Campaign

OSPREY
PUBLISHING

# Granicus 334 BC

## Alexander's first Persian victory

Michael Thompson • Illustrated by Richard Hook

Campaign • 182

# Granicus 334 BC

## Alexander's first Persian victory

Michael Thompson • Illustrated by Richard Hook

First published in Great Britain in 2007 by Osprey Publishing,
Midland House, West Way, Botley, Oxford OX2 9LP, United Kingdom.
443 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10016, USA
Email: info@ospreypublishing.com

A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

ISBN 978 1 84603 099 4

Page layouts by The Black Spot
Typeset in Helvetica and ITC New Baskerville
Index: Glyn Sutcliffe
Maps by The Map Studio
3d bird's-eye views by The Black Spot
Battlescene artwork by Richard Hook
Originated by PPS Grasmere Ltd, Leeds, UK
Printed and bound in China through Worldprint Ltd

07 08 09 10 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

For a catalogue of all books published by Osprey please contact:
Osprey Direct UK, PO Box 140, Wellingborough,
Northants, NN8 2FA, UK
Email: info@ospreydirect.co.uk

North America
Osprey Direct, c/o Random House Distribution Center, 400 Hahn Road,
Westminster, MD 21157
Email: info@ospreydirect.com

**www.ospreypublishing.com**



# CONTENTS

# THE GREEK AND PERSIAN EMPIRES c. 400 BC

# INTRODUCTION

## THE GRAECO-PERSIAN WARS

In 490 BC, Darius I, the Great King of Persia, launched a military expedition against Greece. Five years earlier, he had already quelled a revolt of the Ionian Greek city-states of western Anatolia (modern Turkey) and now sought revenge against those mainland Greek cities that had supported them. An invasion force was landed on the plain of Marathon roughly 20 miles north of Athens, where it was met and defeated by a combined force of Athenian and Plataean hoplites.

Undeterred by this setback, Darius' successor, Xerxes, led another, larger expedition against Greece and the Athenians in particular. Crossing the Hellespont into Europe in 480 BC, he accepted Macedon's surrender and marched south through Thessaly towards central Greece and Attica. A contingent of 300 Spartans blocking the pass at Thermopylae was eventually overcome, leaving open the road to Athens and the Peloponnese. Unable to confront the massive Persian army on land, the Athenians abandoned their city and looked to their powerful

**A relief from Persepolis showing Darius I seated, with Xerxes I standing behind him. (Werner Forman Archive/Archaeological Museum, Teheran)**

navy to face the Persians. Athens itself was duly sacked and burned but the Persian navy suffered a heavy defeat off the neighbouring island of Salamis. Xerxes himself returned to Sardis while a considerable force under Mardonius was wintered in Thessaly, in northern Greece, intending to resume the campaign the following year. Having persuaded the Spartans to confront the Persians, the Greeks engaged and defeated the Persian army at Plataea in Boeotia in 479 BC. In the same year, the Persian navy was defeated again at Mycale, ending Persian military adventures in Greece.



The rhetorician Isocrates was the most vocal proponent of Hellenic unity in order to avenge the Persian attacks on Greece at the beginning of the 5th century BC. He wrote a series of pamphlets from 380 to 346 BC urging various Greek leaders to unite Greece in an expedition against Persia.

## Classical Greece

Although the kings of Persia would not return to Greece with a military force, they constantly meddled in her internal affairs through diplomatic and other means. Financial support and the prospect of military intervention in favour of one city-state (in Greek, *polis*, pl. *poleis*) or another in the constant internecine struggles was a destabilizing factor in Greek internal relations throughout the first half of the 5th century BC. By 449 BC, however, Persia disavowed any formal ambition of conquering Greece with the so-called Peace of Callias agreed with Athens. The détente ensured the hegemony of Athens over the Delian league and her interests in the Aegean basin in return for similar respect for the Persian sphere of influence in western Asia, Palestine and Egypt.

This state of affairs continued for the next 30 years until the lure of intervention in the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and her allies and Athens and the Delian league proved too difficult for the Persians to resist. At the end of a 30-year struggle with her greatest rival, in 401 BC, Athens eventually succumbed to Sparta and sued for peace. Sparta's victory and leadership of the Greek world was not long-lived, however, as Thebes in Boeotia grew in strength and contested for hegemony while Athens herself, spared the annihilation asked for by Corinth and others at the end of the Peloponnesian War, rose again to considerable power and influence with the Second Athenian confederation. During these power struggles in Greece in the first half of the 4th century BC, Persia maintained her interest in a divided Greece by playing the city-states against each other. The allure of Persian gold often proved a temptation too great amongst the warring city-states in their struggles for hegemony.

These internal divisions did not go unnoticed by some in Greece, such as the rhetorician Isocrates, who lamented the exhausting and fruitless feuding amongst Greeks. This, he thought, could best be overcome by their uniting in a crusade of retribution against Persia for the sacrilegious crimes which were committed against Greece a century earlier. Although the theory of pan-Hellenism promulgated in the rhetorical flourishes of Isocrates did not always match the *realpolitik* of conflicts between the Greek *poleis*–as noted, Sparta, which was not alone, had accepted Persian support both during and after the Peloponnesian wars and Macedon, perhaps out of necessity, had gone over to the



This reconstruction of the head of Alexander's father, Philip II, was made on the basis of skeletal remains discovered in 1977 in the Macedonian royal tombs at Vergina. The damage to Philip's left eye occurred at the siege of Methone in 354 BC. (The University of Manchester)

Persians during the invasions of the early 5th century BC–the ideal remained a powerful intellectual construct (Austin, 204). A commitment to 'freedom' (*eleutheria*), what we might today call a right to self-determination, was deeply valued throughout Greek society, despite the apparently contradictory fact that city-states were not averse to sacrificing the freedom of fellow Greeks if it was in the interests of their own *polis.* This was particularly the case when Greek city-states on the margins of the Persian Empire, as in western Anatolia, found their independence under threat. These *poleis* occasionally found themselves sold out by fellow Greeks on the mainland in order to curry favour with the Persians, as happened with the so-called King's Peace of 386 BC when Sparta accepted Persian dominion over the cities of western Asia Minor in return for their support of Spartan hegemony in Greece. Despite this apparent inconsistency, 'liberation' of Greeks from the yoke of Persian rule was a concept and project often lauded. If not exactly wrath, Sparta did incur some shame from fellow Greeks in what could be portrayed as their treacherous dealings with the old enemy Persia.

Nevertheless, by the middle of the 4th century BC, after a half-century of internal struggles, no one city-state in Greece was in a position to undertake such leadership nor, it seems, did any have the will. A new power to the north of the heartland of Greece, however, was soon to be in such a position and under the leadership of its king, Philip II, Macedon was gradually to take up the call.

## The Rise of Macedon

The origins of the Macedonian state in antiquity are obscure, as they were to the classical Greeks who generally regarded the inhabitants as semi-barbarous and residing on the periphery of the civilized world. According to tradition, the Argead line of kings was founded in the 8th century BC but little is heard of them until Herodotus related the role of Alexander I during the Persian invasions. In that instance, the Macedonians somewhat reluctantly co-operated with the Persians but were quick to reassert their independence after the Persian withdrawal. The exact nature of formal Macedonian kingship is also unclear, but accession to the throne was often subject to internal and foreign intrigue, including assassination, with no less than 13 monarchs ruling from Alexander I to Philip II; a period of less than 100 years. By 359 BC Philip II had become king of the Macedonians and was to usher in their ascent to the world stage. A contemporary historian, Theopompus of Chios, claimed that 'Europe had never before produced such a man as Philip' (F. Jacoby, *Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker* 115 [Theopompus] Fragment 27) and his elevation of the previously derided Macedon to regional dominance was an impressive and startling achievement.

The son of Amyntas III, Philip II of Macedon had spent time in Thebes as a noble hostage before he was appointed regent in his early twenties to an infant nephew. Philip soon removed this obstacle to his kingship and assumed the crown in 359 BC. He quickly began to reorganize the Macedonian army, taking into consideration the advances in warfare developed by the Thebans. In particular, he would have noted the tactical innovations of the two great Theban military commanders, Epaminondas and Pelopidas. By lengthening the leftmost columns of the traditional hoplite (heavy infantry) battle line and co-ordinating cavalry to attack the flanks of the enemy, Epaminondas was able to lead the Boeotians to victory over Sparta and her Peloponnesian allies in decisive battles at Leuctra (371 BC) and 'second' Mantinea (362 BC), effectively ending Spartan supremacy in Greece. These innovations highlighted the changing nature of warfare in the 4th century BC. No longer would the traditional clash of heavy armed classical hoplites alone prove decisive on the battlefield. Rethinking the use and nature of heavy infantry, the place and role of light armed auxiliaries and, most importantly, the integration of cavalry into the battlefield were crucial lessons to be learned.

**The 'Lion of Chaeronea' is thought to mark the spot where the Thebans were destroyed by the Macedonian army at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC. (Jona Lendering, www.livius.org)**

### Philip in the north

Philip began his reign by consolidating the border regions to the north-west of the Macedonian homeland which, at that time, was bounded by the mountainous regions of Epirus, Illyria, and Paeonia to the west and north; the Strymon river and Thrace to the east; and the Greek state of Thessaly to the south. Historically, these upland border regions, with their tough, warlike hill tribes, had proved a source of almost constant difficulty to the Macedonian state. In fact, Philip's usurpation of the throne followed his brother, Perdiccas III's, disastrous defeat at the hands of the Illyrians in 360 BC. The historian Diodorus stated (16.2.4-5) that over 4,000 Macedonians had been killed in the battle. After a thorough reorganization and retraining of the army, it was towards this precarious area that Philip turned his attentions in the summer of 358 BC. Defeating the Illyrian king, Bardylis, with an intriguing use of outflanking cavalry, Philip proceeded to further consolidate relations on his western borders through marriage to the daughter of the king of the Molossians, the most significant of the tribes in the highlands of Epirus. With this wife, Olympias, he would father his second son, Alexander III (i.e. 'the Great') in 356 BC.

With the situation in the north and west stabilized, Philip turned east where vigilance of the formidable tribes of Thrace was always required. In addition, the wealthy Greek *poleis* in and around the Chalcidice drew his interest. Amphipolis, astride the Strymon river on the route to the Hellespont, was an Athenian colony settled in 437 BC. Moreover, its hinterland was rich in timber and bordered Mt Pangaion, a prodigious source of gold and silver. In 357 BC, Philip besieged the city, which fell within weeks, much to the consternation of the Athenians who had regarded it as their satellite. Other Greek *poleis* in the Chalcidice and around the Thermaic Gulf would fall to Philip in successive campaigns, either through intrigue or force of arms: Potidea (356 BC); Pydna (356 BC); Crenides (355 BC); Methone (354 BC); and ultimately, Olynthus (348 BC).

Up to this point Philip had contented himself with securing the Balkan frontiers and picking off those Greek *poleis* in the northern

Aegean which Athens, or any other Greek city-state of the south, was unable or unwilling to support. Although his military exploits were no doubt impressive, there does not seem to have been any explicit imperial impulse to his actions. Certainly, the Macedonian state was increasing in wealth and power, but Philip was usually satisfied to make defensive alliances with potentially quarrelsome neighbours or simply buy them off with bribes. Of course, force and the threat of force was sufficient to achieve these limited aims, but Philip, as Diodorus notes (16.95.1–4) was a very shrewd manipulator of diplomatic processes, which for the Macedonian royal line often meant political alliances through marriage. This aspect of Philip's foreign policy should not be overlooked nor should the Macedonians' acceptance of polygamy in the service of political aims. One ancient author commented that 'Philip always married a new wife with each new war he undertook' (Satyrus quoted in Athenaeus *Deipnosophists* 13.557c–e). Although that claim is exaggerated, marriage to women from Illyria, Elymiotis, Molossia, Thrace, and Pherae and Larissa in Thessaly helped Philip secure vital border regions without recourse to constant, resource-draining military adventures.

### Philip in the south

In the mid 350s BC Athens was embroiled in the 'Social War' which saw her expending energy to reassert control over rebellious allies while Philip, under the guise of supporting one side in a conflict between *poleis* on the island Euboea, seized a subtle opportunity to meddle in the affairs of southern mainland Greece. He was fully able to insinuate himself as a player in mainland Greece during the (third) 'Sacred War' of 356–346 BC. This decade-long conflict would further weaken an already war-weary Greece.

In 356 BC a dispute arose over pressure the Phocians were exerting on the sacred priestesses at Delphi. Fearing that the more powerful Thebes would remove their influence at Delphi, the Phocians seized the sanctuary and extorted money from the Delphians to raise a large mercenary army. Later they were to plunder the sacred treasuries and melt down bronze and iron from the temple statues to support their war



**The eastern façade of the Parthenon on the Acropolis of Athens. Alexander dedicated 300 captured panoplies to Athena after his victory at the Granicus. Some of the armour may have been placed on the architrave above the columns. (Jona Lendering, www.livius.org)**

effort. Enraged at this sacrilege, Thebes enlisted their Boeotian allies, the Locrians, and the Thessalians amongst others, against Phocis who in turn garnered the support of Athens, Sparta and some of Sparta's Peloponnesian allies. While some desultory and indecisive engagements occurred between the two sides over the next three years, Philip completed his stranglehold on the cities of the Thermaic Gulf by sacking Methone and capturing Pagasae.

However, Philip was able to exert a more pointed influence in these southern affairs when he was invited by the Thessalian League to bring the rebellious city of Pherae back into the fold. After an initial success against the Phocians who had come to support Pherae, Philip was seriously defeated in two battles by the full Phocian army led by Onomarchus. Undeterred by these setbacks, Philip rallied the Macedonian army and, with the support of the Thessalian cavalry, crushed the Phocian and allied army at the battle of Crocus Field in 352 BC, massacring the 'temple-robbers' and crucifying their leader Onomarchus. Buoyed by this success, Philip probed farther south into central Greece. Beginning to realize the danger, Athens blocked the pass at Thermopylae, whereupon Philip retired.

Nevertheless, Philip had achieved a number of goals. His service to Thessaly saw him appointed *tagus*, or leader, of the League, which was renowned for its rich horse-rearing plains and concomitant expert cavalry. Furthermore, when Phocis ultimately surrendered in 346 BC, their two votes on the Amphictionic Council, which administered the sacred site of Delphi, were given to Philip who championed himself as protector of the sanctuary and avenger of the impious who had defiled it. On the other hand, southern Greece, riven by this indecisive and costly warfare was further weakened.



**The Athenian orator Demosthenes was a vociferous opponent of Philip II. In a series of speeches known as the *Philippics* he attempted to rouse Athenian opposition to Philip.**

### The battle of Chaeronea

Following his gains in the south at the end of the Sacred War, Philip decided not to exacerbate the hostility emanating from an agitated Athens, where the orator Demosthenes fulminated against the Macedonian king in a series of speeches known as the *Philippics*. In 346 BC an uneasy peace was made with Athens, and Philip returned once again to affairs in the north where he overcame Thracian opposition and extended his power to the Hellespont and the Propontis (Sea of Marmara). By this time it was becoming increasingly evident to the *poleis* and states of Greece that the most dangerous and volatile threat to their independence was from Macedon. In 348 BC the prosperous city of Olynthus pleaded for Athenian help when besieged by Philip. Only a pittance was forthcoming, and when the city duly fell a wrathful Philip razed it to the ground and sold off the population as slaves. Perinthus and Byzantium were besieged in 341 BC and when Philip seized Athenian grain ships in the Hellespont alarm bells were sounded in Athens. Grain shipments from the Black Sea were the life-blood of Athenian sustenance and these incursions could not be tolerated. Thebes, marginalized from their fellow Boeotians by the machinations of Philip, also realized the potential dangers of a Macedon perched on their very doorstep. They received overtures from the Persian Empire, which, wary of Philip's meddling near north-west Anatolia, reverted to its previous diplomatic strategy in Greece and sought to aid other Greeks against the latest emerging power.



**This image of the ancient historian Plutarch comes from a 1559 French translation of his works. Plutarch's *Life of Alexander* is one of the main sources of information on the battle of the Granicus along with Diodorus Siculus and Arrian, two other ancient historians.**

By 338 BC events had come to a head. Although Philip had often tried to placate Athenian and Greek unease over his activities, it was apparent that the time for a confrontation with Thebes and Athens could no longer be avoided. Philip, now accompanied by his 18-year-old son, Alexander, led his army south into Phocis and seized the city of Elateia on the Boeotian border which bypassed the strategic pass at Thermopylae. The route to Thebes and Athens now lay open. A frantic Athenian embassy led by Demosthenes was sent to their old enemy, Thebes, seeking an alliance against Macedon. An alliance having been agreed, the full Athenian army joined the Thebans and loyal Boeotian allies at the town of Chaeronea. In early August, Philip at the head of the full Macedonian army of 30,000 infantry and roughly 2,000 cavalry met them on the valley plain outside the little town.

Philip took command of the Macedonian right wing while Alexander was positioned on the left with the other Macedonian generals. It may have been the case that Alexander commanded the cavalry which had been lined up against the Theban Sacred Band on the Greek far right, but cavalry are not explicitly mentioned in the sources (Rahe (1981), Gaebel, 155–7). The Sacred Band, an elite infantry unit of 150 paired lovers, was hitherto the most effective fighting force in the Greek world and occupied the traditional prestige position on the right of the battle line. An ancient military writer remarks that Philip withdrew his phalanx on the left in order to lure the Athenians opposite him into a rash charge (Polyaenus *Stratagems of War* 4.2.2). In this way he hoped to open a gap in the Greek line which Alexander could exploit with his cavalry. As the Macedonian line advanced obliquely, pivoting on a point near Philip which also allowed his feigned retreat, the Athenians moved forwards stretching the centre in their effort to maintain the integrity of the Greek

GREECE AND WESTERN ANATOLIA *c.* 350 BC

front. A gap was opened into which Alexander attacked, isolating the Sacred Band which he wheeled upon and completely destroyed. Philip in turn attacked, eventually killing more than 1,000 Athenians and capturing a further 2,000. For an Athenian contingent of, perhaps, 6,000 hoplites the losses were clearly high. The Thebans and their allies also suffered heavy losses and, in fact, the Sacred Band was never re-formed. It was in every sense a decisive Macedonian victory.

With Greece defenceless against the might of the Macedonian army, a meeting was called at Corinth where Philip sought to establish his leadership over Greece and unite the whole of Greece with Macedonia against the Persian Empire in retribution for the Persian invasions of the early 5th century BC. Although Sparta in her characteristic stubbornness refused to join, Macedonian hegemony over Greece following the battle of Chaeronea was now moot. Philip could turn to other conquests.

**The Temple of Apollo at Corinth. In the summer of 337 BC, Philip II summoned the Greek leaders to Corinth in order to form a 'league', united, under his leadership, to bring retribution against Persia.**

### The assassination of Philip II

The security which Philip had brought to the Macedonian state, and which the crown prince, Alexander, was due to inherit, was to be disrupted by internal dynastic events. In 337 BC Philip took another wife, a Macedonian named Cleopatra. This raised the possibility of a fully Macedonian heir, a fact which her uncle, the powerful noble Attalus, was swift to note at the wedding party in the presence of both Philip and Alexander. Attalus had gravely insulted Alexander and, after the violent altercation which inevitably ensued, Alexander (as well as his mother, Olympias) went into exile. The marriage was certainly perceived as a direct threat to Alexander and further courtly intrigues likely added to a sense of increasing isolation for the young prince.

In 336 BC Philip had decided to marry one of his daughters to Olympias' brother, Alexander, king of Epirus, and it was at this wedding that Philip was assassinated by a disgruntled bodyguard, Pausanias. The 'official' explanation of the murder was that Pausanias, furious that Philip had refused to redress a serious and personal grievance that Pausanias had earlier had with Attalus, decided to kill the king. The details of this sordid event are impossible to unravel and conspiracy theories, ancient and modern, abound. Whether Alexander and Olympias (or others) were involved and what their motives might have been cannot be known. What is certain is that Alexander quickly seized the throne, eliminating potential rivals under various pretences and garnering the support, or at least co-operation, of other powerful figures, such as the generals Antipater and Parmenion.

By 335 BC, Alexander was firmly ensconced as the king of Macedon. He had received the acclamation of the army and had eliminated any rivals. Campaigning in Illyria, he finally subjugated the hill tribes there and, when Thebes revolted in early spring of that year, he savagely razed the city to the ground and enslaved the population. For the Greeks, the new king had set a clear and unequivocal example of the costs of rebellion. Following these campaigns, Alexander set out with the army for the invasion of Persia.

# CHRONOLOGY

*All dates BC*

| | |
|---|---|
| **490** | 1st Persian invasion of Greece. Persian defeat at Marathon. |
| **480** | 2nd Persian invasion of Greece. Spartan '300' defeated at Thermopylae. Athens sacked and burned. Greek naval victory off Salamis. |
| **479** | Persian army defeated at Plataea and navy defeated off Mycale. |
| **449** | Peace of Callias. Persia disavows future military intervention in mainland Greece. |
| **431-401** | Peloponnesian War. Athens defeated by Sparta and her empire dismantled. |
| **401** | The 'Ten Thousand' in Persia. The Greek mercenaries in support of the Persian usurper Cyrus operate in Asia Minor. |
| **386** | King's Peace. Spartan hegemony in Greece. Greek *poleis* of western Anatolia under Persian dominion. |
| **362** | Battle of 2nd Mantinea. Thebes and allies under Epiminondas defeat Sparta and allies, leading to Theban hegemony in Greece. |
| **359** | Accession of Philip II to the Macedonian throne. |
| **356** | Birth of Alexander III (the 'Great'). |
| **346** | Isocrates produces his oration *Philippus.* |
| **2 August 338** | Battle of Chaeronea. Thebans and Athenians defeated by Philip and Alexander. |
| **Summer 337** | League of Corinth established. Macedonian hegemony recognized. |
| **Summer 336** | Accession of Darius III to the Persian throne. |
| **Summer 336** | Expedition force under Parmenion sent to Asia Minor. |
| **October 336** | Assassination of Philip II. Alexander accedes to the throne of Macedon. |
| **October 336** | Accession of Alexander III (the 'Great') to the Macedonian throne. |
| **336/5** | Illyrian campaign. Defeat of the Balkan hill tribes by Alexander. |
| **335** | Revolt of Thebes. The city is razed to the ground and the population enslaved by Alexander. |
| **Spring 334** | Alexander sets out from Aegae in Macedon with the invasion force. |
| **Summer 334** | Alexander visits Troy while Parmenion and the army cross the Hellespont. |
| **May 334** | Battle of the Granicus river (1st set battle against Persia). |
| **Autumn 334** | Siege of Halicarnassus. |
| **Spring 333** | Alexander cuts the Gordion Knot. |
| **November 333** | Battle of Issus (2nd set battle against Persia). |
| **1 October 331** | Battle of Gaugamela (3rd and final set battle against Persia). |
| **Spring 330** | Persepolis burned. |
| **July 330** | Death of Darius III. |
| **May 326** | Battle of Hydaspes river (modern Jhelum) against Porus. |
| **10 June 323** | Death of Alexander in Babylon. |

# OPPOSING COMMANDERS

## MACEDONIAN

The career of Alexander the Great's father, Philip II, has been outlined in the introduction and his importance in the creation of the state and army of Macedonia which Alexander was to lead into Asia should not be underestimated. Alexander, of course, acceded to the kingship of Macedon with the acquiescence (or occasional removal) of the nobles and the acclamation of the army but those institutions inherited by Alexander which were so central to the military organization of the expedition into Asia, particularly the Companion Cavalry and Foot (i.e. infantry) Companions, had been restructured or created by Philip II. Furthermore, the consolidation of the Macedonian state in security and administrative matters, the increase in state revenues and economic development as well as the creation of the powerful army were all achievements of Philip II. As one scholar has succinctly summarized the relationship: 'No Philip, no Alexander' (Errington, 99).



**This detail from the Alexander Sarcophagus discovered in Sidon (Lebanon) in 1887 shows Alexander in action against Persia. (akg-images/Erich Lessing)**

This detail from a line drawing of the 'Alexander Mosaic' from the House of the Faun in Pompeii depicts Alexander at the battle of the Issus. The mosaic dates to the second half of the 2nd century BC but is believed to be a copy of a painting completed *c.* 330–310 BC.

### Alexander III ('the Great')

In many respects, Alexander the Great is the subject of this book so only a cursory description of his career will be given here. He was born in 356 BC to Philip and his Molossian wife, Olympias. As a young man, one of his teachers was the eminent philosopher Aristotle. Alexander was regent of Macedon in Philip's absence during the campaign against Thrace and delivered the decisive blow in the battle of Chaeronea in 338 BC when he annihilated the Theban Sacred Band. Until Philip's marriage to the Macedonian Cleopatra and the possibility of a 'fully' Macedonian prince, Alexander was the recognised heir to the crown (his half-brother, Philip Arrhidaeus, was in some way mentally deficient).

Alexander swiftly assumed the kingship upon Philip's assassination, removing those potentially dangerous to him, such as Attalus, and securing the loyalty of those who supported him, such as Parmenion. Having consolidated his rule over Macedon he subdued the rebellious hill tribes of Illyria and crushed the revolt of Thebes which he razed to the ground as an example to the Greek *poleis.* He received his father's position as *hegemon* (leader) of the League of Corinth which had been established in 337 BC and began preparations in late 335 BC for the invasion of Persia.

In 334 BC this army crossed the Hellespont and met a local Persian army at the Granicus river. Alexander defeated this force and continued down the Aegean coast of western Asia Minor, occupying (or 'liberating') the Greek *poleis,* formerly under Persian rule. By reducing these coastal cities he hoped to remove possible landing points for the powerful Persian navy, a strategy which was not fully realized until the capture of Egypt in 332 BC. At the battle of Issus in 333 BC he defeated the Persian army, this time under the personal leadership of Darius III. Alexander's ultimate triumph over Darius came at the battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC and by 330 BC the destruction of the Persian Empire was complete.

Further years of difficult campaigning through the eastern satrapies (provinces) of the Persian Empire followed and Alexander's eastern progress was eventually exhausted in the Punjab after his victory at the battle of the Hydaspes against a local Indian rajah, Porus, in 326 BC. He was unable to cajole his troops to campaign farther east and turned back to Babylon in 325 BC. Leading them down the Indus to the Indian Ocean and through the hostile terrain of the Gedrosian desert on the northern coast of the Persian Gulf, Alexander reached Babylon in 323 BC where he died of illness at 33 years of age.

### Parmenion

Parmenion served as Alexander's second-in-command at the Granicus, commanding the left wing of the army as he would later do at the battle of Issus (333 BC) and Gaugamela (331 BC). This command was not new to Parmenion as he had served under Philip II in the same capacity, where he was so highly regarded it was said Philip remarked that 'in many years he himself had found only one general, Parmenion'. (Plutarch *Moralia* 177c).

**This detail from the Alexander Sarcophagus shows a Companion cavalryman, perhaps an officer, in action against Persian infantry. Although of Philip's generation, the general Parmenion was a virtual second-in-command to Alexander. (akg-images/ Erich Lessing)**

Parmenion's early origins and service are obscure but he was probably already in his 40s when he defeated the Illyrians in 356 BC (Plut. *Alex.* 3.8) and in 346 BC Parmenion was sent on the embassy to Athens which led to the Peace of Philocrates. In 336 BC he was sent with Attalus and Amnytas to lead the force of 10,000 which was to secure the bridgehead in Asia Minor ahead of the main invasion force. There he was only partially successful in his encounters against the Greek mercenary, Memnon of Rhodes, and the local Persian forces, suffering a defeat at Magnesia on the Meander, but he managed to establish a toehold in Asia Minor before his recall to Macedonia in the winter of 335 BC after the death of Philip.

Parmenion quickly associated himself with Alexander and acquiesced in the murder of the latter's potential rival Attalus, thereby helping Alexander to secure the throne. For this service he and his family were apparently well rewarded. In particular, his sons, Philotas and Nicanor, obtained major commands and fought at the Granicus: Philotas leading the Companion cavalry and Nicanor the infantry regiment known as the *hypaspists.*

At the Granicus, the historian Arrian (1.13.3–5) records that Parmenion advised Alexander to pitch camp and fight the next morning, a counsel which Alexander rejected in favour of immediate attack. In the battle, Parmenion held his usual role, commanding the Thessalian cavalry on the left wing where, according to Diodorus (17.19.6), they fought 'eagerly'. Parmenion continued his role as active 'second-in-command' until 330 BC when Alexander charged him with securing the captured treasure of Persia by moving it to Ecbatana.

Perhaps this was a reasonable posting for the aged veteran who was probably now in his 60s. Sadly, before the end of the year, he was killed by fellow Macedonians. Implicated in the alleged plot of his son, Philotas, against the king himself, Parmenion, in addition to his son, was sentenced to death. The details of this squalid affair are difficult to untangle but it is harsh to suggest that this capable, loyal and long-serving officer deserved such an ignominious end.

### 'Black' Cleitus

Cleitus, known in the ancient sources as 'Black' Cleitus, to distinguish him from a lesser Cleitus of the later Alexander campaigns, was born of Macedonian nobility (his sister, Lanice, had served as Alexander's wet-nurse) and he served in the Companion Cavalry under Philip and Alexander. At the decisive battle of Gaugamela in 331 BC, Cleitus commanded the *ile basilike* ('Royal squadron'), also known as the *agema,* the king's personal mounted bodyguard of Companions, and it is likely that he held this command at the battle of the Granicus River. Moreover, despite discrepancies in details, the ancient historians agree that he saved Alexander's life at the Granicus when he severed the arm of a Persian satrap who was poised to give Alexander the fatal *coup-de-grace.*

In 330 BC when the cavalry was re-formed into two *hipparchies,* Cleitus held joint command with Alexander's closest companion, Hephaestion (Heckel, 35–6). In the course of the next two years, Cleitus performed valuable service during the tough guerrilla warfare in Persia's north-eastern provinces. None the less, in one of the most dramatic events in the whole of the Alexander story, Cleitus was murdered by a frenzied

Alexander at a drinking party in the autumn of 328 BC. The excessive flattery offered to Alexander by obsequious courtiers and the implicit and explicit denigration of Philip and Philip's commanders at the banquet offended Cleitus who in turn praised Philip and his generation's accomplishments. Perceiving this as an insult in the extreme, the incensed and drunken Alexander promptly ran him through with a lance. The king's later remorse hardly expiates what was one of his blackest moments.

## PERSIAN

In the 4th century BC, the Persian Empire, the rulers of which were called by the Greeks the *megas basileus*, or Great King, was the largest ever seen in the ancient Near East. Under the capable leadership of the Achaemenid dynasty founded by Cyrus II in 559 BC, who unified Media and Persia, Persian holdings, by the time of Alexander's invasion, extended from the shores of western Anatolia to the Indus Valley in the east and from Bactria (modern Afghanistan) in the north to the southern cataracts of the River Nile in Egypt. From the reign of Darius I (521–485 BC) the Empire was ruled from the capital Persepolis through a structure of administrative units known as *satrapies* (provinces).

The *satraps* (governors) who administered these districts were principally responsible for yearly tribute remitted to the central government and, with the help of a military overseer, raising forces for the army. However, they were granted a great degree of autonomy in return for protecting the kingdom. Despite, or perhaps because of this autonomy, the satraps at times proved themselves somewhat less than loyal to the Great King. Rebellions occurred, particularly in the 360s BC in Asia Minor when a number of now virtually hereditary satraps attempted to carve out essentially independent kingdoms. In addition, rivals and usurpers to the throne also emerged from satrapal ranks, as in the case of Cyrus the Younger who in 401 BC, leading an army with the '10,000' Greek mercenaries immortalized in Xenophon's *Anabasis*, failed in his attempt to seize the Persian throne of Artaxerxes after perishing in the battle of Cunaxa.

### The Persian satraps and other commanders

Darius III, who himself had only gained the throne of Persia in 336 BC, relied on the satraps and nobles of Asia Minor to meet the Macedonian incursion. They were better placed for the initial engagement and he did not personally lead the army until the battles of Issus (333 BC) and Gaugamela (331 BC) when Alexander had penetrated much deeper into the Persian heartland.

The Persian commanders met for a war council at Zeleia roughly 20 miles east of the river Granicus. The ancient historians provide names for 14 of the commanders. Of these, five were satraps of provinces in Asia Minor: Arsames of Cilicia, Arsites of Hellespontine Phrygia, Atizyes of Greater Phrygia, Mithrobuzanes of Cappadocia, and Spithridates of Lydia and Ionia. Little is known of these men personally, but Diodorus (17.19.4) records that they led various regional cavalry units at the battle. Mithrobuzanes and Spithridates were killed in the battle, the latter at the

### The Persian Commanders at Granicus

| Name | Command |
|---|---|
| Arbupales (son of Darius, son of Artaxerxes II) | |
| Arsames | Cilicia (satrap) |
| Arsites | Hellespontine Phrygia (*hyparch* and satrap) |
| Atizyes | Greater Phrygia (satrap) |
| Memnon (Greek mercenary) | Held estates in the Troad |
| Mithridates (son-in-law of Darius) | |
| Mithrobuzanes | Southern Cappadocia (*hyparch* and satrap) |
| Niphates | A landowner in Asia Minor |
| Omares (commander of the mercenaries) | |
| Petenes | A landowner in Asia Minor |
| Pharances (brother of Darius' wife) | |
| Rheomithres | |
| Rhoesaces (brother of Spithridates) | |
| Spithridates (brother of Rhoesaces) | Lydia and Ionia (satrap) |

hand of Alexander. Atizyes fled and was killed at the battle of Issus, while no mention is made of the fate of Arsames. Intriguingly, Arrian (1.16.3) says that Arsites committed suicide after fleeing the battlefield because the Persians blamed him for the defeat, perhaps because he opposed Memnon's counsel not to face Alexander immediately.

Eight other Persians and Memnon, the Rhodian mercenary commander, are also named as present at the battle. Three relations of Darius fought and died in the battle: Arbupales, Mithridates, and Pharnaces, while the brother of Spithridates, Rhoesaces, was at least severely wounded. Of the remainder, Niphates, Petenes and Omares (perhaps a Persian who commanded the Greek mercenary infantry) perished in the battle, while no mention is made of the fate of Rheomithres. Memnon, who held estates in the Troad, also escaped.

Thus, of the 14 named commanders, eight are noted as having died in battle with at least one severely wounded, a rather high casualty rate for the Persian nobility who can by no means be considered cowardly.

### Memnon of Rhodes

Memnon, and his brother Mentor, had served the Persians as mercenary commanders in the Troad from at least the 350s BC. Connections between the Rhodian brothers and the local satrap were evidently very close. Mentor had married Barsine, the sister of Aratabazus, the satrap of Lower (or Hellespontine) Phrygia (north-western Anatolia), who in turn had married one of the Rhodians' sisters. When Artabazus failed in his rebellion against Artaxerxes III ('Ochus') in 353 or 352 BC they were forced into exile at Pella in Macedonia.

Their capabilities as military commanders were still, however, highly valued and Mentor was pardoned by the Great King in 343 BC, whereupon he subjugated the province of Egypt which had freed itself from Persian control 60 years earlier. In return for this service, Memnon and Artabazus were also allowed to return. Upon Mentor's death in 340 BC, Memnon was granted his lands and military authority, and even married his brother's widow, Barsine.

Memnon was tasked with countering Parmenion's advance force, which had been sent to the coast of Asia Minor in 336 BC, and he was largely successful in forcing the Macedonian incursion back to the Troad and Hellespont region. However, in 335 BC he was unable to completely eject the advance force from Asia, which was soon to be joined by the main army under Alexander.

When the satraps gathered at Zeleia to formulate their strategy to combat Alexander, Memnon counselled a delaying 'scorched earth' policy to exhaust the resources available to the Macedonian army. Perhaps out of an innate distrust of the Greek, the satraps rejected this advice and met Alexander at the Granicus River. Memnon was active in the battle but, unlike the Greek mercenaries and many Persian satraps, he fled the field and escaped.

Despite the defeat at the Granicus, Memnon was put in charge of the defence of western Asia Minor and organised the tenacious defence of Halicarnassus which was besieged at a cost by Alexander in 333 BC. After control of the western Anatolian seaboard fell to Alexander, Memnon collected a large fleet and operated in the Aegean, seizing islands and cities and threatening Alexander's rear. The potential for disrupting Alexander's progress east created by these operations was significant, and they even drew interest from Greek *poleis* such as Sparta who foresaw a chance to join forces and throw off the Macedonian yoke. At the siege of Mytilene in 333 BC, however, Memnon fell ill and died. With the threat of this capable commander removed, Alexander was able to continue his campaign with his supply lines and Greek 'allies' safe and intact.

# OPPOSING ARMIES

## MACEDONIA AND HER ALLIES

In 326 BC Alexander's eastward march was brought to a halt by the 'mutiny' of his troops at the River Hyphasis (the modern Beas in eastern Pakistan). Alexander addressed the army and, in recalling how his father, Philip, had changed Macedon said:

> *he made you a match in battle for the barbarians on your borders, so that you no longer trusted for your safety to the strength of your positions so much as to your natural courage… It was due to him that you became masters and not slaves and subjects of those very barbarians who used previously to plunder your possessions and carry off your persons (Arr. 7.9.2).*

Philip had done this by reorganizing, equipping and training an army that the Greeks previously had looked upon as little more than a rabble. At the end of his life, Philip had 'left armies so numerous and powerful that his son Alexander had no need to apply for allies in his attempt to overthrow the Persian supremacy.' (Diod. 16.1.5)

### Macedonian infantry

A significant part of the reorganization was the creation of a formidable infantry phalanx (Diod. 16.3.2). From 10,000 infantry in 359 BC the infantry had grown to at least 24,000 by 334 BC and they had the technical advantage of being equipped with a long pike (*sarissa*), roughly 5–6m (*c.* 15–18 feet) in length. Made of cornel wood and tipped with an iron spear tip at front and iron butt at rear, the *sarissa* was roughly twice the length of the traditional thrusting spear of the Greek hoplite. Although the length of *sarissa* required the use of both hands, and thus necessitated the lightening of a defensive shield to one resting on the shoulder held by a sling over the neck and a forearm strap on the shield, its extended length was advantageous in keeping opposing infantry at bay. In a phalanx the spear tips of the levelled *sarissae* of the first three to four ranks would project beyond the front rank while the remaining ranks would hold their *sarissae* upright or inclined to the front to protect against missile attack. This bristling front of spear points prevented opposing infantry from making initial contact with the Macedonians, an enormous advantage in this type of hand-to-hand combat. As well as the small shield, defensive armour also included a helmet, a linen cuirass, and greaves.

For a unit of men to manipulate the *sarissa* effectively, a high degree of training was necessary to maintain cohesion. Philip initiated constant and rigorous manoeuvres and drills (Diod. 16.3.1) which honed his infantry to a degree of professionalism rarely matched in Greece. Moreover, much



**Sculptural relief of a 'yuana' from Persepolis. The Persians called the Greeks 'yuana' because their contact was chiefly with the 'Ionian' Greeks who settled had the western coast of Asia Minor. (Jona Lendering, www.livius.org)**

campaigning. However, in one of the most fortuitous events of Alexander's career, this potentially serious menace was removed when Memnon died of an illness during the siege of Mytilene. Furthermore, it appears that Darius then had a change of heart about carrying on operations behind Alexander's march and ordered his fleet, and the mercenaries operating with them, to return east with the intention of joining the army he was already collecting from all areas of the empire.

Alexander now marched his army south through Ancyra towards the Cilician Gates which passed through the Taurus mountain range and into the fertile Aleian plain at the north-west corner of the Mediterranean. Forcing the Cilician Gates with relative ease, he raced to the city of Tarsus in one day, capturing the city before it could be burned. While Alexander was taken ill after swimming in the freezing waters of the River Cydnus near Tarsus, Darius led his vast native army, swelled by 30,000 Greek mercenaries, from Babylon to Sochi near the Amanus range east of the River Issus. After recovering from his illness, Alexander set out to find Darius and, after much searching and complicated manoeuvrings, the two armies finally met on the plain through which the river emptied into the Gulf of Issus. At last Alexander was to face the Great King directly on the field of battle.

# THE BATTLEFIELD TODAY

As it did in antiquity, the ancient Granicus (the modern Biga Çay) flows from the mountains of north-western Anatolia and empties into the Sea of Marmara. To access the site a car is required which may be hired in Istanbul. At least two days are required as the drive from Istanbul to the site will take from seven to eight hours. It is recommended that the traveller stay the night in Çanakkale and perhaps allow an extra day or two to take in the archaeological site of ancient Troy and the First World War Gallipoli battlefields, both of which are near Çanakkale.

From Istanbul follow the D100 motorway west through Silvri to the D110 through the city of Tekirdag to Kesan where you should take the D550 south down to the Gallipoli peninsula. The quickest route would be to cross at Gelibolu, approximately five hours' drive from Istanbul, where there are ferries to Lapeski (ancient Lampsacus). From Lapeski follow the D200 motorway along the Marmara coast to the town of Biga from where the battlefield lies slightly north of the town.

**The Turkish authorities have placed this road sign to indicate the way to the 'Granicus Battlefield'. However, the battle occurred some two miles south, further upstream the river.**

**The confluence of the the Biga Çay and the Koca Çay which formed the extreme right extent of the battlefield as viewed from the western (Macedonian) bank.**

Alternatively, you can follow the D550 farther south to Eceabat where the ferries run frequently across the Dardanelles to the lovely town of Çanakkale. Here pleasant accommodation and waterside restaurants may be found. From Çanakkale follow the E-90 road north through Lapeski along the D200 motorway to Biga. Roughly five miles before the town of Biga there is a sign-posted turn-off to the little town of Karabiga, the ancient settlement of Priapus, on the coast of Marmara. The drive from Çanakkale to the Granicus takes less than two hours and largely follows the route Alexander would have taken via Percote and Lampsacus (Lapeski), although he may have travelled inland in the vicinity of the town of Balikiçeºme, via the ancient but yet unidentified towns of Colonae and Hermotus, approaching the river Granicus in the low valley formed by the Kocabaº Çay.

The rather straight road to Karabiga passes through the heavily cultivated land of the 'Granicus' plain and roughly two miles before the town of Karabiga the authorities have placed a brown sign at a right turning which reads 'Granikos: Savaº Alani' ('Granicus Battlefield'). The dirt track indicated by the sign crosses a wide modern irrigation canal and roughly one mile later terminates at a rough stone ford not suitable for normal cars. This is the River Granicus which even in May/June is, at this point, wide (*c.* 50 feet) and free-flowing, if somewhat shallow. The mouth of the river can be seen under half a mile away to the north where the Sea of Marmara opens out. Although this is the ancient Granicus, the actual site of the battle did not occur here but rather farther upstream roughly two miles south of the location indicated by the road sign. Nevertheless, at this point, the relatively low and treeless banks give a good indication of how the actual battlefield may have appeared in antiquity, particularly with regard to Parmenion's position on the left of the Macedonian line.

To reach the actual battlefield it is necessary to return to the main road (the track along the west bank of the river is unsuitable for normal cars after two miles) to the village of Çinarköprü five miles south. The tiny village of Çinarköprü is a short distance off the main road and leads to a bridge which crosses the Granicus just south of the confluence of



**This is quite possibly the first photograph taken of the river Granicus. Taken *c.*1900 by a German army officer Oberleutenant W. von Marées. It clearly indicates that, unlike today, the banks were much lower and the vegetation sparser. The two horses in the river indicate how shallow it is in summer.**

the Biga Çay and the Koca Çay which formed the extreme right extent of the battlefield as viewed from the western (Macedonian) bank. As argued in this book, the battle lines stretched from a point north of the confluence of the Biga Çay and the Koca Çay to roughly two-and-a-half miles northwards downstream. To a great extent, this corresponds to the tree-lined banks which, at ground level, indicate the existence of the river in the otherwise flat and featureless plain surrounding it. In fact, the tree line of the Granicus becomes very distinct when viewed from nearby high ground. Just over half a mile due east of the leftmost extent of the battlefield lies the village of Çesmealti at the base of the small hills which run south towards Biga. From here, or from the tiny hamlet of Adiye on the slight hills immediately south-west of the river, the tree line of the river clearly stands out immediately east of the stand of plane trees from which the village of Çinarköprü receives its name, i.e. 'Plane tree bridge'.

Although the banks of the river are now high, steep and rather heavily wooded it is possible to access the bed of the river from paths near the Çinarköprü Bridge. In May/June the river does not occupy the full width of the bed but meanders as a small stream with occasional rivulets cutting through the exposed sand and gravel riverbed upon which sporadically grows small scrub and vegetation. With the exception of steep and narrow paths which lead to the diesel pumps and hoses through which the farmers draw water for their fields out of the river, it is not possible to descend or ascend the banks along the course of the battlefield. At points the main stream appears quite deep and swift flowing, although in summer it is mainly shallow and slow moving.

What immediately strikes the modern viewer (and the author bases this account on a field walk of the site in late May 2006) is that the description of the cavalry battle in and about the river as described in the ancient sources is difficult to square with the present topographical reality. Moreover, and perhaps more worryingly, is that the present topography little resembles the accounts of visitors of 30 years ago who describe the river as mostly easily fordable and the banks accessible to cavalry at virtually all points of the battlefield (Foss, Hammond [1980],

**This photo taken *c.* 1910 by Walter Leaf for his work, *Troy: A Study in Homeric Geography*, shows the plain of Adresteia looking south. The Granicus River runs in a channel just behind the two camels in the middle distance.**

Nikolitsis). Photographs taken 30 years ago do resemble the somewhat indistinct photographs taken by the German army officer Oberleutenant W. von Marées who explored the area at the turn of the 20th century AD with his colleague Oberst A. Janke. In modern times they were first to have walked the battlefield and identified the river as the ancient Granicus. In his 1904 work, *Auf Alexanders des Grossen Pfaden: Eine Reise durch Kleinasian*, Janke provided a photo by von Marées (this is the earliest photo of the River 'Granicus' that the author is aware of) which indicates topography similar to that photographed by Nikolitsis (plates 2-8) and described by Foss (500–2, figs. 3–9) and Hammond (1980), (77-80). Allowing for a considerable increase in vegetation on the river banks since antiquity, it was still possible to reconstruct, given the physical topography as it was 30 years ago, a massed cavalry action in the river and along its banks. Unfortunately, this is not readily possible today.

There may be two explanations for this. It appears that the river is being partially dredged to increase its flow in summertime *and* that the banks have been gradually increased or, at least, the lower 'gaps' which breached banks of any considerable height and allowed easy access to the riverbed have been filled in with modern earthworks. A crane was seen dredging the river bed and drawing up gravel on the lower courses of the river where the banks are much lower than those at the battlefield. In addition, numerous lorries were seen on the track of the eastern bank along the river where the banks appear to be in the process of being further embanked to support the farmed fields there.

It is perhaps not surprising that the river has been altered in this way. The area surrounding the Biga Çay is very heavily cultivated and the plain itself provides some of largest and most arable tracks of farmland on the north-western coast of the Anatolian peninsula. The river, from which is drawn so much of the water used to irrigate these fields, is now, apparently, being managed to ensure a suitable supply of water for irrigation in summer. Conversely, the increased embankments protect the fields from winter floods when, as can seen from the width of the riverbed and rubbish strewn high in the trees and vegetation on the banks, the river must become quite swollen and swift.

**The monumental 'Gate of all Nations' at the Persian royal palace in Persepolis. The gate was finished by Xerxes in the second phase of building at the site (*c.* 460 BC). This view from the south-west shows two colossal 'bull-men' standing at the rear doorway. (Jona Lendering, www.livius.org)**

It may even be the case that the embanking and subsequent levelling of the plain has erased the small slight rise of three metres which Janke noted (Hammond, 80 note 20) at the turn of the 20th century and which may have even been a more prominent rise before the intervening years of ploughing removed any trace of the 'hill' (*lophos*) upon which Plutarch says the shocked Greek mercenaries witnessed the cavalry battle and unsuccessfully sought surrender terms.

None the less, as seen at present, the Biga Çay is still the ancient Granicus, despite a minority view that the river has since changed course. (See Hammond [1980], 77 and Devine [1988], 4) and it is still not too difficult to image the battle while viewing the river northwards from the bridge at Çinarköprü.

## Troy

The hill of Hisarlik, ancient Troy, inscribed as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in 1998, is roughly 19 miles south of Çanakkale on well signposted roads. The scene of Homer's epic poem the *Illiad*, excavations were begun in 1871 by a founder of modern archaeology, Heinrich Schliemann, and have continued intermittently to the present. The mound comprises no less than ten distinct levels built upon from the early 3rd millennium BC to the Byzantine bishopric of 1000 AD. However, the allure of Troy is the sixth level dated to the late Bronze Age and associated with the events and heroes related in the *Iliad*. An excavated stretch of wall with tower foundations from 'Troy VI' is one of the highlights of any visit to Troy. The complex site is well laid out and an excellent guidebook (revised in 2005) by the current director of excavations, Manfred Korfmann, is available at shops just outside the entrance to the site. For those interested in the ancient world, Troy should be added to the itinerary of any trip to the Granicus.

## Gallipoli

The Gallipoli peninsula also contains sites for those interested in more modern military conflicts. The battlefields and cemeteries of the ill-fated

Gallipoli campaign of the First World War may be found there. In 1915, the Allied attempt to force the Dardanelles, capture Istanbul, and knock the Ottoman Turks out of the war foundered on the southern tip of the peninsula at great loss to Commonwealth and Turkish forces alike. The battlefield and cemeteries are located at two places. The first lies on the southern tip of the peninsula at Hellas Point where the mainly British landings were made. The stark obelisk of Hellas Point lists the British and Commonwealth forces who fell there, and is mirrored by the impressive Turkish Çanakkale Martyrs Memorial to the east. Roughly ten miles north of the tip of the Gallipoli peninsula lies ANZAC Cove where Australian and New Zealand forces were landed to open another front. Little headway was made in the steep and difficult terrain, as the numerous little cemeteries indicate. High on the ridges overlooking the island of Imbros lays Çonkbayiri Hill where the Turkish dead are remembered in another impressive monument. The sense of loss, conciliated by a mutual respect testified on both sides through these monuments, is a moving experience.

# BIBLIOGRAPHY

## Primary sources

Inexpensive editions of English translations of Arrian and Plutarch are published by Penguin books under the following titles:

Arrian, *The Campaigns of Alexander.* Trans Aubrey De Sâelincourt with a preface by J.R. Hamilton (1971)

Plutarch, *The Age of Alexander: Nine Greek lives*. Trans Ian Scott-Kilvert (1973)

Editions of Arrian, Plutarch and Diodorus in English translation with facing Greek text are available in the Loeb Classical Library series. Translations in this book are largely taken (although occasionally adapted) from these volumes and are cited in the text as follows:

Arr. = Arrian (1976 v.1, 1983 v.2). *History of Alexander and Indica*. 2 vols. Trans P.A. Brunt, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass; Heinemann, London.

Diod. = Diodorus (1952 v.7, 1963 v. 8). *Library of History*, Vol. 7 trans by C. Sherman and vol. 8 trans by C. Bradford Welles, W. Heinemann, London; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

Plut. *Alex*. = Plutarch (1919). 'Life of Alexander' in *Plutarch's Lives*. Vol. 7. Trans by B. Perrin, Heinemann, London; Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.

A new translation of the ancient historian, Justin's, account of Alexander's campaigns is Justin, M.J.. *Epitome of the Philippic history of Pompeius Trogus: books 11-12, Alexander the Great*. Trans. by J. Yardley and W. Heckel, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1997)

## Secondary literature

There are a great number of earlier scholarly accounts of the battle of the Granicus, mainly written by German scholars, which cover virtually all possible reconstructions of the battle. These are very usefully summarized by Nikolitsis (11–12) and analysed by Badian (1977). In addition, general histories of ancient Greece and Alexander the Great usually contain reconstructions of the battle, e.g. Peter Green's (1991), 489–512, heavily revised view of the battle. Only those works which are directly cited in the text are listed here. The standard account of Alexander's career is now Bosworth (1993).

Anson, E., 'The Persian Fleet in 334' – *Classical Philology* 84 (1), pp. 44–49 (1989)

Austin, M. M., 'Alexander and the Macedonian invasion of Asia: Aspects of the historiography of war and empire in antiquity', *War and Society in the Greek World*, Rich, J. and Shipley, G., Routledge, London and New York, pp.197–223 (1993)

Badian, E., 'The Battle of the Granicus: A New Look' in *Ancient Macedonia* Thessaloniki, Institute for Balkan Studies, 2, pp.271–93 (1977)

Badian, E., 'Darius III', *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 100, pp.241–67 (2000)

Bosworth, A.B. *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1980)

Bosworth, A.B., *Conquest and Empire: the Reign of Alexander the Great*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1993)

Briant, P., *From Cyrus to Alexander: a history of the Persian Empire*, Eisenbraun, Winona Lake IN (2002)

Brunt, P. A., 'Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry', *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 83, pp. 27–46 (1963)

Davis, E.W., 'The Persian Battle Plan at the Granicus', in *The James Sprunt Studies in History and Political Science*, Chapel Hill, NC. 46, pp.34–44 (1964)

Devine, A.M., 'Demythologizing the Battle of the Granicus', *Phoenix - the Journal of the Classical Association of Canada* 40 (3), pp.265–78 (1986)

Devine, A.M., 'A Pawn-Sacrifice at the Battle of the Granicus, the Origins of a Favorite Strategem of Alexander-the-Great', in *Ancient World* 18 (1–2), pp.3–20 (1988)

Engels, D.W., *Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army*, University of California Press, Berkeley, London (1978)

Errington, R.M., *A History of Macedonia*, Berkeley and Los Angeles (1990)

Foss, C., 'The Battle of the Granicus: A New Look', in *Ancient Macedonia*, 2, pp.495–502, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki (1977)

Gaebel, R.E., *Cavalry Operations in the Ancient Greek World*, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman (2002)

Garvin, E.E., Darius III and Homeland Defense, *Crossroads of history: the Age of Alexander*, W. Heckel and L. A. Tritle, Regina Books, Claremont, Calif., pp.87–111 (2003) Berkel

Green, P., *Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 B.C.: a historical biography.*, University of California Press, Berkley; Oxford (1991)

Hamilton, J.R., *Plutarch: Alexander a commentary*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (1969)

Hammond, N.G. L., 'The Battle of the Granicus River', in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 100, pp.73–88 (1980)

Hammond, N.G.L., 'Casualties and Reinforcements of Citizen Soldiers in Greece and Macedonia', in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 109, pp.56–68 (1989)

Harl, K., Alexander's Cavalry Battle at the Granicus, in *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War and History in Honor of Donald Kagan*, Hamilton, C.D. and Krentz, P., Regina Books, Claremont, Calif., pp.303–26 (1997)

Heckel, W., *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire.*, Routledge, London (1992)

Heckel, W. and R Jones, *Macedonian Warrior: Alexander's elite infantryman*, Osprey, Oxford (2006)

Kent, R.G., *Old Persian: grammar, texts, lexicon*, American Oriental Society, New Haven, Conn. (1953)

Lane Fox, R., *Alexander the Great.*, Allen Lane, London (1973)

Manti, P.A., 'The Cavalry Sarissa', in *Ancient World* 8, pp.73–80 (1983)

Markle, M.M., III. 'The Macedonian Sarissa, Spear, and Related Armor', in *American Journal of Archaeology* 81 (3), pp.323–39 (1977)

Markle, M.M., 'Use of the Sarissa by Philip and Alexander of Macedon', in *American Journal of Archaeology* 82 (4), pp.483–97 (1978)

McCoy, W.J.. 'Memnon of Rhodes at the Granicus', *American Journal of Philology* 110 (3), pp.413–33 (1989)

Milns, R. D., 'Alexander's Macedonian Cavalry and Diodorus 17.17.4', in *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 86, pp.167–68 (1966)

Nikolitsis, N.T.. *The Battle of the Granicus*, , Svenska Institutet i Athen, Stockholm and Lund (1974)
Rahe, P.A., 'The Military Situation in Western Asia on the Eve of Cunaxa', in *American Journal of Philology* 101, pp.79–98 (1980)
Rahe, P.A.. 'The Annihilation of the Sacred Band at Chaeronea', in *American Journal of Archaeology* 85, pp.84–87 (1981)
Ruzicka, S., 'A Note on Philip's Persian War', in *American Journal of Ancient History* 10, pp.84–91 (1985)
Sekunda, N., *The Persian army, 560–330 BC*, Osprey, Oxford (1992)

### Other resources

For those interested in the battle of the Granicus and Alexander the Great outside of printed media there are numerous resources available on the internet. These can be accessed via a search engine and simple word search. However, as is always true of any internet search, the quality and accuracy of the sites is highly variable. In this case, critical judgement is especially required.

Two feature-length movies have been produced about the life of Alexander. *Alexander the Great* (1956) starring Sir Richard Burton does portray the battle of the Granicus, including the incident where Alexander's life is saved by 'Black' Cleitus. The indifferently received *Alexander* (2004) by Oliver Stone only mentions the battle, which is not depicted, although somewhat strangely the event where Cleitus dramatically saves Alexander's life at the Granicus is conflated into the battle of Gaugamela. Unfortunately, the excellent television programme by Michael Wood, *In the Footsteps of Alexander the Great* (BBC 2005) does not cover the Granicus but is a first-rate survey of Alexander's life.

# INDEX

Figures in **bold** refer to illustrations.

# Related Titles

| ISBN | SERIES | No. | TITLE |
|---|---|---|---|
| 978 1 85532 110 6 | Campaign | 7 | Alexander 334–323 BC |
| 978 1 85532 470 1 | Campaign | 36 | Cannae 216 BC |
| 978 1 84176 147 3 | Campaign | 84 | Adrianople AD 378 |
| 978 1 84176 000 1 | Campaign | 108 | Marathon 490 BC |
| 978 1 84603 002 4 | Campaign | 174 | Pharsalus 48 BC |
| 978 1 84176 473 3 | Essential Histories | 26 | The Wars of Alexander the Great 336–323 BC |
| 978 1 84176 357 6 | Essential Histories | 27 | The Peloponnesian War 431–404 BC |
| 978 1 84176 358 3 | Essential Histories | 36 | The Greek and Persian Wars 499–386 BC |
| 978 1 85532 867 9 | Warrior | 27 | Greek Hoplite 480–323 BC |
| 978 1 84176 950 9 | Warrior | 103 | Macedonian Warrior: Alexander's elite infantryman |
| 978 1 84176 770 3 | Elite | 121 | Ancient Siege Warfare: Persians, Greeks, Carthaginians and Romans 546–146 BC |
| 978 1 84176 782 6 | Elite | 126 | Siege Warfare in the Roman World 146 BC–AD 378 |
| 978 1 84176 605 8 | New Vanguard | 78 | Greek and Roman Siege Machinery 399 BC–AD 363 |
| 978 1 84176 634 8 | New Vanguard | 89 | Greek and Roman Artillery 399 BC–AD 363 |
| 978 0 85045 539 7 | Men-at-Arms | 148 | The Army of Alexander the Great |

**To order any of these titles, or for more information on Osprey Publishing, contact:**
Osprey Direct (North America) *Toll free:* 1-866-620-6941 *Fax:* 1-800-659-2436 *E-mail:* info@ospreydirect.com
Osprey Direct (UK) *Tel:* +44 (0)1933 303820 *Fax:* +44 (0)1933 443849 *E-mail:* info@ospreydirect.co.uk
**www.ospreypublishing.com**

Accounts of history's greatest conflicts, detailing the command strategies, tactics and battle experiences of the opposing forces throughout the crucial stages of each campaign

# Granicus 334 BC

## Alexander's first Persian victory

Granicus River was Alexander's first great victory over the Persians, where he demonstrated the heroic style of active and decisive leadership that was the hallmark of his career. In the initial engagement, Alexander's 5,000 cavalry, supported by archers and javelin men, routed a force of 20,000 Persian cavalry. This convincing victory was the springboard for the subjugation of the coastal cities, the neutralization of the Persian navy and ultimately the conquest of the Persian Empire. Exploring the courageous leadership of one of the world's most inspirational yet ruthless leaders, this book provides a detailed analysis of the battle.

Full colour battlescenes



3-dimensional 'bird's-eye view' maps

Illustrations



Maps

US $18.95 / $26.95 CAN

ISBN 978-1-84603-099-4

OSPREY
PUBLISHING

www.ospreypublishing.com