile Alexander in St Petersburg refused to negotiate. By the first week in October Napoleon was forced to recognize that withdrawal to western Europe was the only alternative to wintering in Moscow, unprovisioned and cut off from his empire; and so the Grand Army began to retrace its footsteps. Kutuzov, after an attempt to impede the French progress at Maloyaroslavets, hung on to the enemy left flank, delegating the main task of harrying and pursuing to Platov, the *Ataman* of the Don Cossacks. Rain, mud, the break-up of the roads and the arrival of a severe winter began to take their toll of the withdrawing columns. No supplies were to be had since the route had been stripped bare by French foragers on the approach march during the summer. To leave the route meant death at the hands of Cossacks or peasants. As the Grand Army disintegrated, so the Russian forces became bolder, capturing the great French base at Minsk ahead of Napoleon's columns.

On the Berezina River, not far from Minsk, Kutuzov attempted to cut off the retreat of the remnants of the Grand Army, but failed to do so. But hardly a tenth of the original enemy force which had entered Russia the previous June escaped to East Prussia and Poland.

During 1813 the war continued in Silesia, Saxony and Brandenburg. Kutuzov died that April and was succeeded as Commander-in-Chief by Wittgenstein. The Russians and the Prussians were defeated, however, at Lützen and Bautzen by new French armies, and Napoleon was not finally vanquished until the Battle of Leipzig towards the end of that year. The French Emperor then withdrew west of the Rhine. France itself was invaded by Russian, Prussian and Austrian troops from the east and by British forces from the Pyrenees. In the spring of 1814 Paris was occupied by the Allies.

The following year Napoleon escaped from his place of exile in Elba to raise new armies, but neither Russian nor Austrian troops were present in the three-day battle which ended on the field of Waterloo.

Alexander's Military Experiments

Alexander I, who was in many respects weak, unstable and vacillating, took a very close interest in foreign and military affairs. Many of his generals, Wittgenstein and Bennigsen among them, were able and experienced; some had once served under the legendary Suvorov and had copied his free-and-easy methods. Alexander himself, however, came increasingly under the influence of Count Arakcheev, a very reactionary officer of artillery. After the Napoleonic Wars there was a tightening of the disciplinary code and service conditions became particularly harsh, soldiers being flogged for relatively trivial offences; both the Tsar and Arakcheev delighted in precision parade-ground drill to the neglect of most other forms of training.

Alexander was particularly interested in the experiences of the Austrians and Swedes in forming the so-called military colonies, an experiment which he himself adopted on a large scale. He set up great military farming communities behind Russia's north-west and south-west borders putting state serfs into uniform and transporting and resettling them together with their families, very much in the same way as the Cossack hosts had been resettled over the last 200 years. The difference, however, lay in the fact that each military colonist had to maintain not only himself and his family but, in addition, two soldiers who were billeted with him. Nor did the colonist himself bear arms. The whole of the male community spent half the day on military duties, drill and other training, and half on farm work. The sons of the colonists were inducted into the army at a very early age and were sent, in due course, to special military schools, where they were known as *kantonists*, prior to full-time regular service. Eventually about a quarter of the peacetime army strength was boarded out to these colonies. The performing of military duties was unpopular with the colonists and the experiment did not improve the efficiency or the morale of the standing army, for there were a number of mutinies.

The young *kantonists*, however, knowing no other life, were to form the backbone of the corps of non-commissioned officers in the period shortly before the Crimean War. Quite a number of them became officers.

Many of the remaining regiments, not allocated to colonies, were set to constructional work, building roads and bridges and reclaiming land from swamp and forest.

The discipline imposed on the army and indeed on the whole of the Tsarist State was harsh and fermented revolution among the aristocracy, intellectuals and army officers. Since the French



Officer's epaulette and other rank's shoulder-board of the King of Sardinia's Regiment of Infantry

A grenadier from an infantry regiment, *c.* 1844. The uniform is still in the Napoleonic War design

Revolution there had been an air of liberalism in Europe, and subversive secret societies flourished. When Alexander was succeeded at the end of 1825 by his brother Nicholas, who as a Grand Duke was suspected of being by nature more despotic than was Alexander, the Moskovsky Guards Regiment and other detachments in St Petersburg mutinied. There were also scattered uprisings in other places. These, known as the 'mutinies of the Decembrists', were put down relatively easily, but the effect which they had on the new Tsar was to remain with him during the whole of his thirty years' reign and colour many of his subsequent actions. Nicholas I investigated the outbreaks with great thoroughness and was said to have personally interrogated a number of the prisoners, most of whom were army officers or from the court nobility. What amazed him most was that the activities of the societies were so widespread; even the sons and grandsons of Wittgenstein and Suvorov were involved. By Russian standards Nicholas's treatment of the offenders was moderate, even humane; a few were hanged, many more imprisoned and numbers exiled. Suspect regiments were ordered away on active service against the Persians and the Turks and others were disbanded. Yet the mutinies left Nicholas unnerved and, as time passed and he became gradually more sure of himself, he began to purge the army and subjected it to a close, even personal, control and surveillance, which was to last almost until the time of his death in 1855.

The Small Wars

In 1826 the Persians invaded the Russian Transcaucasus, initially gaining many successes and forcing back the Imperial troops of General Ermolov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus. In the following year, however, Ermolov and his successor, the Tsar's favourite, Prince Paskevich, reoccupied the lost territory and invaded Persia, compelling the Shah to pay a large indemnity and cede the fortresses of Erivan and Nakhichevan. But that same year, in 1828, war broke out again with Turkey both on the Danube and in Asia.



Shoulder-boards of the Ukrainian Grenadiers: (a) Corporal; (b) *Efreitor*

In the Caucasus, Paskevich, an irrascible eccentric who, according to contemporary accounts, was an experienced administrator and logistics expert, advanced into Turkey as far as Erzurum, defeating a stronger army. In the Balkans, however, 2 Russian Army, under the nominal command of the elderly Wittgenstein, was at first less successful. Wittgenstein, a veteran of the Napoleonic Wars, was hamstrung by constant interference on the part of the Tsar and the Chief of Staff, Count Diebitsch, both of whom joined him on campaign with the field army in the south-west.

After the unsuccessful operations of 1828 Wittgenstein was replaced by Diebitsch and the Tsar returned to his capital. In 1829 Diebitsch had better fortune in that he advanced as far south as Adrianople. Further campaigning towards Constantinople was out of the question since the Russian troops were greatly weakened by plague, and losses in men and animals due to ill-health, starvation and cold had been enormous. The Russian High Command had been obsessed with the systematic reduction of fortresses and had displayed an unimaginative field leadership, logistic preparation had been inadequate and the enemy had been underestimated. Peace came in September 1829 with the Treaty of Adrianople.

In November 1830 Russia was severely shaken by the Polish national uprising led by intellectuals and Polish officers of the Imperial Russian Army; Polish troops defected and Nicholas I was declared deposed as King of Poland. The Polish leadership and nation were, however, split and in disarray, and in the event only 40,000 troops were put in the field.

The main Russian forces in the west were two field armies; 2 Army in the Ukraine and 1 Army in West Russia, north of the Pripet Marshes. Field-Marshal Diebitsch, still the Emperor's Chief of Staff, was given the command of 1 Army and ordered to put down the Polish rebellion. Diebitsch counted on making a midwinter lightning advance from Belorussia to Warsaw, marching across the ice-covered rivers. A sudden thaw interrupted his progress and his supply arrangements, already meagre, broke down. The Polish enemy had been underestimated and, five months later, was fighting as strongly as ever. Diebitsch lost confidence in himself, becoming timid and distrustful of his subordinates and staff. He took to drink and in May of that year died of cholera, being replaced by Paskevich, the Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief of the Caucasus, and a favourite of the Tsar's.

Like Diebitsch, Paskevich was a timid and suspicious commander, but slowly and systematically he set to work, avoiding any engagement unless he could be sure of an overwhelming superiority. By the end of August he had reoccupied Warsaw. Tsar Nicholas was very grateful, and Paskevich, whom he treated with an almost exaggerated respect, became both Viceroy of Poland and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, posts which he held until after the Crimean War. This jealous and limited man demanded little except the unquestioning obedience of his subordinates, and the efficiency of the whole of the Russian military machine came to depend both on Nicholas and on Paskevich.

The Russian High Command

Nicholas was a man of imposing presence, authoritative and severe, capable and energetic, and even popular in some quarters. Like Frederick II of Prussia, he regarded himself as the first soldier of the realm, for he kept a tight control



A non-commissioned officer and a company officer of an infantry regiment, *c.* 1846

over all military matters. Yet in some respects Nicholas's inquisitiveness was motivated by mistrust of the army. He had no real military ability, innate or acquired, and his great love was for the outward trappings of soldiering – reviews and parades and the minutiae of uniforms and regulations. The whole of the High Command revolved about his person.

Military affairs were handled by the Tsar's own military headquarters, originally known as a suite and later as a *shtab*, which in Russian means 'headquarters' rather than 'staff'. Its main executive was a council, with the Tsar as the chairman, and four members: the Minister of War (who was usually a general and might in addition be both the Chief of Staff as well as the Tsar's immediate deputy); the Quartermaster-General who, like his Prussian equivalent, was responsible not for logistics but for operational matters, for the Corps of Topographers and the General Staff; the Master-General of Ordnance responsible for armament and warlike stores and the artillery; and the Inspector-General of Engineers in whose province were fortifications, engineer stores and engineer troops, sappers and miners and pontoniers. The Minister of War and Chief of Staff in 1853 was Count Chernyshev, who had held this post for no fewer than twenty-six years. The Minister of War acted as chairman of the military council during its routine sessions in the absence of the Tsar, but the Master-General of Ordnance and the Inspector-General of Engineers had the right to report direct to the Tsar, a right also enjoyed by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army (Paskevich, who was rarely in the capital) and by the commanders of the Household Troops, the Corps of Guards and the Corps of Grenadiers.

The officers of the General Staff, sometimes known as 'officers of the Quartermaster-General', came under the Department of the General Staff in the Ministry of War. The first department, or bureau, of the General Staff dealt with operational matters which, in times of peace, meant little more than movement, order of battle, deployment and quartering, exercises, manœuvres and training. The second department dealt with intelligence, reconnaissance and topography; the third was responsible for financial allocations and accounts. The Russian General Staff, however, far from occupying the exalted position which the General Staff did in Prussia, was out of favour with the Tsar, partly because of its involvement in the Decembrist uprisings; it was disliked, too, by Paskevich who regarded any form of learning with suspicion. Comparatively few officers sought to enter it, and in consequence when the Crimean War broke out there were too few trained staff officers to meet the requirement.

Russian Officers and the German Influence

There were three ways by which young men could enter army service as officers. About one in five of the officers came from the various military cadet schools or the *corps des pages* (for the guards regiments). About one in twelve were promoted officers directly from the ranks where they had been serving as non-commissioned officers for as long as ten years or more. The remainder, and by far the

majority (probably three in four) were commissioned from the ranks where they had been serving as volunteer officer candidates or *junkers*.

The officer entering the army from the *corps des pages* or from the cadet schools was, in all probability, from the *dvorianstvo* or nobility. Yet the hereditary nobility in Russia at that time was quite different from the aristocracy elsewhere in Europe, for it usually formed no more than a titular and petty *noblesse*, having neither wealth nor land and never having been received at court. The commissioned *junker* was usually, but not necessarily, from the nobility; but it was certain that he came from a family which was at least literate. The officer commissioned after long service in the ranks was either a conscript and probably a former serf or else a *kantonist*, a son of a military colonist, trained as a soldier from the age of six. Regimental commanders highly prized the commissioned *kantonists* because of their readiness, as unthinking automata, to perform all the irksome routine duties, but they were known by their fellow officers as *burboni* or oafs.

Whatever their social origins and methods of entering the army, Russian officers, with few exceptions, were without higher education. Only in the artillery and in the engineers were they technically proficient. For the rest, all that was demanded of them was obedience and the performance of their duties to the letter of the order; no freedom of opinion was permitted. Officers were brave, unimaginative and obstinate, lazy and without initiative; and, unless they belonged to the guard or grenadier corps or to certain of the cavalry regiments, they were poor, the pay differing little according to rank (240 silver roubles for lieutenants and only 500 for colonels). Army pay was hardly a third of that paid to Prussian officers. The Prussian officer was noted for his frugal living, yet the Russian officer could hardly exist on his pay. This, in all probability, encouraged corruption among officers and officials. Doctors, veterinary surgeons, paymasters and the commissariat did not rank as officers but as civilian officials in uniform.

The Russian officer system would probably have worked well enough if its generals had been men of real ability, but they were not, since they were products of a system which regarded any

A company officer of grenadiers wearing the short dark green frockcoat, *c.* 1844

Waist-belt and short sword and bayonet carried in a single scabbard; officer's light sabre with porte-épée; both of infantry pattern of the Independent Caucasian Corps

tendency towards independent thought as heresy. An officer was, however, far from being inadequate, for he shared the virtues as well as the characteristic defects of his men. He rarely wanted for courage or hardiness; he was generous and had his own conception of honour, and was often more humane to prisoners of war than he was to his own troops.

Although it was true that Russian troops needed more leading and driving than those of other European nations, the fault of the Russian military system was that it was a false imitation of the Prussian, taking from the last century that which was bad and ignoring its simple virtues. And so it copied and indeed magnified the old Prussian harshness, but failed to learn the lessons of German efficiency, example, honesty and integrity. Officers, even generals, were subjected to the abuse and ridicule of their superiors on parade and in front of their troops. Other ranks received 'the toothpick', the smashing blow on the jaw, and were flogged or made to run the gauntlet, suffering injuries from which many of them died.

The Russian had always an inbred respect for the German, and many of the Tsars and part of the court nobility were German by birth. Von Clausewitz was once in the Russian service. Some German-born nationals served as officers in the Russian Army, but these were greatly outnumbered by Russian nationals of German descent who set great store by their names. According to popular belief this ensured their promotion. Yet Germans, like all other foreigners, were suspect and were disliked in Russia; their presence was unsettling to the officer corps, where they were known as the *liebe Brüder*. Finnish and Swedish officers in the Tsarist Army from the Duchy of Finland were similarly regarded with suspicion, yet, because of their intellect, education, efficiency and integrity, they were usually much respected.

Whereas the Russian Navy was greatly influenced by the English and Dutch marine, the Russian Army was largely copied from Prussia and, to a lesser extent, from France. Uniforms, even the *Pickelhaube* helmets, were Prussian in design. So was the military terminology and the Russianized designation of ranks: *Rotmistr*, *Vakhmistr*, *Ober-ofitser*, *Unter-ofitser*, *Efreitor*, and much else besides.

The Field Army

At the time of the Polish War the largest field formations in existence were 1 Army in West Russia, consisting of four corps of infantry and four of cavalry, and 2 Army in the Ukraine made up of two infantry corps and one of cavalry. In all these two armies numbered over 600,000 men of which all but 100,000 were infantry. The total Russian Army peacetime strength was nearly a million men.

Following the 1833 reorganization, 2 Army in the Ukraine was disbanded and the induction and reinforcement system was brought closer to the French, and what was later the Prussian, pattern. Each regiment set up a reserve depot battalion in its recruiting area, and these reserve battalions were grouped for administration and control into



A Tula 1847 converted flintlock musket showing the action of the hammer, and firing percussion capsule

reserve regiments and divisions. The depot battalions inducted and trained recruits and held the reserve stocks of uniforms and equipment for the affiliated regiment.

The Russian field organization followed closely on the French/Prussian. The only army in existence in 1850, under Paskevich's command, was stationed in Poland, and consisted of four infantry corps. Each infantry corps totalled up to 50,000 men and was made up of three or more infantry divisions, a cavalry division and an artillery division, together with engineer troops. An infantry division had two brigades each of two infantry regiments, one of the four regiments in the division being of light infantry known as *eger* (Prussian *Jäger*). Regiments had three or four battalions four or more companies strong. A battalion usually had 600 to 800 men depending on its number of companies. The guards and the grenadiers, as élite troops, rarely served under the command of line infantry and existed as separate corps, as did the troops in the Caucasus.

The Russian Army had more cavalry than any other army in Europe. Some light cavalry divisions formed part of infantry corps, but the great mass of horse was formed into three cavalry corps, one of guards and two of line, each about 12,000 men strong. Artillery of the cavalry formations was always horse, that of the infantry corps both horse artillery and foot artillery, foot artillery being horse- or oxen-drawn, the gun detachments moving on foot.

The total strength of the armed forces of Russia in 1850 was just under a million men of which about 930,000 belonged to the ground forces. Of these, 80,000 were Cossacks. It was, however, a long-service army, conscripts being recruited by ballot for up to twenty-five years with the colours, with the result that there was virtually no trained reserve. Indeed, many of the regular troops actually serving were unfit for the rigours of active campaigning, by reason of age or medical category, even before the end of their colour service. These were drafted into the Corps of Internal Defence for garrison duties. By 1850 this corps had a swollen strength of 150,000 men. Consequently, in spite of its great manpower resources, the Russian Empire had barely 700,000 trained and fit men under arms. The total number

A field officer (colonel or lieutenant-colonel) of infantry, *c.* 1849



Russia at the time of the accession of Alexander I

of reservists recalled during the Crimean War was just over 200,000.

Sufficient trained reserves could have been accumulated only by adopting the latter-day Prussian short-service method of conscription. But since by the Russian law of Nicholas I no man could serve in the armed forces and remain a serf, the introduction of a short-service army would have meant the end of serfdom. And Nicholas believed that only a long-service army could be sufficiently disciplined and loyal to meet his requirements. It was left for Nicholas's successors both to end serfdom and introduce general short-service conscription; but this did not take place until after 1861.

Russian Infantry

From 1825 onwards about 80,000 conscripts were taken into the army each year for a period of colour service of twenty-five years, shortened to twenty-two years in the guards and fifteen in other corps, provided that the soldier had reached the rank of sergeant, had a good record and claimed his discharge. Conscripts were selected at the age of twenty from any who paid poll tax, from town-dwellers and peasants, many of whom were serfs. The main burden fell on the poorer peasants and serfs of Russian nationality, the selection of re-

cruits being left mainly in the hands of the village elders of the communes (these appear to have had considerable discretion as to exemptions). Then the names of those eligible for service were put into an urn from which the required number of recruits was drawn by lot. When a man went into the army he left his home village, often for ever, since if he survived his period of service, he often had little inclination to return to a community in which he was a stranger; and so he either re-enlisted or became a drifter or vagabond.

After medical examination and the administering of the oath by a priest, recruits were allocated to arms. Tall and well-built men went to the guards. Those who could read and write became clerks or went to the engineers. Lighter men, particularly those with experience of handling horses, went to the cavalry and artillery. When all the other arms had taken their pick, the remainder, the great mass, went to the infantry. In the early days the recruits were kept under close guard, in case they should desert.

Even allowing for the primitive conditions of Russia at that time the training system was harsh and unimaginative, being based, as we have said, largely on that of the Prussian Army of the previous century. The whole of the Russian Army was obsessed by the parade-ground – posture, carriage, arms drill and the precision goose-step, the slapping of the ground with the sole of the boot peculiar to the Russian service. The striking of soldiers on parade, including even the non-commissioned officers, with fists, swords and scabbards was so common that even the Prussian military attachés reported on the harshness and

Infantry drum bearing the Imperial arms

A soldier of the Ukrainian Grenadier Regiment with distinctive helmet and white cross-straps

senselessness of the treatment. And yet Alexander II was said to have recounted with pride how his former drill instructor in the Semenovsky Guard Regiment would place a glass full of water on the top of his shako and drill, turn and march, his legs in turn raised parallel to the ground as he goose-stepped, 'without spilling a drop of water'.

The field training of infantry was still based on the drill movements of the Napoleonic Wars, the whole being artificial and unrealistic. Shock action by the use of the bayonet was prized above firepower, and infantry manœuvred in closely aligned drill movements, either in battalion or company column. Sometimes denser regimental columns were employed, little attempt being made, except by the skirmishers and screens, to use ground or cover. Artillery was allocated by batteries between the columns, and cavalry took up its position either on the flanks or to the rear of the infantry.

Musketry had been generally neglected for decades and there had been strong opposition to the introduction of breech-loading rifles on the grounds that they would encourage the rifleman

Officer's epaulette, now in the National Army Museum. The grade ribbons have rotted away, but the gold colour denotes that the wearer was from the infantry and the tassels that he had field rank. The three silver stars and number show that he was possibly a Lieutenant-colonel from the Kamchatka Regiment

to shoot off his ammunition and make him disinclined to close with the enemy. Firing according to the standard of the time was done by volleys. Few of Suvorov's precepts remained, except that 'the bayonet was wise and the bullet a fool'.

Until 1845 the Russian infantry was equipped with a badly stocked, poorly balanced, smooth-bore flintlock muzzle-loader, firing a round lead ball a distance of only 200 yards. It was both inaccurate and unreliable. Each round had to be rammed home with a ramrod before firing so that the weapon could be reloaded from the prone position only with difficulty, and the rate of fire was rarely more than a round a minute. From 1845 onwards the flintlocks were converted to fire with percussion caps. Over the decades many of these weapons had been so abused by unauthorized modifications such as the loosening of screws and the scraping out of the woodwork under the ramrod seats and the metal keeper bands (in order to make them rattle during arms drill) that they were unfit for firing. Many of the *druzhina* militia battalions, called up for service during the Crimean War, had flintlocks which were fifty years old.

Rifles were, however, being slowly introduced into the service, but in such small numbers as to be an experimental measure. The first of these was the large-bore muzzle-loading Liège rifle,



A display of captured Russian equipment: a smooth-bore, percussion-cap musket with bayonet fixed and ramrod; a saw-edged short sword of the Caucasian Corps; a leather percussion cap wallet; an ammunition pouch with regimental number; helmets, and what is apparently a Russian notice-board, possibly from a hospital

The Russian general service *Pickelhaube* helmet of black leather surmounted by a gilt-metal cruciform mounted globe and spiked fire-crest. The chin strap had a gilt-metal scaled covering. The Imperial double-headed eagle badge with the St George insignia in the centre was common to all regiments, the regimental numbers being detachable from the main plate. The wearer possibly came from the Mogilev Infantry Regiment

meant only for specially trained sharpshooters, firing a bullet with two lugs that fitted into the rifling. It was a poor and inaccurate weapon. This in its turn was replaced by the Ernroth rifle which, it was claimed, had an extreme range of about 1,000 yards. There were very few of these, however, in the Russian Army in 1854.

Numbers of rifles were purchased from abroad, but these were not enough to equip any but a few of the battalions. Most of the infantry relied on percussion-cap and flintlock smooth-bores, and on smooth-bores which had been roughly converted by cutting rifling grooves on the inside of the barrel. Improved ranges were also obtained by taking into use enemy bullets, firstly the Minié round ball and then the Neissler pointed-nose cylindrical bullet, this latter being hollow at the base and expanding in the bore on firing. Captured Neissler bullets were used to make moulds for the mass production of ammunition which effectively doubled the ranges of the percussion-cap muskets, but which led to difficulty in sighting and made ever present the risk of bursting the barrel.

A civilian official of a grenadier regiment

Cavalry and Cossacks

The Russian cavalry force was the largest in the world and its organization was in most respects similar to that of the mounted troops of the other European armies. It totalled over sixty regiments organized into twenty cavalry divisions, usually of three cavalry regiments and one Cossack regiment. The light cavalry consisted of hussars and lancers (uhlans). Dragoons and guards horse grenadiers could fight either as dismounted infantry or as light cavalry, since they were equipped with carbines, bayonets, sabres and, on occasion, lances. The cuirassiers were heavy cavalry designed primarily for shock action.

Russian cavalry suffered from the same sickness which had taken hold of the infantry, in that too much of its training, and indeed its *raison d'être*, was directed towards displays, reviews and ceremonial occasions. Covered *manège* volutions became more important than field-day riding across country. The horses became sleek and soft through underwork and the daily hours of grooming, and the cavalryman's idea of mounted movement was to conduct it at a walking pace with the singers out ahead; even trotting was forbidden. Too much was artificial and had no bearing on war.

A cavalry regiment had from six to eight squadrons, each of a strength of about 120 men; by French, British or German standards it was usually indifferently mounted, the Russian horse being hardly bigger than a pony and very light of bone. On campaign it was the horses which suffered the early casualties due to their lack of fitness and bad supply, the foraging arrangements and overloading. For in addition to the trooper it carried kettles, rations, blankets and fodder. More Russian horses died during the short subtropical summer than in the long and bitter winters.

Lord Lucan, the commander of the British cavalry division in the Crimea, had once served with the Russian Army during the war with Turkey in 1829, and he described the regular Russian cavalry as 'being as bad as could be, but the Cossacks could be damnably troublesome to an enemy, especially in retreat'.

Private soldiers of Grenadiers (the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Regiment) belonging to the Independent Caucasian Corps

The Cossacks occupied a unique position in the Russian forces. They were recruited from the settler hosts, mainly of Russian or Ukrainian stock, which once colonized and guarded the frontiers of Russia. Cossack cavalry was sometimes described as an irregular or para-military force, but this is untrue for it formed part of the regular forces. In return for a grant of common lands and exemption from most taxes, the Cossack adult male was originally at the disposal of the Tsar as long as he could sit a horse. Not until 1835 was the service liability set at thirty years from the recruit's nineteenth year, although only part of this period was with the colours and away from his own territory.

More than sixty per cent of the Cossack male population served in the army, compared with thirty per cent of the Great Russians. The terms and conditions of Cossack service were very different from those of the line, in that the Cossack provided his own horse, uniform and equipment, at his own expense, only the musket or rifle being found for him by the government (and half the cost of that was charged to the host). Far from

being the wild savage described by West European writers, he was generally more intelligent and often better educated than the Russian cavalry or infantry soldier. On the other hand he was less amenable to the harsh and rigid discipline of the line troops; he was a frontiersman with his own loose and informal relationship with officers and junior leaders; yet he still formed a regular component of the Tsar's armies. Generally speaking, he was poorly disciplined, he wore what he pleased, and his mount was an unkempt, diminutive and scrubby little pony, broken from the wild steppe herds and sharing with its rider extraordinary endurance.

These characteristics, bred into the soldier by his birth and way of life, separated the Cossack and Cossack troops from the Russian mass. The Cossack was self-reliant, observant and cautious; and he had a very highly developed instinct for self-preservation. Russian line infantry were very obstinate in defence, particularly if mentally prepared for their task, and would usually fight to the death. The same reliance could not be placed on Cossack infantry (Cossacks, although mainly horsed, had a small infantry element), for the Cossack saw no virtue in dying when, simply by removing himself a few hundred paces to the rear, he could continue the fight. Although Cossacks formed mounted regiments and fought as cavalry, they had little value for shock action, lacking discipline and determination (this latter in common with the Russian cavalry of the line);



Officer's epaulette and other rank's shoulder-board of the Grand Duke Konstantin Nicolaevich's Grenadier Regiment



Officer's saddle of infantry pattern with ceremonial shabrack

but they were experienced in raiding, in seeking out gaps and weaknesses in defence lines, and with the exception of their undisciplined looting, very strong in pursuit.

Cossack cavalry was armed with lance, sabre and musket and was organized into squadrons (the *sotnya* or hundred) six to a regiment. In 1850 there existed eight Cossack hosts; the Black Sea/Kuban (Ukrainian) and the Terek/Grebensk (Russian) Hosts, reorganized since 1832 into the Caucasian Line Cossack Host and at war in that theatre; the Don Host (the largest) and the Ural Host, both of which had numbers of regiments in the Crimea; and the Orenburg, Astrakhan, Siberian and Transbaikal Hosts. The latter were predominantly Russian.

In spite of its many weaknesses, the Cossack cavalry was probably more valuable in war than the guards cavalry or the cavalry of the line, yet Cossacks were little esteemed in the Imperial Army. Many of their number were employed in menial tasks and fatigues, as gallopers and messengers, foragers, escorts and guards, and both their officers and men were much looked down upon by the cavalry.

Artillery and Engineers

Artillery had for long occupied a place of honour in the Russian military hierarchy. Its officers, like those of the engineers, usually had a better general, as well as a better technical, education



Detail from a contemporary Russian panoramic photograph showing Russian troops in action before Sevastopol

than those of the line. All ranks received a better scale of pay than the other arms.

The light batteries and those of the horse artillery relied on a six-pounder gun and a nine-pounder howitzer, these having a maximum range of about 1,000 yards. Field batteries were equipped with twelve-pounder guns and eighteen-pounder howitzers with ranges up to 1,300 yards. The projectiles were usually shot, case-shot (grape) and fused shell. The artillery projectiles had good fire effect and the pieces were ably directed and served. The gun-carriages and mountings were particularly well designed in that many were made of wrought-iron tubular construction (and not cast iron or wood as was the custom elsewhere), and were therefore largely invulnerable to the destructive effect of counter-battery fire. Guns, when limbered up, had a sharp lock and small turning circle, and could be manœuvred and moved rapidly. Rocket artillery was also widely used, as it was, of course, by most other major military powers.

The firepower of Russian artillery was used to compensate the inadequacy of infantry armament. Unfortunately, however, it could do this only when given good visibility and fields of fire. Moreover the artillery ranges of the day were so short that the guns themselves relied on infantry for close defence against enemy cavalry and sharpshooters, a protection which Russian infantry, because of the inferiority of its small arms, was not always able to give.

The Russian military engineer arm before the Napoleonic Wars was staffed largely by Germans and Frenchmen. But after 1818 when Nicholas, still a Grand Duke, became Inspector-General of Engineers, great importance was attached to the training of Russian engineers particularly in the sphere of fortifications. After he became Emperor, Nicholas continued to give this arm a great deal of his personal and exacting attention, always finding money for it when funds were short.

Russian engineers were experienced in the construction of formidable defences out of little but the bare earth, with insignificant use of masonry or timber. Bastions and fortresses were constructed out of earthworks built up and revetted with soil-filled wicker gabions, defended by lines of trenches and a maze of underground galleries and saps. Bastions became interconnected infantry strongholds, from which garrisons could be successively withdrawn from the outer

to the inner defences, artillery usually being detached and held concentrated, either in the rear or to the flanks.

Static trench and fortress warfare was a type of fighting requiring stamina and determination, and in this Russian infantry and artillery excelled. The Russian High Command was well served by its engineer troops and it raised in the shortest possible time almost impregnable fortifications round Sevastopol. These were constructed by civilian labour. The engineers made extensive use there of heavy mines, some being electrically detonated from distances as far away as a quarter of a mile, together with smaller anti-personnel mines detonated merely by foot pressure.

Nicholas's Foreign Pretensions

The Tsar Nicholas believed that Turkey, 'the sick man of Europe', was dying, and, since he regarded himself as head of the Orthodox Greek Church, he chose to believe that the physical and spiritual welfare of the Sultan's Christian subjects was the responsibility of St Petersburg. He was interested, too, so he said, in the claims of the Greek Church in the holy places in Palestine, then part of the Turkish Empire.

Nicholas had, of course, more secular interests: the domination of the Turkish Straits from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean; the elimination of French influence in Constantinople; and the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, with Rumania, Serbia and Bulgaria being established as satellite Russian states. Nicholas hinted to London that he would not be averse to Egypt and Crete being given in payment for British neutrality. He had, he believed, cemented good relations with Vienna by the recent Russian intervention against the dissident Magyars. Prussia appeared to be friendly, for both Prussia and Russia had a common interest in suppressing Polish nationalism. So in 1853 the Tsar ordered two Russian army corps under Paskevich (and later Prince Gorchakov) to cross the Turkish Balkan frontier and occupy the Christian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, as earnest of his intentions and as a material guarantee for the fulfilment of his demands. This was to be the first of a series of provocations, each more daring than the last, ending with the blockade or occupation of the Bosporus.

Fighting broke out between the Turks and Russians on the lower Danube and in the Caucasus where Prince Vorontsov guarded the



Detail from a contemporary Russian panoramic photograph showing Russian troops in action from the line of the Malakhov to the Nos. 3 and 4 Bastions

A Russian political lampoon showing Britain and France holding up Turkey while Russian troops await their landing. The original Russian caption describes the disunity among allies when a swan, a crayfish, and a pike harness themselves to a cart, achieving nothing by their joint efforts

frontier. Losses on both sides were heavy. There were numerous uprisings among the Caucasian mountaineers and in 1854 Russia evacuated the Black Sea coastal forts to the south of the Caucasus range.

Nicholas had made a number of political and diplomatic miscalculations. Turkey, supported by France and Britain, was determined to fight, and Persia, encouraged by the Russian difficulties in Transcaucasia, became threatening. The Austrians, far from being understanding, regarded the Russian interference in the Balkans as unwarranted, so that Nicholas began to fear that Vienna would join an anti-Russian coalition. Prussia was cool. And in St Petersburg it was rumoured that British gold might tempt the Swedes into reoccupying the Duchy of Finland annexed by Russia in 1809. Paskevich advised the Tsar to withdraw his troops from the principalities.

When, however, Britain and France demanded that Russia should evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, their representations were ignored. A state of war was declared in March 1854 and a British fleet began raiding Russian ports in the Baltic.

As a result, the Russian Army was already extended even before the British and French troops disembarked in the Crimea, for substantial forces were deployed to meet the threat of invasion in the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Baltic and central Europe. Because of his lack of trained army reserves Nicholas was unable to achieve a decisive numerical superiority against the Allied troops embarking from the Black Sea.

The Crimean Landing

The Crimea is a large diamond-shaped peninsula (almost an island since it is connected to the

A contemporary Russian sketch purporting to show the repulse of a British landing at Taganrog on the Sea of Azov in May, 1855

South Russian mainland by a narrow neck of land barely seven miles wide), in size about 150 miles from west to east and 100 miles from north to south. With the exception of the rocky outcrops and steep cliffs in the south and along the coast, which rise as high as 4,000 feet, it consists of rolling grass-covered steppes very much like the open English downs. In summer the heat is subtropical, and vines and melons are grown extensively; autumn is the season of the great storms. The winter is cold, although milder than central and northern Russia, and the Sea of Azov and the Straits of Kerch are always frozen for several months of the year.

In 1854 the inhabitants were mainly Moslem Tartar, and had generally closer affinities and sympathies with Turkey than with Russia. In appearance they often resembled the Turks so that many British soldiers were unable to distinguish between them. Small numbers of Tartars were recruited in peacetime into the Russian Imperial service where they served as cavalry together with Cossacks, sometimes being known, somewhat grandiloquently, as the Crimean Tartar Cossack Host.

The two main ports in the Crimea were Sevastopol, the military base, and Evpatoria; both were in the west and bordered on to Kalamita Bay. Roads were hardened earth tracks which became quagmires in the rains and thaws and, as there was no railroad in Russia south of Moscow, all troops, equipment and stores had to come into the peninsula by march route.

In June and July Russian troops had withdrawn from the principalities which, by agreement with the Turks, had been garrisoned by Austrian troops as a temporary measure. Thus the *casus belli* was removed. London and Paris, however, were determined to administer to Nicholas a sharp lesson and they resolved to do this by seizing Sevastopol.

St Petersburg had some prior knowledge of the Allied intention which had been discussed quite



A contemporary Russian sketch of the great land and sea bombardment of October, 1854. The lay-out of the forces with the Russians on the left and the enemy sea and land forces on the right is crude and has no basis in fact, but merely served to emphasize the Russian victory over both land and sea forces. Note the advance of the Russian infantry columns and the death of Kornilov (bottom left), who had his legs smashed by a shell

openly in the London Press. Menshikov, the Russian commander at Sevastopol, had reported, many months before, the presence of Allied warships taking depth soundings off the coast. Menshikov predicted, quite rightly, that the enemy would first take Evpatoria and then move on Sevastopol and as he had only 25,000 men under his command, he urged that he should be reinforced. At the end of June he wrote direct to Gorchakov and so incurred Paskevich's displeasure. For Paskevich doubted that the Crimea would be attacked and stubbornly maintained that the main field campaigns would be fought in the west against Austria, which, he forecast, would enter the war against Russia as soon as it judged the situation to be favourable.

Sevastopol was in fact strongly fortified against seaward assault, but it could hardly be held against land attack since there were no defences to the east or south. Nor until Menshikov appealed to Prince Dolgoruki, the new Minister for War, and through him to the Tsar, could he prise loose the Sevastopol engineers from the centralized control of the authorities in St Petersburg. It was now August, and in the Russian capital it was assumed that the Allies would not make a landing until the spring of the following year due to the lateness of the season (the severe autumn storms made landings of troops or supplies a difficult business and the winter closed in during October).

To this extent therefore the Allied landing was unexpected. Meanwhile Menshikov had received 16 Infantry Division from the principalities. He himself had no proper staff organization, however, his only staff officer, a Colonel Wunsch, being responsible for all operational and administrative departments.

On 13 September the Allied fleet arrived off

Palace Grenadiers (Compagnie d'Orée), *c.* 1856

1 **Shtab-Ofitser of Infantry, King of Naples's Regiment, winter ceremonial parade uniform, *c.* 1849**

2 **Ryadovoi of Infantry, King of Naples's Regiment, summer parade uniform, *c.* 1849**

3 **Gornist, Grenadier Regiment, summer ceremonial uniform, *c.* 1855**

Mounted Shtab-Ofitser, Grenadier Regiment, *c.* 1855

1 and 2 Trooper and Officer, Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard, The Empress's Regiment

3 Nestroevoi of Grenadiers, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Regiment. *c.* 1855

Mounted Officer of the Emperor's Cuirassiers, full ceremonial dress, *c.* 1856

1

2

3

1 **Shtab-Ofitser of an Infantry Regiment, Independent Caucasian Corps, winter ceremonial parade dress, *c.* 1855**

2 **Ryadovoi of Infantry, Independent Caucasian Corps, winter general service uniform, *c.* 1855**

3 **Fifer, Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Regiment, summer ceremonial parade uniform, *c.* 1855**

1 Shtab-Ofitser of a Grenadier Regiment, winter general service dress, *c.* 1855

2 Ryadovoi of a Grenadier Regiment, winter field service marching order, *c.* 1854

3 Barabanshchik of an Infantry Regiment, summer parade dress, *c.* 1855

Cossacks of the Imperial Guard, Emperor's personal escort, ceremonial dress, *c.* 1856

Evpatoria, but since this lay too far north from Sevastopol, steamed southwards and disembarked the troops on the open beaches to the north of the great base. No action was taken by Menshikov to interfere with the landings, but the Cossacks were ordered to destroy all supplies and shelter which might be of use to the enemy.

To approach Sevastopol the Franco-British force would have had to march due south along the coast, crossing the fordable Alma River and the Belbek, scarcely more than a stream. The Alma had a small cliff-like south bank and was covered on the Sevastopol side by fairly steep vineyard and stonewall-covered hills. It was on these hills that Menshikov decided to give battle.

The Battle of the Alma

The Anglo-French force totalled some 60,000 men – including a Turkish contingent of about 9,000 – and 128 guns; in cavalry, however, it had only part of five British regiments, totalling in all 1,000 men. The British troops had no supply or transport organization, and only sufficient horses to move the guns, and they carried with them three days' rations and only the first reserve of ammunition. Even so Menshikov was outnumbered by nearly two to one in infantry and only in cavalry (hussars and Don Cossacks) did he have an advantage. Russian strength on the day of the battle was believed to be 33,000 infantry and 3,400 cavalry. According to British estimates, Russian artillery numbered 120 guns, although in St Petersburg it was put at half that number.

Menshikov had been taken by surprise and he intended to fight a defensive battle covering Sevastopol leaving the alternative of withdrawing open to himself. This latter option was probably fatal to success. He might have done better to have used the week of waiting to throw up earthworks and clear fields of fire, and to inspire his troops with a determination to fight to the end. Menshikov himself was confused and he issued no general intention or specific orders, keeping his



The successful Russian repulse of the French and British attack on Nos. 1, 2 (Malakhov), and 3 Bastions, the Kornilov defences, in June 1855 (from a contemporary Russian illustration)

Commissariat difficulties. The road from Balaclava to Sevastopol at Kadikoi during the wet weather

subordinates ignorant of his plans. Staff work and administration were lacking. He entrusted his right wing and centre to P. D. Gorchakov and the left to Kiryakov, but neglected to cover the extreme left flank on the steep bluffs nearest the coast. Among the Russian infantry were the Borodinsky, Kazansky, Minsky, Moskovsky, Suzdalsky, Vladimirsky, Tarutinsky, Volynsky and Uglitsky Regiments.[1]

Battle was joined on 20 September in fine weather. The British crossed the river and ascended the hill amid mounting casualties, and entered the breastworks from which they were ejected by the helmeted close columns which marched steadily forward with fixed bayonets. Once more the British infantry returned to the attack, only to fall back again in disorder when counter-attacked, since their support, the Brigade of Guards, had still not come forward. When the support arrived, the British rifle fire decided the issue and the columned Russian infantry fell in rows as it was hit. *The Times* correspondent, who was present during the battle, reported one Wilbraham of Evans's staff who, watching the measured tread of the Russian columns as they tramped away from the field of battle, commented on their steadiness.

The key to the Alma lay on the exposed Russian left flank where French troops had already gained the heights and begun to roll up the Russian defenders from west to east. By then, after only a few hours' fighting, Menshikov had lost the battle. Russian losses were said to have totalled 5,700; those of the British about 2,000; the French lists were in doubt, originally put at only 560 but later increased to 1,300. The Russians fell back on Sevastopol, according to the intelligence brought by Polish deserters, very severely shaken; they were not always in the good order admired by Wilbraham, for much of the Russian rear was in confusion and panic. Menshikov had failed not only because he was outnumbered, but through his own lack of leadership and because his infantry, the bulk of his force, was so wretchedly armed. The Russian cavalry, like the British, took no part in the battle.

A private of the 33rd Foot (Duke of Wellington's Regiment) taken prisoner by two Russian infantrymen. The story has it that he escaped by shooting his left-hand captor with his own Russian musket, clubbed the right-hand man, and then returned to the British lines carrying his Minié

As soon as Menshikov had rallied and reorganized his forces, he decided to abandon Sevastopol and move off to the north-east where his rearward communication with Russia through the Perekop Isthmus would be secure. At the same time he would be able, he thought, to attack the besieging Allied force from the outside flank. Sevastopol remained under the command of Admiral Kornilov with a few battalions of infantry and sailors and a military engineer officer of great ability and energy, a Colonel Todleben. This officer, using the labour of civilians as well as that of the military, soon began to throw up great earthworks round Sevastopol. Seven Russian men-of-war were sunk as blockships at the entrance to the harbour. Menshikov's main army quitted the naval base on 23 September, but by 1 October when Menshikov returned to the city the defences were already in existence. Reassured, Menshikov began to move a number of troops back into the base to man the defences.

On 17 October the first Allied attack was made against Sevastopol. The land assault never materialized, but the British and French fleets closed in and engaged the forts with 1,100 guns against, at the most, about 150. The coastal artillery of those days had a considerable advantage, however, for against a loss of six Russian guns and fifty casualties, the British and French killed and wounded totalled 520. No ships were lost but several were set on fire. Dundas, the naval commander, told Raglan, the British Commander-in-Chief, that the action was 'a false one which he declined to repeat'.

Balaclava

Meanwhile the Allied commanders, elderly and cautious, had given up any idea of attacking Sevastopol from the north and they had moved south, so skirting the eastward defences, to the Crimean coast where the British established a new base at Balaclava while the French opened up the port of Kamiesh. In the second week in October

The repulse by the French of Khrulev's Russian attack at Evpatoria January 1855

the Franco-British force had settled down to what was to become the siege of Sevastopol.

That autumn Menshikov was substantially reinforced by three infantry divisions, a dragoon corps and two uhlan regiments. Before the arrival of 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions, Menshikov moved Liprandi's 12 Infantry Division (made up of the Azovsky, Dneprovsky, Odessky, Ukrainsky and Uralsky Regiments), together with 2,000–3,000 cavalry consisting of hussars, uhlans and Don and Ural Cossacks, against the long and exposed British flank (and line of communication) between the base port of Balaclava and the outskirts of Sevastopol. Liprandi was supported on the right by Zhabokritsky's brigade of 16 Infantry Division (the Suzdalsky and Vladimirsky Regiments) on the southern slopes of the Fediukhin Hills, and on the left by Gribbe's Dneprovsky Regiment and cavalry.[2] Menshikov's intention appears to have been the creation of a diversion away from Sevastopol, and he intended to do this by the capture of the British base. Four redoubts equipped with British naval guns and garrisoned by Tunisians in the Turkish service were taken early on 25 October in spite of the spirited defence by the Arabs. For the Turks had been forewarned a day or so before by Tartar spies of the Russian intentions, but had been unable to persuade the British of the reliability of the intelligence.

A detachment of Russian horse then moved on towards Kadikoi, but was repulsed by a volley of musketry of the 93rd Highlanders, some rear details and Turks, and a battery of artillery. The main body of the Russian cavalry under Ryzhov wheeled to the north of the No. 4 Redoubt and, turning south, topped the causeway of the Vorontsov road to come face to face with part of Scarlett's Heavy Brigade of Cavalry. While Scarlett completed his unhurried preparation for the charge the Russian cavalry sat supine, barely 300 paces away. The British charge when it came was successful in driving the Russians from the field; the Heavy Brigade suffered only eighty casualties, the Russians about three times that number. This sharp engagement lasted barely a quarter of an hour and the Russians were saved from rout by the

French troops in the trenches in front of Sevastopol repulse a Russian sortie

inactivity of the British Light Brigade and the passivity of the British commander who was in charge at the time.

The British Army at that time had many points of similarity with the Imperial Tsarist forces. It was a long-service regular army without trained reserves. Its senior officers were very elderly and cautious, its younger officers brave and probably more daring than the Russians, although not always competent. The strength of the British Army, like the Russian, lay in the doggedness of its infantry; the infantry of both armies lacked, however, the verve and *élan*, and indeed the professionalism, of the French. Raglan, the British Commander-in-Chief, was determined not to risk losing his small but precious cavalry force. British cavalry, no less than the Russian, was over-drilled for parades, and its senior commanders were unenterprising. But, all in all, the British cavalry regiments of the day showed much greater determination and fire than their Russian counterparts.

Before midday rumour had it that Semyakin's Russian force on Canrobert Hill was about to remove the British naval guns from the captured redoubts. Raglan, who was watching the scene from the heights, then sent the impetuous Captain Nolan with a very vague note to General Lucan, in command of the Cavalry Division, 'wishing the cavalry to advance to the front and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the guns'. Lucan, who was in the hollow, could see no guns; and Nolan, unable to explain the order, apparently waved airily down the great North Valley in the direction of Liprandi's *Russian* guns. And so, to Liprandi's astonishment, the Light Brigade made its historic and costly charge over nearly two miles of open country, almost down to the Chernaya River, unsupported by guns or infantry; and when they had taken the guns they were unable to remove them. Many of the British casualties were caused by Cossacks, on the outskirts of the field, riding down the dismounted survivors. As the French General Bosquet, a spectator to the battle, said, 'C'est magnifique, mais ce n'est pas la guerre'. And the fault lay primarily with Raglan.



Prince Gorchakov's withdrawal from the fortress of Sevastopol across the bridge of boats during the night of 8 September 1855. Sevastopol on the far south bank is shown in flames and the Russian vessels on the left (east of the bridge) have been blown up at their moorings

Inkerman

On 2 November, 4 Russian Army Corps had arrived from Odessa and Menshikov resolved, under pressure from the Tsar, to attack the Allies, not in the flank, but from the front out of Sevastopol, climbing from the harbour edge to the heights occupied by the British 2 Division and the Light Division.

The plan of attack was complicated in that only two days was allowed for reconnaissance and planning for this most difficult manœuvre, a night attack over unknown ground by the astonishingly large force of forty battalions. The operational plan and the division of responsibility were unclear, and commanders and troops were insufficiently trained for this exacting operation of war. For the Russian soldier fought well when he was under the eye of his officer and could see the enemy; he was not, however, mentally equipped to deal with the unexpected.

The Russian plan relied on exact timing and a closely synchronized approach from two different directions. Soimonov's 10 Infantry Division, with twenty-nine battalions of the Butyrsky, Kolyvansky, Suzdalsky, Tomsky, Vladimirsky and Uglitsky Regiments, brigaded under Zhabokritsky and Vilboa, with accompanying six-pounder and twelve-pounder guns, was to move off south-east from the town up a ravine called the 'Kilen balka' (the Careening Ravine) to strike at the British position on the heights. Meanwhile Pavlov, commanding 11 Infantry Division with just under twenty battalions of the Borodinsky, Okhotsky, Selenginsky, Tarutinsky and Yakutsky Regiments, brigaded under Okhterlony, was to come down from the north of the harbour, cross the Chernaya by a causeway bridge thrown over the river, and, striking south-

The Battle of the Chernaya River in August 1855

wards, climb the steep hill by the Volovya balka. Pavlov would then join Soimonov on the ridge. Part of Liprandi's 12 Infantry Division, under P. D. Gorchakov, was to demonstrate towards Balaclava and to divert Bosquet's attention. Timofeev, with other detachments, was to make a strong diversionary assault on the French left and so pin down their army directly facing Sevastopol. Dannenberg, the corps commander, was to move with Pavlov, but not assume command over Pavlov and Soimonov until the forces joined up at the top of the ridge. Menshikov, who remained with the rearguard, was to be in overall command.[3]

The bold attack was badly executed. There was some disagreement or misunderstanding between Dannenberg and Soimonov so that some of the latter's actions became inexplicable. The night was dark and misty and there was great difficulty in orientation and map-reading. The bridge-building was delayed and Pavlov was late. Soimonov surprised the British, however, overran a two-gun battery and gained the ridge, from which he was driven back by musketry and bayonet attack. Supported by artillery he again took the ridge, and there waited in vain for Pavlov. Meanwhile the battle developed into a series of confused hand-to-hand engagements. By the time Pavlov arrived the British had already overcome their surprise; yet they were still in the greatest of danger even though the Russian artillery on Shell Hill was being neutralized by counter-bombardment fire.

P. D. Gorchakov, described by Todleben as incompetent, failed to hold Bosquet by diversion; and the arrival of Bosquet's reserves at Inkerman that morning finally decided the battle. The Russians fell back to Sevastopol having lost over 11,000 officers and men and six generals, one of whom was Soimonov. Allied losses were only 4,500. But the battle had left the Franco-British command in poor spirits as they could no longer see an easy victory over this obstinate foe.

A private soldier of a grenadier regiment in winter general service uniform, *c.* 1855

The Russians, however, regarded Inkerman as a near disaster. Menshikov was deeply depressed, saying that he could entertain no hope of destroying the enemy unless the winter would do it for him. His prayers were almost answered, for the great storms of 14 November destroyed Allied shipping, supplies, tents and roads. Sickness and cold did much of the rest.

The Storming of Sevastopol

The winter of 1854–5 was one of siege operations, trench warfare and mining and countermining, much sharpshooting and occasional sorties. Casualties were heavy on both sides. Nicholas continued to press Menshikov for offensive action before the spring. Menshikov's attack, carried out by Khrulev, against the Franco-Turkish garrison at Evpatoria failed, and towards the end of February Menshikov was replaced as Commander-in-Chief by Prince M. D. Gorchakov. A few days later the Tsar died. The key to the Crimea continued to be the ambiguous, indeed the ambivalent, attitude of Austria towards Russia.

Gorchakov, too, lost heart shortly after taking over his new command, blaming his predecessor's foray on Inkerman for his misfortunes. He hinted to St Petersburg that it might be necessary to evacuate the city. But during June he beat off a determined French offensive on the Malakhov and a subsidiary British attack on the adjoining No. 3 Bastion, much to the delight of the new Tsar.

In August Alexander II put such pressure on his Commander-in-Chief that he obliged him to attack the Allies along the Chernaya River where the French, Turks and Sardinians were strongly entrenched on the Fediukhin Heights. The attack was made on 16 August by Read's 3 Corps of 7 and 12 Divisions and Liprandi's 6 Corps of 6 and 17 Divisions. Three further divisions were in reserve. The attack failed after a few hours' heavy fighting and cost Gorchakov over 8,000 casualties. In the Russian view this unnecessary battle made the fall of Sevastopol certain.

Immediately afterwards the Allies renewed their



A contemporary English military map of Sevastopol

heavy attacks on Sevastopol. By 8 September the French trenches were not forty paces from the Malakhov, and in a surprise assault they took the formidable defence works in about fifteen minutes, holding it against Russian counter-attacks. The British offensive on the Great Redan across 200 yards of open ground failed miserably amid heavy casualties. A French attack on No. 5 Bastion was similarly unsuccessful. That day the Russians suffered 13,000 casualties against an Allied loss of about 10,000. With the fall of the Malakhov, Gorchakov determined to evacuate the fortress and, during the course of that night, he withdrew the whole of the garrison, except for many of his wounded, across a bridge of boats to the north side of the estuary. Much of the city was destroyed by explosion or fire, and the Allies were not aware that the enemy had gone until the next day. No attempt was made to pursue.

Finale

The war came to an end in 1856. During the whole of 1855 the Russians had a force of over 300,000 men and 100,000 animals in the Crimea, all of which had to be maintained and fed from the Ukraine and central Russia. Russian battle casualties were 104,000, but the deaths through typhus in winter and cholera in summer must have been many times this number since the official figure given for deaths was 450,000. Whereas the Franco-British force could be moved and supplied by sea, the Russians were tied to the land. Reinforcements had to be marched in from over enormous distances and were often in no condition to fight when they arrived. During the autumn and spring *rasputitsa*, the season of the breaking up of the roads

which lasted over several months of the year, movement and supply virtually stopped. The road to the south across the Ukraine became one of desolation marked by graves and dead horses. Inefficiency and corruption in the administration had become a national scandal.

When the Russians eventually came to the peace table, however, their hand had been much strengthened. Turkey and France were tired of the war. And the Russians had recently won victories in the Caucasus against Turkish troops who had been reorganized, and in some cases commanded, by British officers. Kars, after a long and bitter Turkish defence, had been taken.

There were no victories and no gains, but only losses for all the belligerents.

NOTES

1 *Russian Order of Battle at the Alma*

The right wing and centre was commanded by General of Infantry Prince Petr Dmitrievich Gorchakov (not to be confused with Prince M. D. Gorchakov) and comprised regiments of 16 Infantry Division and 1 Brigade of 14 Infantry Division. The left wing was under Lieutenant-General Kiryakov and was formed both from regiments of 17 Infantry Division and from the reserve battalions of 13 Division. The first of these officers had served in the Napoleonic Wars, the second was a holder of the George's Cross from the Polish War.

The total of the Russian troops present at the battle was forty-two infantry battalions, sixteen squadrons of cavalry, eleven *sotni* of Cossacks and ten batteries of artillery, in all 35,000 men and eighty-four guns.

The Russian deployment from left to right was as follows:

(*a*) On the extreme left from the village of Almatamak were 5 and 6 Battalions of the Brest and Belostok Regiments in company-column; behind them in the second line stood the Tarutinsky Regiment in attack-column; in reserve were the Moskovsky Regiment and 4 Light Battery of 17 Artillery Brigade. 2 Battalion of the Minsky

A Tartar messenger

Regiment was on outpost duty at the hamlet of Aklez near the sea.

(*b*) In the centre, to the left of the Evpatoria road, were 1 and 2 Light Batteries of 16 Artillery Brigade, behind which, in attack-column, was stationed the Tsarevich's Borodinsky Regiment. On the right of the Evpatoria road about 3,000 yards from the river stood 4 Battalion of the Kazansky (the Grand Duke Mikhail Nikolaevich's) Regiment in attack-column together with 1 Battery of 16 Artillery Brigade. Behind it in the second line were the Vladimirsky and the Uglitsky Regiments together with a light horse battery of Don Cossacks.

(*c*) Out in front of the first line were the skirmishers, 6 Rifle Battalion, 6 Sapper Battalion and some marines.

(*d*) The main reserve consisted of the Volynsky Regiment, three battalions of the Minsky Regiment and 5 Light Battery of 17 Artillery Brigade, with a brigade of 6 Light Cavalry Division of two regiments, the Kiev (Prince Nikolai Maksimialianovich's) and the Ingermanlandsky (Gross Herzog Sachsen-Weimar's) Hussars, and 12 Light Horse Battery.

(*e*) The open right flank was covered by Tatsyn's 57 and Popov's 60 Don Cossack Regiments.

At the Battle of the Alma twenty-four men in each battalion had rifled carbines and, in all, Menshikov's force had a total of only 2,200 rifled small-arms.

2 *Russian Order of Battle at Balaclava*

Between 1 and 21 October the Russian forces had been reinforced by the arrival of Lieutenant- General Liprandi's 12 Infantry Division with four batteries, the Butyrsky Regiment from 17 Division and one battery, six reserve battalions of the Minsky and Volynsky Regiments, 4 Rifle Battalion and 2 Second-Line Reserve Battalion of the Black Sea (Kuban) Cossacks. The cavalry reinforcements consisted of Ryzhov's Composite Brigade of 2 Hussar and 2 Uhlan March Regiments, 53 Don Cossack Regiment and a detachment of Ural Cossacks, together with Lieutenant-General Korfa's Reserve Uhlan Division which had been detached to Evpatoria. A further 25,000 men were expected to arrive with 10 and 11 Infantry Divisions of 4 Corps.

Lieutenant-General Liprandi's force moving in the centre due west from Chorgun, comprised seventeen battalions, twenty cavalry squadrons and ten Cossack *sotni*, totalling 16,000 men with forty-eight foot and sixteen horse-artillery pieces. Liprandi's deployment was as follows:

(*a*) Major-General Gribbe on the left flank with three battalions of infantry, six cavalry squadrons, one Cossack *sotnya* and ten guns, was to take Komary, due east of Balaclava.



A Russian electrically detonated mine which could be exploded by remote control at distances of up to a quarter of a mile

(*b*) The centre column under Major-General Semyakin was to advance in two echelons: the left, directly under Semyakin, of five battalions and ten guns, and the right under Major-General Levutsky of three battalions and eight guns. This centre column was to move from Chorgun to Kadikoi.

(*c*) The right column under Colonel Skyuder of four battalions, three Cossack *sotni* and eight guns was to take No. 3 Redoubt.

(*d*) Lieutenant-General Ryzhov's cavalry of fourteen squadrons and six Cossack *sotni* together with three batteries and one infantry battalion was in reserve and at Liprandi's disposal.

Major-General Zhabokritsky's force on the far northern flank consisted of seven battalions, two cavalry squadrons, two Cossack *sotni* and fourteen guns; in all 5,000 men.

3 *Russian Order of Battle at Inkerman*

Lieutenant-General Soimonov's column consisted of twenty-nine battalions, one Cossack *sotnya* and thirty-eight guns, in all 19,000 men. Lieutenant-General Pavlov's forces comprised twenty battalions and ninety-six guns, totalling 16,000 all ranks. The corps commander was General of Infantry Dannenberg, a Napoleonic Wars veteran.

P. D. Gorchakov's troops, known as the 'Chorgun Force', totalled sixteen battalions, fifty-two cavalry squadrons, ten Cossack *sotni* and eighty-eight guns, 20,000 men in all.

Lieutenant-General Moller remained in command of the Sevastopol garrison. Major-General Timofeev with 5,000 troops and twelve light guns was to make his sortie from No. 6 Bastion.

The Plates

The period of the Crimea War bridges the century between the old and the new. Much of the uniform and equipment designed in 1808 was still in use in the 1840s and 1850s and this shows the former influence of the Napoleonic French design. This was being replaced by the new-style military wear of Prussian pattern, but for a time, from 1845 onwards, both types of uniform were being worn side by side.

A The Palace Grenadiers (Compagnie d'Orée), c. *1856*

The Company of Grenadiers for duty in the Imperial palaces was founded in 1828 and continued in existence throughout the nineteenth century. Old soldiers of the guard of good conduct, particularly those who have distinguished themselves in the field, are placed in this company where they perform the guard duties in the Winter Palace in St Petersburg and in the Kremlin in Moscow. The company is under the orders of the Imperial Household and not under the War Ministry and is commanded by one of the aides-de-camp. In all it comprises twenty-four officers, 150 non-commissioned officers and men, two fifers and three drummers. Much of the uniform is common with that of the guard and the line, the musician's shoulder-pieces and the inverted gold chevron sleeves, the crossed leather shoulder-belts (but covered in gold-coloured cloth), the ammunition case and the service chevrons on the left arm.

B1 Shtab-Ofitser (Field Officer) of Infantry (The Regiment of His Majesty the King of Naples, formerly the Nevsky Marines); winter ceremonial parade uniform, c. *1849*

This uniform is worn by a colonel or lieutenant-colonel, and in this regiment has features, particularly the red trouser-stripe and gold lace facings on the collar and cuffs, which are to be

Company officers of a grenadier regiment, *c.* 1855. Left: winter general service order, right: ceremonial summer uniform with linen overalls

found in guard and sometimes grenadier regiments, but not in infantry of the line. Field officers, when on parade, wear epaulettes with tassels instead of the shoulder-strap. A *shtab-ofitser* is not, of course, a general staff officer. Generals and general staff officers wear uniforms similar in design to that shown here except that a general wears the dark green tunic, aiguillettes attached to the right shoulder, gold epaulettes and a scarlet and gold collar, red trousers with a gold stripe (full dress) or green trousers with a red stripe, and a black spiked helmet with long white horse-hair plume. A general staff officer wears a dark blue tunic and trousers, black velvet facings, scarlet piping and white buttons, silver epaulettes and aiguillettes. His helmet has a white horse-hair plume.

B2 Ryadovoi (Private Soldier) of Infantry (The Regiment of His Majesty the King of Naples), summer ceremonial parade uniform, c. *1849*

The chevrons on the left sleeve denote that the soldier has long service and may be an aspirant

for a commission, while the white background on the shoulder-strap shows that the soldier may have come from 3, 6, 9 or 12 Infantry Divisions. The titular designation (the King of Naples) was merely a courtesy exchange of titles by the crowned heads of Europe who permitted their monograms to be used on the shoulder-straps and standards. The regiments then became known as *shefskie polki*. The cartridge-case on the right breast is meant primarily for the safe carriage of musket percussion-cap igniters. The musket with fixed bayonet is held in the traditional carriage position for marching in column.

B3 Gornist (Bugler) of a Grenadier Regiment, summer ceremonial uniform, c. *1855*

Musicians usually wear the red plumed helmet, which otherwise is of similar pattern to the spiked general service shako. The gold reverse-chevron sleeve facing is common to the ceremonial dress of musicians in the Imperial Army. In field service uniform only the top shoulder-piece is worn. Grenadiers *always* wear yellow shoulder-boards, whereas the guards wear different colours according to the seniority of the division and of the regiment – red for the senior regiment of 1 Guards Division, blue for the second regiment and dark green for the third. The colour system is complicated, however, for in 3 Guards Division the first and second regiments wear yellow shoulder-boards. Infantry of the line wear the colour of the divisional shoulder-board. In hot weather white linen tunics are taken into use. Like all musicians the soldier wears on ceremonial occasions the short half-sabre as a side-arm.

C Mounted Shtab-Ofitser (Field Officer) of a Grenadier Regiment, c. *1855*

Infantry officers when mounted wear the normal-pattern overalls and not breeches or pantaloons. The field officer's (colonel of lieutenant-colonel) uniform is remarkable only in that he is wearing just below the throat the rank identity plate which was first introduced in 1808, and is now merely an ornament, together with a cockade on the right-hand side of the helmet at the chinstrap mounting. This cockade was awarded to grenadier and certain infantry regiments. The horse furniture is of standard infantry officer pattern; a single bit with a curb-piece extension (rather like a Pelham bit); a leather saddle with a single leather breastplate and a crupper, placed on a leather numnah and a decorated horse-blanket (shabrack). Behind the cantle is a valise, and the cloak or greatcoat is carried forward of the pommel, strapped in a waterproof roll. Two large leather wallets or holsters, known as *chushki* (pigs), are carried forward of each saddle-flap.

D1 and D2 Trooper and Officer of the Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard (The Empress's Regiment)

The organization of the cavalry of the guard was complex since it comprised no less than two whole cavalry divisions and was further sub-divided into the Old Guard and the New Guard. Pride of place in 1 Guards Cavalry Division went to the Regiment of the Gentlemen of the Guard, then the Regiment of Horse Guards followed by the Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard (the Emperor's). These three regiments belonged to the Old Guard. Then followed the Cuirassier Regiment of the Guard (the Empress's) of the New Guard, depicted here, the Cossack Regiment of the Guard (Old Guard), the Ataman Cossack Regiment and the Ural Cossack Squadron, both of the New Guard. 2 Guards Cavalry Division consisted of horse grenadiers, dragoons, lancers and hussars, all of the Old Guard. To complicate further the order of battle, 1 Division of the cavalry of the line comprised the overspill of other lesser guards cavalry regiments – the Moskovsky and Pskovsky Dragoon Guards, the Lancers of the Guard, the Sumsky Hussars and the Pavlograd Hussar Guards. Guard regiments were commanded by major-generals (colonels in cavalry of the line). The officer and trooper shown here are in full ceremonial dress wearing the coloured cloth cuirass for state occasions. Their regiment has two cutters and fitters and twenty tailors on its establishment.

D3 Nestroevoi (Civilian Official) of Grenadiers (His Highness the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's Regiment), c. *1855*

Civilian officials of infantry regiments are uniformed, but although they are part of a regiment they do not belong to it. So they wear their own peculiar uniform without cap badge and yet, curiously enough, wear regimental buttons and shoulder-straps. They are not normally armed, although in times of war certain of the commissariat, train, clerks and clergy carry pistols. Civilian officials with the army usually belong to one of the following categories, chaplains, intendants, doctors, veterinary surgeons, apothecaries, bandmasters, schoolmasters, paymasters, artillery and engineer technicians and clerks.

E Mounted Officer of the Emperor's Cuirassiers in full ceremonial dress, c. *1856*

In full dress the tunic is white, for undress or general service dark green. The piping and shoulder-straps for cuirassiers generally varies by colour within the division, the first two regiments wearing red, the third yellow and the fourth blue. The cuirass is normally yellow, weighing over twenty pounds. Breeches for full dress are blue with a thin single or double red stripe, but on dismounted guard duty overalls may be white; in the field they are either grey or dark green. When not on state occasions, the eagle can be removed from the helmet. In undress the flat 'muffin' cap without a peak is worn. The ornate horse-blanket cover (shabrack) is never taken into the field. The cuirassier's arms consist of pistol, a 3 ft. 8 in. straight sword weighing about four pounds, in a steel scabbard, and the nine-foot lance common to Cossacks and most cavalry, furnished with a leather sling and a foot-loop. Pennons are carried on the lances, coloured according to the identity of the regiment.



Company officer's epaulette and other rank's shoulder-board of the King of the Netherlands' Grenadier Regiment

F1 Shtab-Ofitser (Field Officer) of an Infantry Regiment of the Independent Caucasian Corps, winter ceremonial parade dress, c. *1855*

In 1834 the ten regiments of the Caucasus were reconstituted as 20 and 21 Infantry Divisions, each with two line and two light infantry regiments and a brigade of grenadiers. In 1845, 19 Infantry Division was formed and the three divisions formed the basis for the Independent Caucasian Corps. To this were added Cossacks and dragoons. Full-skirted tunics are normally worn in this corps and they have adopted the Caucasian hillman's distinctive head-dress. Otherwise, except in the pattern of some swords, there was little difference between the Caucasian Corps and divisions elsewhere.

F2 Ryadovoi (Private) of Infantry of the Independent Caucasian Corps, winter general service uniform, c. *1855*

Caucasian infantry, like the rifle battalions and the fourth regiment of the line in infantry divisions, always wore black waist- and shoulder-belts instead of the customary white. Except for the short Caucasian sword with the additional bayonet mounting on the scabbard, the soldier's arms and accoutrements are the same as for the line. Distinctive features of the uniform are: the campaign thigh boots (for ceremonial occasions green overall trousers with red piping are worn); the broad-skirted tunic and the black fur Caucasian-pattern cap. The centre and top of the head-dress presents a skull-cap appearance of dark brown material with piped braiding cross-pieces. The off-white collar and shoulder-straps indicate that the soldier is probably from the third regiment of 21 Infantry Division.



Map: The Battle of the Alma, September 1854

F3 Fifer of a Grenadier (His Imperial Highness the Grand Duke Konstantin Nikolaevich's) Regiment, summer ceremonial parade uniform, c. *1855*

This soldier belongs to the Caucasian Brigade of Grenadiers (later a division of grenadiers). As a bandsman he wears the ceremonial facings on chest, shoulders and sleeves and the short sword (*lopast*) carried by the Independent Caucasian Corps. The metal container suspended behind the sword scabbard is for the fife. The tunic is of the wide-skirted pattern common in the Caucasus together with summer light-weight linen trousers.

G1 Shtab-Ofitser (Field Officer) of a Grenadier Regiment, winter general service dress, c. *1855*

This lieutenant-colonel of a grenadier regiment belongs to the third regiment of a grenadier division (identified by the colour of the collar *paroli*) and is wearing the newer pattern of greatcoat instead of the older and shorter dark green one, which, however, continues to be worn by staff officers. Infantry officers' swords are of a common pattern with a black, white and orange sword knot, except that officers of the guards wear metal and not leather scabbards. Officer-pattern swords are also carried by sergeant-majors. Other rank swords, either the straight double-edged *tesak* or the half-sabre, are worn as decorative side-arms by all rank and file in the guards, grenadiers and sappers, and the bandsmen and non-commissioned officers of the infantry of the line (excepting the rifle companies).

G2 Ryadovoi (Private Soldier) of a Grenadier Regiment, winter field service marching order, c. *1854*

This soldier, not under arms and without the white waist-belt, carries the black calf-leather pack and the cylindrical waterproof valise. The grey long-skirted greatcoat is buttoned up, rather in the French fashion, for ease of marching. In winter



Company officer's epaulette and other rank's shoulder-board of His Majesty the King of Naples's Regiment

the greatcoat has a camel-hair *bashlik* or hood. The short sword, the *tesak*, is worn as a side-arm when muskets are not carried, hooked to the cross-belt on the soldier's right-hand side. The colour of the gorget patches on the collar, known as *paroli*, vary by regiment, the first regiment in the division being red, the second light blue, the third white and the fourth dark green. The fourth regiment wear black waist- and cross-belts instead of white. The shoulder-straps of grenadier regiments are always yellow and the yellow buttons are embossed with a flaming grenade.

G3 Barabanshchik (Drummer) of an Infantry Regiment, summer parade dress, c. *1855*

This drummer belongs to the fourth infantry regiment of 17 Infantry Division, denoted by the colour of his shoulder-boards, the numeral and the *paroli* gorget colour patches (in this case none). His long greatcoat is buttoned up underneath the skirt to give it the appearance of a frockcoat. White linen summer overall trousers are looped under the instep of the boots. Like all musicians he wears as a side-arm – either the light half-sabre or the *tesak* suspended on the broad shoulder-belt. The pattern of the drum is common to all infantry. The helmet bears the regimental cipher on the Imperial arms rather than the regimental number (in black metal for other ranks, silvered in the case of officers). Ornamental gold shoulder and sleeve chevrons are not worn with greatcoats.

H Cossacks of the Imperial Guard, Emperor's Personal Escort, in ceremonial dress, c. *1856*

This group of Cossacks dressed in their traditional uniforms are from the Terek and Kuban Cossack squadrons which formed a composite guard regiment for the Sovereign. The dress for the squadrons is uniform except that the inset crown in the head-dress and shoulder-straps are scarlet for the Kuban and light blue for the Terek. The Circassian *cherkeska* coat is dark blue, plain camel-hair in undress, with stitched-in ornamental cartridge compartments on the chest. The gold or silver-mounted dagger (*kinzhal*) and Circassian swords are carried on the waist-belt. The soldiers sometimes carry the traditional Cossack horse-tail standard and the heavy service leather whip (*nagaika*). The trumpeter wears the braided shoulder-pieces and reversed chevrons on the sleeves common to the ceremonial dress of all army musicians. The Terek Cossacks are ethnically Russian, and were originally Volga Cossacks who set up independent colonies on the banks of the Terek River near the foothills of the Caucasus, dating from about 1577, taking recruits and women from the Caucasian hillmen and nomads – Circassians, Kabardans, Chechens and Nogai. The Kuban Cossacks, ethnically Ukrainian, came to the Caucasus much later at the end of the eighteenth century by way of the Ukraine and the Black Sea; but they, too, soon acquired Caucasian dress and customs since they were, for several decades, absorbed into the Caucasian Cossack Line Host.

Men-at-Arms Series

TITLES ALREADY PUBLISHED

THE STONEWALL BRIGADE *John Selby*

THE BLACK WATCH *Charles Grant*

FRENCH FOREIGN LEGION *Martin Windrow*

FOOT GRENADIERS OF THE IMPERIAL GUARD *Charles Grant*

THE IRON BRIGADE *John Selby*

CHASSEURS OF THE GUARD *Peter Young*

WAFFEN-SS *Martin Windrow*

THE COLDSTREAM GUARDS *Charles Grant*

U.S. CAVALRY *John Selby*

THE ARAB LEGION *Peter Young*

ROYAL SCOTS GREYS *Charles Grant*

ARGYLL AND SUTHERLAND HIGHLANDERS *William McElwee*

THE CONNAUGHT RANGERS *Alan Shepperd*

30TH PUNJABIS *James Lawford*

GEORGE WASHINGTON'S ARMY *Peter Young*

THE BUFFS *Gregory Blaxland*

LUFTWAFFE AIRBORNE AND FIELD UNITS *Martin Windrow*

THE SOVIET ARMY *Albert Seaton*

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS *John Selby*

THE COSSACKS *Albert Seaton*

BLÜCHER'S ARMY *Peter Young*

ROYAL ARTILLERY *W. Y. Carman*

THE PANZER DIVISIONS *Martin Windrow*

JAPANESE ARMY OF WORLD WAR II *Philip Warner*

MONTCALM'S ARMY *Martin Windrow*

THE KING'S REGIMENT *Alan Shepperd*

THE RUSSIAN ARMY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS *Albert Seaton*

FUTURE TITLES INCLUDE

THE ENGLISH CIVIL WAR ARMIES *Peter Young*

WELLINGTON'S PENINSULAR ARMY *James Lawford*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS *Albert Seaton*

THE BLACK BRUNSWICKERS *Otto von Pivka*

THE AMERICAN PROVINCIAL CORPS 1775–1784 *Philip Katcher*

FREDERICK THE GREAT'S ARMY *Albert Seaton*

THE KING'S GERMAN LEGION *Otto von Pivka*

ARMIES OF THE AMERICAN WAR 1812–1814 *Philip Katcher*

THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMY OF THE SEVEN YEARS WAR *Albert Seaton*

WOLFE'S ARMY *Gerald Embleton*

THE ROMAN IMPERIAL ARMY *Michael Simkins*

THE GERMAN ARMY OF THE NEW EMPIRE 1870–1888 *Albert Seaton*

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL ALBERT SEATON (Retd.) is the author of many books on Russian military history; his *The Russo-German War 1941–45* is probably the only complete and authoritative account published in the free world, and has appeared in London, New York, and Frankfurt. Among his recently published works is *The Battle for Moscow*; *Stalin as Military Commander* will be published in 1973, and he is *Stalingrad.*

£1·25 net (in U.K. only)